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share a common boundary, such as rivers and their deltas or estuaries. However, the systematic
collection and analysis of data on the extent and distribution of localized pollutants has oruy
recently gotten under way. Because inventories are limited to point-source pollutant loads, the
results so far are not useful for assessing the extent and distribution of pollutants generated by
some of the most significant non-point source activities in the region, including agriculture,
forestr, and coastal development projects. In the absence of systematically collected data on
non-point pollutant loads for most of the WCR countries and territories, a more complete picture
of an individual state or subregion's relative contribution and exposure to LBMP must be
inerred from other indicators. We examine a combination of indicators to help assess the
inclination and abilty of states to undertke independent or joint action to control LBMP
problems.
We analyze several issues and arguments that often are assumed to be relevant to the
Caribbean and therefore have been used as a basis for pursuing a regionwide approach to LBMP
control in the WCR. These issues and arguments include: common-pool pollution effects; scale
economies; common pollution problems; and the need for uniform standards (water quality or
pollution control standards). Each of these issues must be evaluated carefully with respect to the
wide variety of environmental, political, and economic characteristics found in the WCR states.
We believe that all of these issues are indeed relevant and valid at some scale in the Caribbean.
However, the extent to which they are applicable regionwide is not at all clear.
We believe that strong arguments can be made in favor of a regional protocol containing
intitutional arrangements that help to resolve pollution problems at the domestic and subregional
levels, especially transboundary pollution between adjacent or neighboring states. This kind of
an effort can build upon existing bilateral arrangements, if deemed successful, such as those
between Venezuela and Trinidad & Tobago, Mexico and Belize, or the United States and
Mexico. We advocate an approach that start out at a small scale so that valuable, and
potentially tranferable, experience can be gained at little risk of larger program ineffectiveness.
If scientific research demonstrates the need to internlize pollutant effects that are more
widespread, then larger subregions might be delineated, building upon the experience gained at
the bilateral leveL. The best approach appears to be an incremental one, building upon
successful arrangements among those states that have appropriate incentives for solving real
transboundar pollution problems.
We also address the arguent for an LBMP protocol in the WCR tht gives priority to
resolving localized but widely occurring pollution problems-an approach that is clearly more
compatible with the environmental realities of the region. We are concerned that the logic of
concluding an international protocol to address primarily domestic problems depends upon
certin unproven assumptions about clearinghouse efficiencies and other scale economies, and
about the likelihood that an international program wil be more effective than effort by
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individual states in attracting funding and other forms of assistace from multilateral and
bilateral donor agencies. We believe that these assumptions are valid to a point that stops short
of justifying a uniform, regionwide approach to LBMP problems and solutions. We recommend
that a protocol focusing on common, nontransboundary LBMP explicitly recognie that some
common LBMP problems in the WCR are more common than others, by carefully delineating
subregional groupings and approaches on the basis of shared marine environmental problems.
We furter recommend that in such a case the "umbrella" function of a regional protocol should
concentrate on the need to ensure uniform access to all clearinghouse products and on the
resolution of issues concernng the internal allocation of financial and techncal assistace to
individual states and subregions.
We explore thee avenues to identifying promising opportnities for mutually beneficial
collaborations, or "gain from trade," in pollution control. First, economic commonalities
thoughout the region are identified, with the states grouped and ranked according to their level
of participation in relevant economic sectors. This information is useful in identifying states
engaged in a particular polluting activity on a relatively small scale, who could benefit from
pollution control approaches and technologies that have already been adopted by another state
engaged in the same activity at a much larger scale. At the same time, states operating in the
same industries at roughly the same scale of activity may encounter the same LBMP problems
and thus might well be interested in cooperating on the development of common solutions. Also
considered are the states' existing relations as trade parters, which could serve as an additional
basis or support for collaborations and exchanges in LBMP control.
Second, we consider the relative identities of WCR states as polluters and pollutees
withn geographic subregional groupings, according to an approach developed by Broadus et al.
(1993). Specifically, relevant population and economic data are used to estimate the extent to
which each state is a source of LBMP; the extent to which it has a stae in controlling the
problem; and its relative economic capacity to undertke corrective action. This analysis yields
several ilustrative examples of key match-ups among source, staeholder, and faciltator states
with and across subregions, in which faciltator states (typically importnt trading parers or
aid providers) inuence source states to control their LBMP emissions for the benefit of key
staeholder states. Although this anlysis is distinctly geared toward intances of tranboundary
pollution, we believe that it wil be useful even if the negotiating parties concentrte their effort
on collective responses to common, nontransboundary problems. In either case, an
understading of each state's relative stading with respect to source, stae, and capacity should
enhance the abilty of negotiating parties to identify those specific collaborations and exchanges
that are most likely to be successfully implemented.
Thid, we develop a qualitative rating system that takes into account not only the siz but
also the direction of a state's economic incentive with respect to controlling LBMP, and not only
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its economic capacity but also its institutional capacity to underte corrective action. Like the
economic groupings, this approach compares all the WCR states within a single, regionwide
context. This rating system helps to predict which states are the most likely to engage in
sustained and successful action to control LBMP, and, for the other states, the general types of
assistance or special inducements that each is most likely to require in order to participate
successfully.
The Cartagena Convention establishes a broad goal with respect to the control of LBMP
in the Convention area. As currently articulated, this goal is subject to variable interpretations.
In order to improve the potential for protocol effectiveness, this goal must be clarified, its terms
should be made more explicit, and objectives should be specified to enable states, collectively
or independently, to reach this goal. In particular, the term appropriate measures, found in the
Convention's mandate that its Contracting Parties "shall take all appropriate measures to prevent,
reduce, or control" LBMP, should be defined explicitly.
One important role for the prospective protocol wil be the clarification of rights to a
clean marine environment. Broad language iI the Cartagena Convention, the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), and principles of customary international law
lend support to the notion tht states affected by pollution originating in another jurisdiction have
the right to a clean environment. The emerging "polluter pays" principle is consonant with these
sources of law, but appears to apply primarily at the subnational leveL. However, these sources
of law are not unambiguous with respect to the assignment of rights. We develop a stylized
model to demonstrate the importnce of clearly defined rights and to help elucidate the potential
for benefits from agreements, or "gains from trade," in pollution control (Appendix C).
Gains from trade can be facilitated with mechanisms for transfer payments. These
mechanisms exist already and have been employed to assist in the resolution of Caribbean LBMP
problems to a limited extent. The United States, some European states, Sweden, Canada, and
Venezuela already provide foreign aid of various types to many states in the region. These
tranfer payments can be "tied" specifically to pollution control arrangements in the context of
the subregional or bilateral agreements that we have suggested. It is not necessary that transfers
be financial; transfers can involve scientific or technological research, expertise, or equipment,
or other goods and services.
Another importnt role for the protocol is the reduction of transactions costs among states
involved in pollution control negotiations. Transactions costs can involve costs of information
disparities and uncertinty, negotiation, and enforcement. The protocol can also serve the
traditional roles of providing a forum to help focus pollution-related scientific research and
monitoring and to identify an array of feasible pollution control instruments that might be
employed by states in pollution control at the domestic and subregional levels.
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At this juncture, it is not yet possible to evaluate the effectiveness of a protocol on LBMP
control for the Caribbean. We can, however, say something about the general features and
elements that might be incorporated into a protocol to improve its potential for effectiveness.
Notably, the WCR resembles the Mediterranean as a regional sea, suggesting that many lessons,
on what to adopt as well as what to avoid, can be drawn from the Mediterranean experience.
Experience with the control of LBMP in other regional seas can provide useful lessons as well,
particularly in the areas of program finncing, political commitment, statements of goals, targets
and deadlines, and compliance.
-Vll-
-Vll-
Contents
List of Tables .............................................. Xl
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xu
1. Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
A. Background: Land-Based Marine Pollution and the Wider Caribbean Region . . 1
B. Purpose of the Study ....................................3
C. Study Approach and Organization of the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
ll. Natural Systems, Pollution, and the Interdependency of WCR States . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
A. Regional Geography and Freshwater Input . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
B. Ocean Circulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
C. Weather and Atmospheric Circulation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
D. Spatial Scales of Pollution in the Wider Caribbean Region . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
E. Subregional Scales of Pollution and the CEPPOL Pollutant Load Inventories 20
F. Summary .......................................... 29
III. Commonly Advanced Arguments for Collective Action in the WCR . . . . . . . . . . . 30
A. The Importnce of Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
B. Pollution Costs and Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
C. Common-Pool Effects .................................. 31
D. Common Environmental Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '_' . . . . . . 34
E. Scale Economies and Clearinghouse Efficiencies .................. 37
F. Uniform Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
G. Summary .......................................... 47
IV. Economic and Institutional Characteristics of the WCR ........ . . . . . . . . . . 49
A. Regional Diversity .................................... 49
B. The WCR States and the Cartgena Convention. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
C. Overview of Demographic and Economic Indicators .... . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
D. Comparative Overview of the CEPPOL-Designated Subregions ......... 56
1. Economically heterogeneous subregions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2. Economically homogeneous suubregions ..................... 60
3. Marie pollution and resource degradation problems with
and across subergions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4. Extra-regional trade as a unifying force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
E. Legal and Regulatory Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
F. Measures of Environmental Infastrctue ...................... 73
G. Scientific Capabilties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
H. The Role of NGOs in the WCR ............................ 77
1. Other Regional Organations .............................. 78
J. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . 82
-lX-
Contents (contd.)
V. Analysis of the Incentives and Prospects for Collective Action .............. 84
A. Analytic Approaches ................................... 84
B. Economic Commonalities ................................ 84
C. Sources and Stakes .................................... 92
D. An Alternative Assessment of Capacities and Incentives to Control LBMP . 102
E. Concluding Remarks .................................. 109
VI. Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
A. Regional Background Characteristics ........................ 112
1 . Delineation of Subregions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 112
2. Coherence Among Member States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 115
3. High-Level Political Commitment and Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . .. 117
4. Knowledge of Baseline Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 118
B. Elements of Effective Program Design ....................... 119
1. Clear Goals and Objectives .......................... 119
2. Obligation to Adopt Measures: Targets and Deadlines ......... 120
3. Efficiently Designed Program Measures .................. 121
4. Compliance Mechanisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 122
5. Mechanisms for Trade .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 123
6. Adequate Financing Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 124
7. Effective Decisionmaking Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 125
8. Adaptability Over Time ..................... ~.' . . . .. 126
C. Dynamic Measures of Effectiveness .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 127
1. Level of Compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
2. Achievement of the Program Goal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., 128
3. Increased Domestic Abatement Effort ................... 129
D. Summary ......................................... 130
Appendices
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
Data Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 1
Estimation of Drainage Basin and Coastal Populations . . . . . . . . . . .. 147
Opportnities for Gain from Trade: A Stylized Model . . . . . . . . . .. 155
Consultant Report: E. H. Gladfelter and J. C. Ogden. The status of
relevant scientifc capabilties and knowledge of land-based marinepollution problems in the Caribbean. (unattched)
Consultant Report: L. A. Kimball. Land-based sources marine
pollution: institutions and exchanges. (unattched)
Consultant Report. E. F. Mandell. Land-based sources of marine
pollution, legal instruments, and institutional capabilties in the
Spanish-speaking countries of the Wider Caribbean Region. (unattched)
References ............................................... 166
-x-
List of Tables
1 Lessons Learned from a Comparative Assessment of LBMP in the Baltic,
North Sea, and Mediterranean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
2 Principal Rivers Draining Into the Wider Caribbean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3 CEPPOL Results: Waste Loads from Domestic Sources in the
Wider Caribbean Region by Subregion (t/y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
4 CEPPOL Results: Waste Loads from Industrial Sources in the
Wider Caribbean Region by Subregion (t/y) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5 Regional Enviromnental Programs & Projects in the Caribbean . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6 Pollution Control Instrments: A Qualitative Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
7 Distributional Implications of Instrument Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
8 Political Units in the Wider Caribbean Region ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
9 Participation in Law of the Sea, London Dumping, and Cartgena Conventions . . 52
10 Major Net Importers and Net Exporters of Fish and Fish Products in the WCR . . 55
11 Observed Resource and Pollution Problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
12 Authority for Enviromnental Policy and Enforcement in the WCR States . . . . . . 71
13 Measures of Enviromnental Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
14 Regional Enviromnental Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
15 Leading Oil and Natural Gas Producers, Oil Refiners, and Producers of
Industrial Chemicals ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
16 Leading Agricultural, Sugarcane, and Banana Producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
17 Coastal Development and Leading Fish Producers and Tourist Destinations .... 89
18 Debt Service Ratios and Leading Recipients of Foreign Aid . . . . . . ... . . . . . . 90
19 Major Export and Primary Importing States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
20 Opportnities for Exchange and Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
21 Sources, Stakes, and Capacities within Subregions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
22 Key States and Trading Relationships in the Wider Caribbean Region . . . . . .. 101
23 Qualitative Ratings of Capacity and Incentive to Undertke LBMP Control. . .. 103
24 Overall Prospect of Sustained and Effective Action to Control LBMP . . . . . .. 107
25 Checklist: Factors for Regional Program Success ................... 113
26 Commonality of Specific LBMP Problems as Basis for Subregional Groupings . 116
A.l Economic and Population Data for WCR States .................... 132
A.2 Lad Areas, Coastlines, and EEZs ............................ 133
A.3 Selected Indicators of Land-Based Marine Pollution Inputs. . . . . . . . . . . . .. 134
A.4 Selected Fisheries Data, 1990 ............................... 136
A.5 Selected Economic Data on Countries and Territories of the WCR,
Grouped by CEPPOL-Designated Subregions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 137
A.6 Scientific Associations and Member Institutions in the WCR ............ 143
A.7 Participation in Global and Regional Organiztions .................. 144
B.l Estimated Drainage Basin and Coastal Populations of the WCR States . . . . . .. 150
-X1-
I.,.:.'.
I,
l:
List of Figures
I~
-.
1 Actual and Hypothetical Maritime Jurisdictions in the
Wider Caribbean Region .................................... 2
2 Surface Currents of the Wider Caribbean Region (March) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3 Surface Currents of the Wider Caribbean Region (June) ................ 14
4 Surface Currents of the Wider Caribbean Region (September) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5 Surface Currents of the Wider Caribbean Region (December) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6 CEPPOL-Designated Subregions .............................. 21
7 Relative Contributions of Combined Pollutats from
Domestic and Industrial Sources by Five WCR Subregions .............. 26
8 Relative Contributions of Individual Pollutants from
Domestic and Industrial Sources by Five WCR Subregions .............. 27
9 Relative Contributions of Pollutats from Combined Domestic and Industrial
Point Sources by 25 WCR States, Grouped by CEPPOL-Designated Subregions . 28
10 Relationship Between Pollution Emissions and Damages ................ 40
11 Regional Diversity as Measured by GDP Per Capita .................. 51
12 WCR Fish Exports and Per Capita Fish Consumption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
13 Major Regional Areas, Actions, and Actors in Environmental Management
and Sustainable Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
14 CEP Contributions (Deficits), 1981-92 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
15 Comparison of Sources, Stakes, and Capacities withn CEP Subregions. . . . . . . 96
16 Relative Capacities and Incentives to Control LBMP Throughout the WCR ... 105
B.l Drainage Area of the Wider Caribbean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . '_' . . . .. 149
C.L A Model of Transboundary Pollution Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ". . . . .. 158
-xii -
i. Introduction
A. Background: Land-Based Marine Pollution and the Wider Caribbean Re~ion
Lad-based marine pollution (LBMP) is the world's most serious marine pollution
problem, estimated by the United Nations Joint Group of Expert on the Scientific Aspects of
Marine Pollution (GESAMP) to contribute more than 75 percent of the pollutants enterig the
sea (GESAMP 1990). Negotiations are under way to develop a regional protocol for action to
control LBMP in the Wider Caribbean Region (WCR), which is derined by the 1983 Convention
for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region,
or Cartgena Convention, to include the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean Sea proper, and those
part of the western Atlantic within 200 nautical miles of the Bahamas and Florida, down to the
nortern border of Brazil.
A map of the Wider Caribbean Region is found in Figure 1, which also depicts the actual
(heavy lines) and hypothetical (th lines) maritime boundaries of the WCR states. i Except for
two "doughnut holes" in the Gulf of Mexico, there are no high seas in the region. Several
importt international boundaries have been agreed upon, but the majority are stil undecided.
In Section V, we employ ths base map as an heuristic tool for displaying certin information
about the characteristics of the states of the region.
The Caribbean basin is home to a large and diverse marine ecosystem, including roughly
14 percent of the world's coral reefs; the barrier reef system off Belize is the world's second
largest, measuring approximately 220 kI in length. Throughout the region, the reefs receive
protection from extensive and productive sea grass beds, which also provide grazing for sea
turtles, manatees, fish, and invertebrates. Also characteristic of the region are coastal
mangroves that support a grazing food chain and provide nursery grounds for fish and shellfish,
while trapping sediments and exporting nutrients (Elder and Pernett 1991).
The diversity of the region includes not only its natural marine systems but also a
tremendously broad range of cultures, languages, political systems, and economies. For
example, the WCR is home to the world's largest and most diverse economy (the United States);
to countries tht are among the world's smallest (St. Kitt & Nevis, Grenada, St. Vincent & the
Grenadines) and poorest (Haiti, Guyana, Nicaragua); and to one of the world's few remaing
i We have adated and updated this map from Fenwick (1992). Hypothetica boundares are those identified
by the U.S. Deparent of State in its World Data Ban 2. In most caes, the hypothetica boundares are
approximate equidistat boundares, and they do not reflect any accptance by the U.S. governent. Some claims
may be based upon unilateral assertions; these claims may be subject to change by national legislation or decree or
though international boundar negotiations. Boundares as represented are approximations for general reference
only.
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communist states (Cuba).
Despite this diversity, however, and the existence of several distinct subregional
identities, there is a relatively high degree of regional interdependence. To a large extent this
cohesion is attributable to perceptions by, and pattern of trade with, the United States and other
major parters outside the region (United Kigdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Canda). For many years these trading pattern emphasized bananas, sugarcane, and other
agricultul products. Although these remain importnt regional export, in recent decades they
have been joined by a variety of manufactured goods. Most significant, however, is the extent
to which tourism has come to dominate a large number of WCR economies, with cruise tourism
becoming an especially powerfl unifying force thoughout much of the region.
As in all regions of the globe, local situations and priorities are reflected in the mi of
land-based marine pollution problems observed within the region. In addition to agrochemical
runoff and discharges of industrial effluents, characteristic conditions include poor sewage
treatment facilities; increasing urbaniztion, especially in coastal areas; upland erosion; and
deforestation (UNEP 1989a, 1994a). Even the region's tourist industr, which relies upon
perceptions of a pristine environment, itself contributes substantially to degradation of the coastal
environment in a variety of ways, including inadequate sewage treatment at tourist facilities,
coastal erosion from beach dredging to accommodate accelerated hotel constrction, tag of
corals, and daage to corals by anchors, spearfishing, and ship waste.
Growing recognition in the 1970s of these and other environmental problems led to the
adoption, in 1981, ofthe Action Plan for the Caribbean Environment Programe (CEP). Initial
funding for the CEP came in the form of "seed money" from the United Nations Environment
Programe (UNEP), but gradually the governents of the WCR have taken over responsibilty
for fuding and management of the program. Among the signs of the regional governents'
"clear commitment" to the CEP, UNEP cites regular contributions to the Caribbean Trust Fund,
which support the CEP, and ratification of the Cartgena Convention, which entered into force
in 1986, along with a Protocol concerng Co-operation in Combating Oil Spils in the Wider
Caribbean Region (UNEP 1991a). Negotiation of a second protocol, on Specially Protected
Areas and Wildlife, followed in Januar 1990. This report is intended to advance the basis for
progress in discussions among the WCR states toward negotiation of a thd protocol to the
Cartgena Convention, concernng land-based sources of marine pollution in the region.
¡~
,
B. Purpose of the Study
In May 1993, the US Environmental Protection Agency's Office of International
Activities awarded study grant assistance to the Marine Policy Center (MPC) of the Woods Hole
Ocenographic Institution to compile inormation and produce analyses to enhance the
3
effectiveness of an international protocol for the control of LBMP in the Wider Caribbean
Region. The analyses have been guided by four principal study objectives:
(1) a review and summary of LBMP problems to detennine common problems and priority
problem areas;
(2) a survey of broadly defined environmental inrastrcture to help identify national
commitments and national capacities to prevent, reduce, or control LBMP;
(3) a survey and analysis of subregional differences in commitment or interest in regional
control of LBMP, to help direct and motivate recommendations for protocol mechanisms;
and
(4) a comparison of program approaches from other regions, especially the Baltic, Nort
Sea, and Mediterranean, providing lessons from which an effective program for the
Caribbean might be designed.
Special attention to program experiences in the Baltic, Nort Sea, and Mediterranean
regions reflects the fact that these were the first regional environmental programs on LBMP to
be evaluated on a comparative basis, in a study also undertken by the Marine Policy Center
(Broadus et al. 1993). That study identified precisely what effort have been made in these thee
regions, what has worked best, what has not worked, and why. These lessons are displayed in
Table 1 and are referred to thougho~t ths report, directly and indirectly, as we develop our
analyses and recommendations concërnng an effective LBMP protocol for the Caribbean. We
employ the tenn effective in the sense used by Broadus et al. (1993), where it refers to the
degree to which the program's actual effect achieves the program's goals. 2
C. Study Approach and Organition of the Report
Of all the lessons listed in Table 1, perhaps the most fundamental concerns the existence
of differences among states in outlook and capabilty, and the importnce of program design to
accommodate these differences and thereby serve the real national interests of participatig states
2 This definition is consistent with that developed by Bernauer (1995). Bernauer defines effectiveness as the
extent to which, holding other factors constant, an intitution contributes to "goal attinent." Goal attanment can
be meaured as the difference between, for examle, the quaity of the mane environment prior to the
implementation of a protocol and its quality when protocol effectiveness is evaluated.
4
Table 1
Lesons Lerned from a Comparative Assessment of LBMP
in the Baltic, Nort Sea and Mediterranean
Clarity
Capacity to
evolve
Political
coii tment
speciticity
or
objectives
Scientific
involvement
self-interesttest
Mechanisms
~or trade
Reporting
and
compliance
Transparency
Limit
expectations
Costly misunderstandings, false start and wasted effort can be avoided
by seeking maimum clarity in defining proram qoals, the relations
amonq parties, measures and rec01endations, and the role of the
secretariat. Particular effort should be made to excise hidden agendas
(eq., if income transfer or lobbying of governents is to be a program
objective, this should be set out clearly and incorporated explicitly
into program desiqn).
The ability to adjust the program to changed circutances and improved
knowledge is vital to its effectiveness over time. The method of
keepinq the framework convention quite spare and leaving program
elaboration to subsequent protocols, directives, recommendations, or
flexible action plans is useful in this reqard.
Program effectiveness will depend inevitably on the political commitment
of the parties. Examples of movement toward enhanced effectiveness were
observed in all three regions as a result of collective political
intervention by parties at a ministerial level. The devJ.ce of an
overarchinq, hiqh-level political fnru above tb& reqionel program, as
in the Nort Sea COnference.., appears tC' have been useful in this
reqard. Such a foru also provides a hiqhly-visible focal ('int for
public pressure, and i t contrib~tes to program transpar.ency, which
enhances the relevance and effectiven6ss of public pressure.
Demonstratinq effectiveness and clarity in its measures is importnt
both in sustaninq proram support and in operational program
implementation. For this it is necessary to specify objectives whose
accomplishment can be measured and demonstrated. Targets and timetables
are useful. especially if they are sensitive to differences in the
stakes and economic capabilities among the parties. Black lists and
qrey lists are useful in spcifying the scope of concern, but experience
has pointed to the need to narrow program focus in practice to priority
tarqets (sometimes called "red lists").
A mechanism for expert scientific input and advice is essential, to
clarify the nature and magnitude of problems and to monitor changing
conditions, but it is important to assure that scientific research
interests do not altogether run away with program resources. The
persuasive establishment of baseline conditions, both in term of
ambient measures and emissions, must be a priority, as demonstrated by
the hindrances created by shortcominqs in doinq so in all the cases
examined. It should be recognized that the baseline profiles can be
useful even if somewhat crude, and that assembling credible baselines
will be expensive and time consuming.
States can be expected to serve their own self-interests, but program
effectiveness will be improved to the extent that program design takes
account of this and explicitly seeks to accommodate the genuine (rather
than presumed) self-interest of its parties. Program structures that
encourage or accommodate agreements and actions by sub-groups of
parties, that allow for flexible financial or technical assistance, or
that provide explicitly for variable schedules or an "opt out" option on
some measures, may also be helpful in this regard.
Because the seir-interests of states will dirrer, and because one of the
principal rationales for collective action is to facilitate sharing and
exchange, program effectiveness will be enhanced by provision of
mechanisms for explicit "trade" (quid pro quos, specialization) among
participants. Similarly, efficiency is served by implementation
measures that take into account differences among states and that
facilitate trading to accomplish mutual objectives (such as tradable
quota schemes). Implicit trades or explicit quid pro quos lly be
achieved through program funding schemes.
Assessing the degree of state compliance with program recommendations
has been obviated in all three cases by the poor performance of state
reporting. Special emphasis in program design should be placed on
specifying expectations for compliance, means for monitoring compliance,
and particularly, procedures that encourage accurate and timely state
reporting. In this reqard, keeping the reporting burden simple and at a
minimum is "important. It may also be useful to assure that the results
of reporting are useful to all parties and to suggest a reporting system
that meshes routinely and automatically into the states' own practices.
Some provision for non-intrusive, third party inspection may also be
useful, though this is only implicit in the cases examined through their
lack of success with more conventional, passive means of collecting
state reports.
Most of the lessons proposed above speak to the value of transparency in
program desiqn and execution, but it warrants explicit inclusion.
Program effectiveness is enhanced (both in term of party state support
over time and of verifiability by other interests) by the maximum
transparency compatible with the protection of proprietary interests and
the sovereiqn rights of independent states.
Regional programs in the real world can at best be catalytic. Measures
to control land-based Ilrine pollution will necessarily occur almo~t
exclusively through domestic actions. The programs may succeed as a
medium for exchange and consensus among memers and as a promoter of
externl funding support, which can be used to reinforce internationally
agreed program objectives and reward compliance. The effectiveness of
the reqional trust fund device is not clear from the cases examined and
must be carefully questioned. Aqain, clarity of purpose and
transparency cannot be over emphasized.
Source: Broadus et a1. 1993
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(the "self-interest test").3 Without a doubt, WCR States are seriously concerned about
environmental quality regionwide, but they are even more concerned about and motivated to act
on activities that impinge upon or otherwise threaten the use of ocean resources within their own
jurisdictions .
Land-based marine pollution problems typically, and in the first instance, are treated as
primarily a domestic issue. Although a state may suffer from marine pollution generated by
other states or may benefit from actions taken by another state to improve its own marine
environment, the existence of such externl effects does not signal automatic agreement on
collective actions. Rather, such actions must be perceived as beneficial by individual states if
their participation is to be secured.
The data, analyses, and recommendations presented in this report reflect the following
basic assumptions about the essential factors that shape a state's perceptions of the likely benefits
of participating in collective actions to control LBMP and its prospect of actually realizing
benefits:
A state's effective commtment to regional control of land-based marine pollution may be taken
approximately to be a fuction of the potential impacts it most feas from marine pollution, the
proportion of its-population or economy most exposed to such impacts, its degree of trans boundar
exposure to inputs from other source states, its own relative contribution as a source, its own
endowment of institutional and economic capabilties to tackle the problem, and the additional
resources or benefits that might be made available to it through exchange with regional nèighbors.
(MPC 1993).
These key factors wil tend to differ across the region, particularly in a region as diverse
as the Wider Caribbean.
Our starting point for analyzing importnt differences among individual states or
subregions of the WCR is a review and summary characterition, in Section II, of the region's
natural systems and most significant LBMP problems, including their principal sources and
distribution. Special attention is devoted to inventories of selected domestic and industrial point-
source pollutat loads for 25 of the WCR states, as collected and analyzed by the Program for
Marine Pollution Assessment and Control (CEPPOL).
The evidence to date indicates that most land-based marine pollutats are not tranported
far from their sources of discharge, and that tranboundar pollution, where it occurs, appears
3 We adopt the perspective in this report that states are naturally "self-interested." The key to an effective land-
based mae pollution protocol is to haress the natural self-interest of these states to prevent, reduce, or control
maine pollution.
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to be confined to border regions.4 The potential remains for a generalized "pollution" of the
Wider Caribbean to develop or to be detected as more data are systematically collected, which
would strengthen the case for a regionwide approach. Neverteless, an LBMP protocol for the
region can be effective if it focuses on tranboundary pollution problems at the subregional level
or on the numerous incidences of problems of a limited areal extent, whose resolution could
benefit from shared experience or attention. The appropriateness of a focus on common, but not
necessarily transboundary, LBMP problems is reportedly acknowledged and planed for by the
negotiating parties (Wood-Thomas, pers. comm., 1995).
Much of the published literature and written records of WCR discussions have focused
on the establishment and implementation of a regionwide approach to the prevention, reduction,
or control of LBMP. In Section III, we critique several of the more commonly advanced
arguents and proposals and caution againt those that are not substantiated by environmental
realities or do not reflect a balanced perspective on the costs and benefits of uniform approaches
for individual states. We argue that one of the most importnt challenges facing the Contracting
Paries is to correctly characterize the scale of LBMP problems and faciltate identification and
implementation of appropriate solutions at the subregional leveL.
Sections IV and V are concerned with the identification of commonalities and
complementarities-environmental, economic, and institutional-that can serve as the basis for
subregional collaborations and exchanges. In Section IV, we present a broad range of
economic, environmental, and natural resource data for 37 political units, or states, in the WCR,
as well as information on their environmental laws, inrastructure, regulation, and enforcement;
the extent of their participation in relevant regional and global organations; and the extent of
marine scientific capabilties and NGO involvement and activity. Comparisons are made within
the subregional framework established by the CEPPOL program to faciltate its analysis of point-
source pollutant loads and distributions thoughout the WCR.
In Section V, we pursue three alternative approaches to identifying promising
opportnities for mutually beneficial collaborations, or "gain from trade." First, common
export products and economic activities are identifed as a potential basis for collaboration on
scientific reseach and pollution control approaches among states at similar scales of activity,
or for technology transfer from states operatig at larger scales to those operating at smaller
scales. Next, we consider the relative identities of WCR states as polluters and pollutees withn
the CEPPOL subregional groupings, according to the approach developed by Broadus et al.
(1993). Specifically, we estimate the extent to which each state is a source of LBMP, ha a
stae in controlling the problem, and has the economic capacity to tae corrective action. Our
4 We employ a broad defintion of tranbounda pollution to include direct impacts from discharges, impacts
on straddling fish stocks (including potential destruction of nursery areas), damge to export goods, impacts on
toursm, diminished passive use values. See Broadus and Varov (1994) for a description of potential daages
from transboundar pollution occurrences.
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analysis yields several ilustrative examples of key match-ups among source, stakeholder, and
faciltator states (i.e., major trading partners or aid providers) with and across subregions.
Finally, we develop a rating system that taes into account not only the size but also the
direction of a state's economic incentive with respect to controllng LBMP, and not only its
economic capacity but also its intitutional capacity to underte corrective action. Although the
rating system is rather crude, the results are useful for predicting which states are the most likely
to engage in sustained and successful action to control LBMP and, for the other states, the
general categories of assistance or special inducements that each is likely to need in order to
participate successfully.
In Section VI, we apply to the Wider Caribbean Region the lessons learned about
program effectiveness (Table 1) in the earlier, comparative study of programs in the Baltic,
Nort Sea, and Mediterranean regions. We present a checklist of importt factors in thee
main categories-relevant regional background characteristics, program design elements, and
indicators of program effectiveness-and compare these factors with expectations about a
protocol for the WCR, based upon regional realities and the state of the policy debate over the
establishment of an LBMP protocol.
Following the main text of the report are thee appendices that provide additional data
or furter explanation of certin portions of the text. Appendix A contains a number of data
tables that support the discussions in Sections iv and V, and Appendix B explains our approach
to estimating the proportions of each state's population that live within the drainage area and the
coastal zone of the Wider Caribbean Region. (The information in Appendix B is relevant
priarily to the discussion of "Sources and Stakes" in Section V, but also to the review of
LBMP inputs in Section IV). Appendix C supplements the discussion of "Economic
Commonalities" in Section V with a stylized model that examines the effects of propert right
distributions, burden of proof, and lack of clarity in property rights on the range and extent of
possible "gain from trade" to be realizd from agreements intended to reduce or control LBMP
emissions.
Finlly, we note the availabilty of thee additional appendices not included with ths
report. These are papers prepared by consultats to the Marine Policy Center project to serve
as the basis for discussions at a regional workshop of expert held at the University of the West
Indies in Barbados in December 1994, and also as expert source materials for the preparation
of ths report. Gladfelter and Ogden (1994) provides a summary of the relevant scientific
capabilties and current knowledge of LBMP problems in the Wider Carbbean. Kiball (1994)
presents an overview of the key functions, intitutions, and processes involved in the design and
implementation of an interntional protocol on LBMP. Mandell (1994) surveys the importnt
LBMP problems, legal instrents, and intitutional capabilties of the Spansh-speaking
countries of the WCR. Copies of each of these papers are available on a limited basis from the
Marine Policy Center.
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II. Natural Systems, Pollution, and the Interdependency of WCR States
A. Regional Geography and Freshwater Input
The Caribbean Sea is defined by the margin of Central and South America and the
Greater and Lesser Antiles Islands. The Caribbean Sea contains four deep basins separated by
prominent undersea ridges. Together with a fift basin, the Gulf of Mexico, ths larger water
body comprises the American mediterranean, one of four mediterraneans on eart (the others
are the Arctic, the Asiatic, and the European mediterranean). A stil larger entity surrounding
the Caribbean is the Wider Caribbean Region (WCR), which adds to the American
mediterranean the Bahamas and par of the sea off the Guianas. The WCR is defined in the
Cartgena Convention as comprising "the marine environment of the Gulf of Mexico, the
Caribbean Sea, and the areas of the Atlantic Ocean adjacent thereto, south of 30° nort latitude
and within 200 nautical miles" of the Atlantic coasts of states from the Bahamas and Florida
down to the nortern border of BraziL. 1
The Wider Caribbean Region encompasses an area of 4.31 millon ki2 and has a mean
depth of 2174m. The drainage basin, from which freshwater is delivered to the coast, has an
area of about 5.6 milion ki2, of which the largest portions are in the United States (62%),
Venezuela (17%), Colombia (4%), and Mexico (4%). While not formally incorporated into the
defintion of the WCR, the lands draing into the marine area are clearly of. importce to
management of this area, and particularly so in a discussion of land-based pollution. Of the
pricipal rivers entering this area (Table 2), which collectively deliver about 66,500 m3/sec of
freshwater, 45% comes from the Orinoco (Venezuela), 28% from the Mississippi (U.S.), and
11 % from the Magdalena (Colombia). Fifteen rivers comprise the remaining 16% of riverine
input. An additional, undefined freshwater input enters from the lagoons, mangrove swamps,
and bayous that make up a large portion of the coastline, especially along the nortern Yucatan
Peninsula, eastern Florida, and the nort coasts of Colombia and Venezuela.
Also signficant is the freshwater input originating from the Amazon River, which \s
techncaly outside of the Wider Caribbean Region defined by UNEP. The Amazon discharge
approximates 170,000 m3/sec of freshwater on average, of which a porton enters the Carbbean
along the coast near Trindad and Tobago. Froelich, Atwood, and Giese (1978) estimate that
about half of the freshwater entering the Carbbean Sea, evident as salinty depressions extending
to about 100 m depth, is from this source. This water also contain signficant quantities of
dissolved silca, an importt nutrient for certin phytoplankon.
lA stil larger area, incorporating pars of the Sargasso Sea and Bermuda and the Gulf of Panam, is referred
to as the Intra-Americas Sea by IOCARIBE, the Carbbean and Adjacent Regions Task Force of the
Intergovernental Oceanographic Commssion (IOC) of UNESCO.
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Table 2
Principal Rivers Drainng Into the Wider Caribbean
River Draiage Water Sediment Specific Mea tubidity
Area (km?) Discharge discharge tranport (mgll)
(m3sec-l) (106 tons/year) (tl2/yea)
USA
Mississippi 3,268,000 18,400 222 76 380
Apalachicola 44,000 620 0.16 6.8 15
Mobile 97,000 1,500 4.5 42 95
Brazs 114,000 160 15.9 0.14 3200
Colorado 107,000 79 1.9* 17.9
USA-Mexico
Rio Grande 467,00 23 very low*
Colombia
Magdaena 235,000 7,500 234 1000 1000
Venezuela
Orioco 950,000 30,000 85.0 91 90
*Low values due to dam.
Sources: Borgese and Ginburg, 1982; UNEP, 1994a.
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In addition to freshwater, rivers naturally deliver suspended sediments to the sea. In the
case of the Wider Caribbean Region, large amounts of sediment are delivered by the Mississippi
(222 milion tons/yr), the Magdalena (235 milion tons/yr), and the Orinoco (85 millon tons/yr;
UNEP 1989a). The Amazon discharges a large quantity of sediment, of which some portion
finds its way into the WCR. For perspective, the dredging required for maintenance of all U.S.
navigational waterways and harbors entails about 270 millon tons/yr (see Herbich 1992), some
of which is disposed of at contained sites on land (see Mangone 1990:189). At the river's
mouth, both freshwater and its suspended and dissolved loads become entrained in and dissipated
by the prevailng coastal and ocean circulation pattern. In the case of the Mississippi, the
Orinoco, and the Amazon, sufficient water volumes are involved tht the fate of the river plume
ca be detected remotely using satellte imagery (Müller-Karger 1993). River discharge directly
or indirectly affects sudace salinty, concentration and composition of phytoplankon, plant
pigments, and suspended sediment concentration. Available satellte imagery shows the Amazon
plume moving nortward along the Guiana coast from Februar though May (when the Nort
Equatorial Counter Current is weak), directly entering the Caribbean though passages between
Tridâd and Tobago and the mainland, and engulfing these islands and the island of Barbados
as well. Durig this time surface salinty at Barbados may drop from 34 0/00 to 31 0/00 (Hunte
1994). From June to January, discolored water originating at the mouth of the Amazon veers
offshore near French Guiana and curves eastward into the open ocean, in a plume that can be
defied on satellte imagery in terms of its pigment concentration. According to Müller-Karger
(1993), ths period corresponds with the clearest water conditions at Barbados.
The Orinoco River also has a strong impact in the eastern Caribbean Sea, varying
seaonally with discharge. During the dry season from February though April, the Orinoco
outfow enters the Caribbean between Trindad and Venezuela moving westward across the
southern Caribbean. Eddies in the tropical Atlantic at this time can move Orioco water
offshore to the east of the Antiles, engulfing Barbados in pigment-rich water during January-
March. During the period of maximum discharge for the Orinoco, the Islands of Trindad,
Tobago, Grenada, and St. Vincent are regularly affected. Imagery taen in October 1979 shows
a plume of Orinoco water extending nortward nearly to Puerto Rico, along and west of the
submerged Aves Ridge.
From other satellte imagery, Müller-Karger (1993) concludes that the Mississippi plume
ordiny moves westward along the Texas shoreline. An October 1982 image of the Western
Carbbe shows dispersal of the Magdalena River plume, normally following the coast to the
west, extending nortwest intead, nearly to the Island of Jamaica. Clearly, much more is to
be learned from additiona and increasingly sophisticated satellte imagery.
The above demonstrates that the pathway exists for waterborne materials to travel great
distances in the WCR, with measurable impacts on phytoplanon chlorophyll concentration,
salinity, turbidity, and concentrations of certin chemicals. The extent to which human affect
11
the quantity or composition of river water suggests the extent of transboundary containation
of marine waters in the WCR.
B. Ocean Circulation
The major ocean surface currents of the Caribbean area have been known in broad brush
for many years (e.g., Figures 2-5). These currents in general enter the Wider Caribbean Region
from the open ocean to the east and along the norteast coast of Brazil and the Guianas. Water
from both the South Atlantic and Nort Atlantic enter in ths way, ultimately feeding into the
Gulf Stream in the Straits of Florida in about equal quantities (Richardson, pers. comm., 1994).
These surface currents establish a seemingly clear relationship among "upstream" nations to the
east and south and "downstream" nations to the west and nort. However, as ilustrated below,
ths gross understanding of surface circulation in the Caribbean is clearly incomplete, and
importnt refinements wil come from ongoing and future oceanographic research in this area,
such as studies under way by IOCARBE (Maul, pers. comm., 1995).
For example, importnt departres from the general east-to-west surface circulation
pattrn exist as a result of gyres along the coasts of Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela,
producing west-to-east inshore components of drift. Simlarly, eastward-moving back eddies
exist along the south coast of the Greater Antiles Islands. These natural pattern of circulation
result in trnsboundary exchange from Belize to Guatemala and Honduras, and from Nicaragua
to Costa Rica, Panaa, and Colombia.
Deep water in the Caribbean is believed to enter periodically though the deeper passages
of the Lesser Antiles. Circulation in the deep water is probably far more quiescent than for
surface waters. Thus, the deep water occupying the four basins of the Caribbean Sea, which
lies entirely within the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of adjacent coastal states, is subject to
the impacts of human activities in ways that are not well understood.
C. Weather and Atmospheric Circulation
Like the surface ocean circulation, prevailing easterly tradewinds result in an upstrea-
downstrea relationship among nations in the Wider Carbbean Region. Lad-based
atmospheric pollutats, such as industrial stack effuent and other point source gases and
pariculates, as well as non-point source pollutats such as chlorinted hydrocarbon pesticides,
are relevant to a discussion of tranbounda atmospheric containtion.
Between 1886 and 1986, 492 hurrcanes (storm of tropical origin with a cyclonic wind
circulation of 75 mph or more) have theatened or actually reached the Wider Caribbean Region
(see Gray 1992). Damage caused by hurcanes results from direct impacts of wind (and the
associated cargo of wind-blown debris), torrential rainall, and ocean waves and storm
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surge-each of which has caused social havoc though devastating loss of crops, housing, civil
inrastructure, and human life. The "hurricane season" for ths area is June though November,
with peak hurricane incidence in August, September, and October. The economic impacts of
these storms, and the associated human suffering, have been very severe. The shared natural
hazard represented by hurricanes suggests there are regional benefits to be derived from
cooperation in hurricane prediction and monitoring, damage relief, and natural hazard standards
for industrial siting and construction (especially where use or storage of hazardous materials are
involved).
D. Spatial Scales of Pollution in the Wider Caribbean Region
In our discussion of regional approaches and opportties to addressing land-based
marine pollution problems, two separate categories of issues are germane:
a) pollution problems of large areal extent, with regional transboundary
implications, whose resolution calls for action over a spatial area larger than one
or two nations; and
b) pollution problems of limted areal extent, but numerous localized occurrences
thoughout the region, whose resolution could benefit from shared experience or
attention.
In the WCR, by far the most serious damages caused by effluents from land-based
sources ocur locally, with the territorial sea or exclusive economic zone of the source state.2
Most land-based marine pollutats are not transported far from their sources of discharge, and
tranboundary pollution events, where they occur, appear to be confined to border regions.
Overviews of land-based regional pollution in the Caribbean are given by several recent
UNEP papers (see UNEP 1994a and references therein; WWF/ESI 1994 and references therein).
The defintion of pollution problems in some existing report is blurred, with a resulting
confion of specific sites, sources, or pathways of pollution. For example, the identification
of cholera and inectious hepatitis as importnt land-based mare pollution problems in the
WCR seems to ignore the distinction between contate dring water supplies and
contated coastal waters, as well as the geographical boundaes of the WCR. References
to inadeqtely treated sewage in some cases are based upon an a priori assuption tht
seconda wastewater treatment is the sole acceptable option for domestic wastewater disposal
in the WCR. Natual processes that lin national jurisdictions are sometimes interpreted as
2 For example, in 1992, Jonathan Canon, the director of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico Program, was quoted as
saying: "(t)he general judgment, I believe, is that the gulf is not in a crisis state, although there are locaiz crisis
area" (BNA 1992).
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tataount to a demonstration of transboundary pollution. And naturally occurring phenomena
such as red tides, ciguatera poisoning, natural diseases in corals and other marine anials,
seagrass die-offs, and certin mass mortlities in the sea (cf., Brongersma-Sanders 1957), are
taen as evidence of human impacts. Effectively setting priorities and addressing abatement of
existing pollution problems and their prevention in the future requires clear and techncally sound
definition of the pollution problems or their potential to develop.
Gladfelter and Ogden (1994; see Appendix D) divide pollutants into two categories; a)
enrchment of naturally occurring substances, and b) introduction of new containants. These
authors appropriately include other human-derived stresses, such as over-fishing and mangrove
clearing, as sources of pollution. According to the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Adminstration (NOAA), the following sources should ultimately be included in a pollutant
discharge inventory:
a). Point sources (industr and wastewater treatment facilties)
b) Urban non-point runoff (stormwater runoff and combined overfow discharges)
c) Non-urban non-point sources (agriculture and forest runoff)
d) Upstream sources (pollutants carried to the sea from inand sources)
e) Irrgation return flows (agricultural pollutants carried in irigation runoff).
To ths list should be added pollutants carried in direct groundwater discharge to the sea.
According to UNEP (1994a), the major land-based pollutants entering the Caribbean are:
sewage, hydrocarbons, sediments, nutrients, pesticides, litter and marine debris, and toxic
wastes.
Perhaps the most widespread coastal pollution problem globally is nutrient
overenrchment. It is also among the most common marie pollution problems in the Caribbean,
where nutrients are added as sewage discharge and runoff of dissolved fertilizr. (Fertilizr use
is estimated to have increased 33% between 1979 and 1989.) Neverteless, nutrient
overenrichment, though widely occurring in the WCR, is believed to be a problem of localized
scale at the present time, as is the case in most regions of the globe.
Altered sediment delivery to coastal waters can have negative impacts, if increased, on
mangrove, seagrass, and coral habitats; and if decreased, on deltaic wetlands. Clearing of forest
lands, ming operations, and ocean disposal of dredged materials are sources of sediments that
are known to be increasing at the present time. (See Cortés and Risk 1985 for a discussion of
the effects of deforestation on reefs.) Reefs near the Centrl America coast and areas of the
18
eastern Caribbean are believed to be suffering from sediment stress related to agricultural
practices and tourism development, but it does not appear that the problem involves
transboundary or regional spatial scales. CEPPOL pilot studies intiated in 1992 at four regional
laboratories in the region may shed additional light on the impact of various pollutants, including
sewage, oil, and particularly sediments, on reefs and other coastal ecosystems (Mandell, pers.
comm., 1995).
Disposal of sewage in coastal waters is a topic of great concern internationally, but also
a topic of significant misunderstading. The two major elements of concern regarding sewage
are public health and nutrient overenrichment (in extreme intaces, excessive organc loading
ca be an issue as well). Combining industrial and domestic waste streams can compound the
problem by adding chemical toxicity to the above problems, which can frustrate effective
wastewater treatment and recycling and add an additional environmental impact. Where tourism
and aesthetics are particularly importnt, sewage disposal can become a charged issue.
Moreover, an emphasis in some quarters on deploying standardiz or best available
tehnologies has helped promote the idea that low-cost solutions to handling domestic wastes,
such as on-site disposal in leaching beds, are ineffective, and that expensive high-technology
wastewater treatment plants are always preferable. These perceptions are neither techncally
correct nor in the public interest. A more balanced and inovative view of wastewater treatment
is evident in UNEP (1991b). Salas (1994) points out, appropriately, that standard secndary
wastewater treatment facilties do not eliminate nutrients from the effuent stream, often add
toxic disinectants for pathogen control (with undesirable secondary environmenta impacts), and
leave disposal of solids (sludge) as an unresolved separate problem. Modem wastewater
treatment facilties are costly to build, operate, and maintain in monetary terms and in terms of
energy and freshwater consumption.
We are not aware of any regional-scale impacts of sewage disposaL. Neverteless, a
continuing dialogue on suitable wastewater handling practices and technologies in the WCR is
a neeed and appropriate element of regional collaboration. A key question is the determation
of appropriate water quality standards. For example, certin bacterial standards, such as the
fecal coliform water quality indicator, can give a high result tht is often falsely attibute to
human fecl containation where it does not exist, rather than to any of a number of other likely
sources, such as warm-blooded anals and naturally occurring sediment bacteria.
According to Gladfelter and Ogden (1994), thermal pollution from power plants
represents a localizd but widely occuring problem in the WCR.3
3Reseach undertaken for the present study, as reported in Section IV of this report, indicates that thermal
pollution is a concern for Barbados, Colombia, the Dominica Republic, the Netherlands Antiles, Puerto Rico, St.
Lucia, and the US Virgin Islands.
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Oil hydrocarbons represent a pollutant category that one might expect to have regional-
scale implications. For example, a 1979 collsion of the tank vessels ATLANTIC EMPRES
and AEGEAN CAPTAIN near Trindad and Tobago spiled an estimated 300,000 tons of oil into
the ocean (Famighetti 1995), or approximately eight times the volume of the well-known 1989
EXXON VALDEZ spil in Prince William Sound, Alaska; and oil released in the 1979 Ixtoc
wellhead blow-out accident in the Gulf of Mexico was about 16 times the Valdez spil. Neither
of these spils has received significant attention in the discussion of pollution or habitat
degradation in the WCR, however, including UNEP's (1994a) review of hydrocarbon pollution
in the WCR. Of course, the UNEP report focuses on land-based sources of pollution;
nonetheless, it does include discussion of natural seeps entering the Caribbean (citing Harey
1987) at a depth of 150 to 250 m (amounting to an estimated 1 millon tons, or 27 times the
Prince Willam Sound spil).
The distribution of tar and dissolved/dispersed hydrocarbons was the subject of a major
six-yea study by CARPOL (Atwood et al. 1987). The study revealed interesting trends in the
spatial and time distribution of hydrocarbon residues. Neverteless, Gladfelter and Ogden
(1994) conclude, "While pollution of this sort is unsightly and deadly to some large marine
anals, it is not among the highest priority problems affecting the coastal ecosystems: the coral
reefs, the mangroves, and the seagrass beds." UNEP (1994a) concludes: ". . . inormation
required to ascertin the ecological and health risks caused by long-term chronic oil discharges
into the coastal marine environment of the WCR, is stil very limited. . . ."
E. Subregional Scales of Pollution and the CEPPOL Pollutant Load Inventories
UNEP's 1994 Regional Overview of Land-Based Sources of Pollution in the Wider
Caribbean Region (UNEP 1994a) sumarizes the results to date of national inventories of land-
based mare pollution in the WCR as reported by the Program for Marine Pollution Assessment
and Control (CEPPOL), which is administered jointly by UNEP and the Intergovernental
Oceanographic Commission (IOC). For purposes of assessing the geographical distribution of
the pollution load and analyzing the results, the CEPPOL program divided the WCR into six
geographic subregions (see Figure 6). With ths arangement, thee political units are
designate as falling into more than one geographical subregion: Mexico spans Subregions I and
II (Gulf of Mexico and Western Caribbean); Cuba spans Subregions I and il (Gulf of Mexico
and Norteastern-Central Carbbean); and the Netherlands Antiles span Subregions IV and V,
with the islands of St. Maaren, St. Eustasius, and Saba assigned to the Eastern Carbbean
subregion (IV and the islands of Bonaire and Curacao to the Southern Caribbean (V). 4
4A1though not listed in Figure 6, Aruba, a member of the Netherlands Antiles Federation until 1986, is included
by CEPPOL as a separate politica unit within Subregion V.
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As of 1994, the CEPPOL program had compiled data on biological oxygen demand
(BOD), total suspended solids (TSS), total nitrogen (TN), total phosphorus (TP), and oil and
grease inputs from domestic and industrial point sources in 24 WCR countries, and from point
and non-point sources combined in the U. S. Gulf Coast region. Additional information, such
as the presence or absence of phenols and various heavy metals, was also recorded though not
quantified. The results, as summarized in the 1994 UNEP Regional Overview, are displayed in
Tables 3 and 4.
In considering the results, some importt limitations of the data should be taen into
account, especially: the non-comparabilty of data for the U.S. Gulf Coast; the absence of
certin countries and of an entire subregion from the inventory; and the lack of inormation as
to the basis for normalizing the data. S
Attempts by this study to ascertin the point-source share of U.S. Gulf Coast pollutant
loads have been unsuccessful, but it is useful to bear in mind that non-point sources have been
estimated to contribute between 70 percent and 90 percent of the nutrent loads (i.e., nitrogen
and phosphorus) entering the Gulf of Mexico from U.S. land-based sources (Broadus and
Vartov 1994), with industrial-scale agriculture being by far the largest of the non-point source
contributors. For certin other countries in the WCR, the proportion of all land-based nutrients
from non-point sources can be expected to be substantially greater than in the United States,
because of such factors as the generally lower availability of domestic septic and municipal
sewage treatment facilties and, in some countries, the more intensive use of fertilizers. Similar
factors hold true for non-nutrient pollutants from non-point sources, particularly pesticides, the
use of which has been dramatically curtiled in the United States in recent years but remains
intensive in Venezuela, Mexico, and the Central American countries (Henao et al. 1993; UNEP
1994a).
The subregion completely missing from the inventory is Subregion VI (the Equatorial
Atlantic Nort West), which includes French Guiana, Guyana, and Suriname. To the extent that
transboundary pollution effects do exist, it is unfortnate indeed not to have any data on
pollution sources within the subregion that is the furtest upstream of the six subregions in the
WCR. Also missing from the inventory are data for Guatemala and Nicaragua (Subregion II);
the Bahamas, the Cayman Islands, and Haiti (Subregion III); and Anguila, Martinque,
Guadeloupe, and Montserrat (Subregion IV).6 As demonstrated in Section IV of ths report,
SIn assessing the value of the Regional Overview (UNEP 1994a), Gladfelter and Ogden (1994) note that the
information in the report is of limited value for assessing "pollutat load per year per (a) cubic meter of seawater,
(b) acre of benthic communty impacted, (c) unit of coastline, (d) unit of human population, etc."
6According to Enrque Mandell (pers. comm., 1995), who paricipated in the analysis of the CEPPOL data,
fiancial assistace and guidelines for preparation of pollutat inventories were provided by CEPPOL to several of
the missing states (i.e., Guyana, Suriame, Guadeloupe, Marinique, and the Cayman Islands).
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Table 3
CEPPOL Results: Wase Loads from Domesic Sources
in the Wider Caribben Region by Subregion (t/y)
Contr ISu b-Region BOD TS 1N TP Oil and
Grea
Sub-Region I
Cuba(N Cot) 53,734 50,811 4,198 5,915 5,985
Mexico(Gulf Coa) 24,529 20,964 4,184 1,810 8,379
USA(Gulf Coat) 37,393 44,552 25,688 11,416 27,00
Sub-Tota 115,656 116,327 34,070 19,141 41,370
Sub-Rël!ion II
Beli 1,905 2,100 650 320 240
Cost Rica 530 1,079 210 25 20
Honduras 9,626 8,235 625 823 450
Mexico(Ca. Coat) 3,756 3,232 607 261 1,256
Pana 969 1,781 327 38 35
Sub-Tota 16,785 16,427 2,419 1,467 2,001
Sub-Rel!ion m
Cuba (Ca. Coast) 9,413 3,481 572 296 112
Dom. Republic 40,573 60,00 3,027 4,182 5,125
Jamaica 4,227 6,658 1,097 133 350
Puert Rico 16,819 20,00 530 890 500
Turk. & Cacos Is. 47 75 13 2 2
".
Sub-Tota 71,079 90.214 5,239 "5,503 6,089
Sub-Rel!ion TV
Antigu & Barbuda 29 45 7 1 1
Baados 3,838 3,300 290 378 290
Bnt. Virgin Is. Dominca 85 145 26 3 2
Grenada 51 81 13 2 2
St. Lucia 86 136 22 3 2
St. Kitts & Nevis 25 40 29 2 1
St. Vin. & Gren. 250 390 66 9 5
US Virgin Islands 26 40 7 1 1
40 44 250 132 200
Sub-Tota
4,790 4,617 710 531 504
Sub-Re2ion V
Arba 61 52 20 4 1
Colombia 26,300 42,120 7,l1S 986 620
Netherlands Ant. 85 5 40 1 1
Tnnida & Tobago 1,00 1,567 1,585 59 28
Venezuela 232,725 185,00 77,575 32,425 18,325
Sub-Tot 26,171 228,744 86,338 33,475 18,975
GRA TOTAL 506,48 456,329 118,79 60,117 68,939
Source: UN 1994a 23
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individual country omissions have varing degrees of influence on the picture that emerges from
the CEPPOL data on point-source pollutant loads. For example, the lack of data for Guatemala
and Nicaragua probably has little effect on the point-source results for Subregion II (or overall),
because the population centers and major economic activities of both countries are oriented
toward the Pacific coast and largely outside the Caribbean drainage basin (see Appendix B), and
because both countries provide quite low access to sewage treatment services in rural areas.
Within Subregion III, inclusion of the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, and Haiti all would likely have
had some effect on the observed distribution of domestic pollutants, though least so in the case
of Haiti, where sewage treatment services are available to a very low percentage of the
population. In addition, Haiti would likely have had observed industrial pollutants, although
probably at a lower level than Jamaica's. For Subregion IV, the omission of Guadeloupe is
likely to have affected the industrial pollutant results, since both Guadeloupe and Barbados
process sugar, rum, and other sugar byproducts in amounts that can be inferred from GDP data
to be roughly twice as large for Barbados as for Guadeloupe. In the case of Anguila,
Martinque, and Montserrat, it appears unlikely, from what little data are available, that their
inclusion would have substantially altered the picture. The same can be said about all thee
Subregion VI states with respect to industrial pollutants, but it is possible that domestic pollutat
results for Subregion VI might have approached those for Subregion II.
Figure 7 depicts the relative contributions of domestic and industrial pollutants by the five
subregions for which CEPPOL data were reported. It is readily apparent that substantially more
than half the tota pollutant load included in the inventory is generated in Subregions I and V.
Figure 8, which displays the subregional contributions of individual pollutants, indicates that
Subregion I contributes less nutrient loading (TN and TP) from domestic sources than Subregion
V, and no more from industrial sources than any of the other subregions, notwithstanding the
fact that the Subregion I data include both point and non-point source pollutants for the U.S.
Gulf Coast.
The relative contributions of individual states are depicted in Figure 9. Among the more
striking results are the indications that Puerto Rico and Barbados each contributes more pollutant
loading from industrial point sources than the United States, and that Mexico contributes more
than ten times the industrial pollutant loading of any other state in the CEPPOL inventory
(accountig for 82 percent of the entire WCR industrial pollutant load). As for domestic point
sources, it is noteworty that Cuba and the Dominican Republic is each responsible for a greater
pollutat load than Mexico, and that Venezuela contributes far more in domestic pollutats than
Colombia.
To a large extent, some of the more anomalous results of the CEPPOL inventory are
explained by its limitation to point sources of pollution. As noted in UNEP's 1994 Regional
Overview, for example, ths limtation has the effect of reporting the greatest domestic pollution
loads for those states that provide sewage treatment services to the greatest number of people,
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while failing to capture the extent to which a population's domestic waste goes completely
uruanaged or inadequately treated. It also does not address (except for the United States, for
which non-point source loads were included) pollution from such significant WCR non-point
sources as agriculture, forestry, marinas, construction, urban runoff, and automotive emissions.
F. Summary
All nation-states of the Wider Caribbean Region use the marine enviroruent as a sink
for the discharge of pollutants from land-based sources. By far the most serious damages caused
by effuents from land-based sources occur locally, within the territorial sea or exclusive
economic zone of the source state. Most land-based marine pollutants are not transported far
from their sources of discharge, and transboundary pollution events, where they occur, appear
to be confined to border regions.
As the WCR is an open system that exchanges massive amounts of water on a continuous
basis, it is understandable that there is no clear evidence that discharges from WCR states
contribute to a generalized "pollution" of the Caribbean Sea and its associated gulfs. Discharges
from the major river systems move considerable distances within and across subregions, and
sediment loads and litter are transported long distances across the region. Our state of
knowledge regarding the transport of other pollutants is too limited, however, to suggest what
movements occur beyond the local and subregional scales.
The systematic collection and analysis of data on the extent and distribution of localized
pollutants has only recently gotten under way. As of 1994, the CEPPOL program had prepared
inventories and begun an analysis of the distribution of selected land-based marine pollutants
generated by domestic and industrial point sources in 24 WCR states, and by domestic and
industrial point and non-point sources combined in the United States Gulf Coast region. Because
all but one of these CEPPOL inventories are limited to point-source pollutant loads, the results
so far cannot be used to assess the extent and distribution of pollutants generated by some of the
most significant non-point source activities in the region, including agriculture, forestry, and
coastal development projects.
In the absence of systematically collected data on non-point pollutant loads for most of
the WCR countries and territories, a more complete picture of an individual state or subregion's
relative contribution and exposure to LBMP must be inferred from other indicators. The
combination of indicators considered in Section IV is useful as well for assessing the inclination
and abilty of states to undertake independent or joint action to control LBMP problems.
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III. Arguments for Collective Action in the WCR
A. The Importance of Scale
The published literature and written records of WCR discussions focuses on the
establishment and implementation of a regionwide approach to the prevention, reduction, or
control of LBMP. In this section, we examine several issues and arguments that are being
debated as bases for pursuing a "regionwide" approach to LBMP control in the WCR. These
issues and arguments include: common-pool pollution effects; common problems; scale
economies; and the need for uniform standards (water quality or pollution control standards).
Some of our discussion is critical of several broad arguments that have been made in
favor of an LBMP protocol for the Caribbean. The intent of this criticism is constructive;
whether or not an international agreement has the potential to be effective depends upon a
careful assessment of the arguments made in favor of collective action. Our analysis cannot be
used in place of the international negotiations that must occur to work out the details of a
protocol. But we hope to give the negotiators an understanding of the different sides of the
issues involved.
All of these issues are indeed relevant and valid at some scaLe in the Caribbean.
However, the extent to which they are applicable regionwide is not at all clear. To a significant
extent, protocol effectiveness wil depend upon whether or not the Contracting Parties can
correctly characterize the scale of LBM pollution problems and tailor appropriate solutions. i
These activities are among the most importnt ones to be addressed by a protocol and
implemented though its institutions.
The occurrence of trans boundary movements of pollution (or of natural resources affected
by pollution) is among the most powerfl rationales for an international protocol on pollution
reduction. Increasingly, the existence of common, but nontransboundary, pollution problems
within the jurisdiction of many states is being advocated as a justification for an international
protocol. An understanding of common socio-economic characteristics, as we describe in
Sections IV and V, can be useful in identifying potential benefits from agreements and
relationships to control pollution. We discuss the potential for these kinds of "gains from trade"
in the Caribbean in Section V.
i Implicit in this statement is the point that region wide approaches to LBM pollution problems may be ineffective
if the problems themselves are not regionwide.
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B. Pollution Costs and Benefits
As we consider the arguments commonly advanced for collective action with respect to
LBMP in the WCR, we should maintain a balanced perspective on the types of benefits and costs
involved in pollution control.
Land-based waste discharges should be described as "pollution" only to the extent that
other human activities or valued characteristics of the marine environment are affected adversely
by the effluents.2 Discharges can affect such uses of the WCR coastal and marine environments
as coastal tourism and recreation, nursery grounds for fish and wildlife, commercial and
recreational fisheries, and biological diversity. Scientists have begun to document the potential,
and in some cases actual, impacts of land-based effuents in the WCR (Gladfelter and Ogden
1994; UNEP 1994a and references therein). The social costs of these impacts have not been
documented to date,3 but they are likely to vary considerably by state and geographic location.
WCR states face a great variety of economic development problems, including issues
associated with effluents from human activities. The introduction of nutrients, pesticides,
sewage, and industrial effuents into local marine environments is a direct consequence of
expanding populations and the siting of industrial facilities in coastal zones or major watersheds.
It is very important to recognize that Caribbean coastal and marine environments provide
substantial economic benefits as sins for agricultural runoff, sewage, and industrial effuents.
Any measures taen to reduce or control discharges from land-based sources are likely to be
costly, but solutions to some of the most significant problems can be achieved with minial
financial investments, e.g., properly sited outfalls. Evaluation of these benefits and costs, and
considerations of their distribution among the citizens of a state or across states, are relevant to
the problems of LBMP control.
C. Common-Pool Effects
Consider a situation in which a set of states share a common-pool resource, such as a
regional marine environment. Marine pollutants originating in one or more of the states of the
2 This definition is the anthropocentric one currently accpted and embodied in international environmental law
(Hunter, Sommer, and Vaughan 1994). Note that the definition of "pollution" found in Article 1(4) of UNCLOS
II appears more broad, in that it also encompasses "har to living resources and mare life." Kimball (1995)
explains that the definition of pollution is being broadened in three ways: the precautionar principle has begun to
be adopted as a nonbinding norm; har to "living resources" now often includes har to "marine ecosystems"; and
coastal zones and related waters are begining to be considered a par of the marine environment.
3 Estimates of the benefits of natural marine environments in the Caribbean, such as coral reefs or marshes, are
only just emerging. See Pendleton (1994); Spurgeon (1992); van't Hof (1985); or Lynne, Conroy, and Prochaska
(1981).
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region flow across national boundaries. 4 Adverse impacts of pollution may occur in all states.
Because each of these states could benefit, at no cost, from expensive pollution control
undertken by any other state in the region, incentives for unilateral pollution control are
diminished. If this kind of "free-riding" can be curtailed through regional collective action, then
it may be possible for pollution emissions to be reduced to a greater extent. Most regional
LBMP protocols are in the nature of contracts through which the states of a region attempt to
obligate themselves to reduce the tendency to free-ride in the reduction and control of pollution.
In fact, mechanisms designed to control or reduce free-riding behavior can be the most important
elements of such protocols.
In some regional seas, such as the Baltic, the rationale for an international protocol on
land-based sources of marine pollution appears clear (Broadus et al. 1993). There are many
sources of potential pollutants and many states affected by transboundary pollutant flows.
Furthermore, substantial uncertinty exists about the precise source of any particular pollutant,
making it costly to assign liability for pollution impacts. This statement is especially true for
historical contributions to stocks of persistent pollutants. Multilateral pollution reduction is
needed to reduce impacts felt by all states in the region.
In the WCR, sources and effects are localized, and therefore the need for an international
agreement on multilateral pollution reduction is not as clear as in the case of the Baltic. A
fundamental question for the WCR is why, within the context of a regional protocol, should a
state assume a serious obligationS to other states to clean up discharges of pollution that
originate and remain within its own borders. 6 This is precisely the issue faced by the
Mediterranean states in their attempts to regulate LBMP in that region.
Unless voluntarily relinquished, each WCR state has the right to determine its own path
of economic development, subject to customary international law (HLR 1991). Any particular
state's choice of development path could involve discharges into its local coastal or marine
environments. Each state has the right to perform its own evaluation of benefits and costs
associated with the release of effluents. Absent transboundary effects and subject to relevant
4 Analogously, natural resource stocks might cross national boundaries. If these stocks are hared by pollution
in one nation's waters, then adverse economic effects may be felt by another nation.
S Clearly there is a legal obligation on the par of state-paries to the Caragena Convention to prevent, reduce
and control pollution from land-based sources. Whether states take this obligation seriously depends upon their
definition of "appropriate measures" and, if defined, whether such measures are implemented. Protocol
"effectiveness" depends critically upon the extent to which states take their obligations seriously.
6 Charey (1994) explains that UNCLOS II "effectively addresses" the issues related to reconciliation between
a nation's obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment and its sovereign right to exploit its natural
resources. Yet it would appear that the language of Article 193 and other language in the Convention relating to
the use of "best practicable means" to prevent, reduce or control pollution is broad enough to accommodate relaxed
interpretations in specific contexts.
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international law, it is unclear that other states or the international community in concert have
the right to impose environmental standards on any particular state and thereby affect its choice
of development path.
According to principles of international law and custom, each state also has the right to
voluntarily relinquish its right to economic self-determination. Each WCR state has the right
to enter into trades, agreements, or other types of relations with other states in the region,
including agreements to adopt policies for pollution control, such as the Cartagena Convention
or UNCLOS III. Two-thirds of the WCR states are Contracting Parties to the Cartagena
Convention, which calls for the development of a protocol on land-based sources of marine
pollution. Article 7 of the Convention provides a good example of the voluntary relinquishment;
to an unspecified extent, of each state's right to economic self-determination. As agreed, parties
to the Cartgena Convention "shall take all appropriate measures to prevent, reduce and control
pollution" from land-based sources (emphasis added). The use of the term "shall" denotes an
obligation on the part of each state-party. A difficult debate has now been initiated on what
measures might be considered "appropriate" (Wood-Thomas, pers. comm., 1995).7
Evolving international law of the marine environment, such as that embodied in
UNCLOS III, has enlarged its focus to include pollution impacts both across state boundaries
and within a state's exclusive economic zone and territory, including estuaries (see Charney
1994). Historically, however, perceptions of the need for international control of marine
pollution at the domestic level have arisen mainly from concerns about the potential for
interntional impacts of insuffcient domestic controls. Meng (1987) concludes, therefore, that
it "seems inevitable that the notion of trans frontier pollution wil remain one of the bases for the
development of international law on marine pollution control, simply because to respect and
protect state sovereignty has always been a fundamental object of international law." We
suggest that the existence of transboundary pollutant flows is one of the strongest reasons for an
international LBMP protocoL8
The adverse effects of transboundary marine pollution often are uncertin or not
imediate. States may wish to avert the risks of any negative impacts of transboundary marine
7 The extent to which a LBMP protocol wil be considered effective, ex post, wil depend upon the clarity of
the definition of "appropriate measures" in this context.
8 To suggest that an international protocol must be negotiated and implemented to control pollution only at the
domestic level would appear, at best, to invite ineffectiveness. Can one reasonably expect that states unaffected by
another state's domestic pollution wil bear the burden of enforcement against the polluting state? Charey (pers.
comm. 1985) argues that "third" states can protect a "commons," such as the marine environment, even if no state
is directly injured. However, a significant obstacle is the cost of bringing the action.
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pollution on their own marine and coastal environments and resources. 9 In the presence of such
risks, it can be sensible for states to be conservative with respect to marine pollution problems.
Risk-aversion with regard to the expected impacts of transboundary pollution provides a rationale
for collective action similar to that in the presence of actual impacts. However, in the absence
. of demonstrated impacts, the implementation of pollution reduction measures is likely to be more
problematic.
In the WCR, adjacent or neighboring states can perceive more clearly the benefits and
costs of marine pollution and pollution controls than can states that are separated by great
distances. LBMP problems can be observed more easily, benefits from pollution control are
more likely to be realized, and monitoring and enforcement costs may be much smaller in a
subregional, especially bilateral, context. A central role of an LBMP protocol in the Caribbean
should be to encourage states to agree to pollution reduction at bilateral or subregional levels,
delineated on the basis of transboundary effects, where they are known to occur, or common
environmental problems. We discuss this role in greater detail in Section V.
Several international heritage sites and trans boundary fishery resources exist in the
Caribbean (Elder and Pernetta 1991). States may have a legal obligation to reduce or to
eliminate activities that have an adverse effect on internationally protected sites or species. With
respect to the arguments discussed above, these resources and protected areas are analytically
identical to the problem of a common-pool resource. For stationary resources, such as marine
protected areas, the same arguments we have made already concenung the advantages of
subregional approaches can be reiterated. For fugitive resources, such as some species of
marine fisheries, similar arguments can likewise be made, although the geographic distribution
of cause and effect may differ from the distribution of marine pollution.
D. Common Environmental Problems ,~-'~'
In the WCR, transboundary pollution problems tend to occur across shared watercourses,
in shared estuaries, or across nearshore marine boundaries. Other serious LBMP problems
exist, but these tend to be localized, affecting uses or harming resources of the state from which
the pollution originates (Section II). Thus one of the strongest reasons for negotiating an
international agreement to control LBMP, namely the occurrence of international pollution
effects, appears not as strong in the Caribbean as in other regional seas, such as the Baltic or
the Nort Sea.
Because of localized intrastate pollution in the WCR, many observers have recommended
9 Aversion to risks does not necessarily imply avoidance of risks at all costs. In other words, we do not
recommend adoption of the extreme version of the "precautionar principle" (see Broadus 1992).
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that an LBMP protocol should focus on approaches to the resolution of local, not transboundary,
pollution problems. An importnt issue to raise in this context is whether or not an international
agreement is needed to resolve local pollution problems. An alternative course of action would
be for each state to make its own decisions and take its own actions with respect to LBMP
problems that are clearly not international in effect. These independent decisions and actions
might involve seeking or trading for financial or techncal assistance from other states, within
the region or elsewhere.
What are the kinds of barriers that exist to prevent Caribbean states from acting on their
own to resolve localized LBMP problems? Several barriers have been identified, including
insufficient financial or physical resources to control LBMP, inadequate institutions, such as
laws and policies, and even ignorance or lack of recognition of LBMP as an environmental
problem.
In cases in which pollution control resources are insuffcient, analysts have suggested that
an international protocol may provide a partial solution. For example, Kimball (pers. comm.,
1995) has pointed out that". . . a well-functioning agreement may attract international assistance
from multilateral and bilateral donor agencies. Thus, the agreement leverages international
assistance for domestic problems, creating incentives for the polluter state to join." We expect
that states may be able to attract international assistance, even in the absence of an international
agreement. However, the conclusion of such an agreement may enhance the significance of
LBMP as an international problem relative to other social problems. If this is true, it is possible
that financial resources that might have been directed to resolve other problems are more likely
to be directed toward LBMP.
Others have suggested that the conclusion of an LBMP protocol resolves a "fairness"
problem in which international assistance is directed only toward an elite subset of states, or
perhaps to specific groups of states in defined "subregions," on the basis of their perceived
capabilities. For example, Wood-Thomas (pers. comm., 1995) states that "(i)f we work
exclusively at the subregional level, several sub-regional groups may not be able to take
meanigful action because they do not possess adequate human or financial resources. External
resources (World Bank, US~, etc.) may not be able to support all of the subregions addressing
similar problems, and they wil therefore most likely lend support to those sub-regions which
are best organized and institutionally capable." The extent to which this statement is true
depends upon how international assistance is allocated. Recently, the lion's share of
international assistance funds from the United States to the WCR has been flowing to Haiti and
Nicaragua, which arguably are not well-organied or institutionally capable. But other
organiations, such as the World Bank, may employ different criteria. Even if an LBMP
protocol does level the playing field in terms of attracting international assistance, issues persist
about allocating this assistance internally among the Contracting Parties. Presumably, these
issues can be addressed through fairness rules incorporated into the protocol.
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It is also possible that the Contracting Parties to a protocol can provide for contributions
from each party to a central fund. We discuss below in Section IV.I the status of contributions
(and unfulfiled pledges) to the CEP fund. Tietenberg (pers. comm., 1995) has suggested that
annual fees might be levied on WCR states (or individual pollution sources) to fund monitoring
and enforcement activities, as is currently the practice with respect to some forms of air
pollution in the United States. The size of the fee might be tied to the level of pollution so that
there is an incentive for states to lower discharges. However, unless the fees are small, there
may be difficulties in getting states to agree initially to participate in such a program. And if
the fees are small, they are unlikely to provide much of a source reduction incentive. In
addition, a system for accurate and consistent measurement of point source and nonpoint source
pollution must be established, unless fees are based on a fixed level of allowable discharges.
An even more difficult problem concerns the lack of institutional infrastructure in many
of the states of the region. We address the status of these institutions in Section IV. E below.
The most serious cases are those states in which political power is held by those who benefit
from using the marine environment for waste disposal and in which those who suffer from
LBMP have little or no political power. It may be difficult, if not impossible, to encourage such
states to agree to a protocol, unless their participation is tied specifically to other issues.
Lining LBMP to other issues wil require an examination of the relevant political conditions
for those states that are reluctant to participate, and negotiation on a case-by-case basis.
Some analysts have argued that international collective action, such as that called for in
a regional LBMP protocol, can stimulate the development of institutions and domestic programs
to implement the provisions of the agreement. If domestic programs are developed, one must
be concerned with the extent to which these programs can be determined to be effective at local
and national levels.
Education about LBMP problems in the WCR wil always be impgrtant. Our
examination of the region suggests that there is a fairly good awareness in each of the states
about the presence of localized marine pollution from land-based sources. More work needs to
be accomplished with regard to determining the extent of the problem in each state, including
the nature of pollutant flows and the size of actual damages and risks. Some good work along
these lines is already being accomplished though the CEP and other research programs.
Institutions established under the auspices of an LBMP protocol might usefully draw upon or
expand existing programs, such as CEPPOL and others, to enhance the awareness and
understanding of marine pollution in the region.
Most WCR states have made some measurable progress toward developing and
implementing the capacity to deal with localized LBMP problems. We discuss this progress in
greater detail in Section V below.
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E. Scale Economies and Clearinghouse Efficiencies
Officials of international organizations, such as UNEP, have argued that a regional
protocol can facilitate technology transfer, expedite information exchange, and focus the
allocation of financial capital and other resources more effectively to solve LBMP problems
(UNEP 1994c, 1992; Nollkaemper 1992). These and other coordinative-type activities are the
kind commonly associated with a "clearinghouse."
Clearinghouse efficiencies are a type of "scale economy:" as the amount of a particular
service, such as information exchange, is increased, the cost per unit declines. In general,
economies of scale are likely to be realized when an activity involves relatively high "fixed"
costs, io when specialization in the performance of tasks is possible, or where risks can be
pooled, such as through the establishment of emergency-response measures. It is important to
note that scale economies may exist over a range of certin levels of activity but disappear,
resulting in "diseconomies" of scale, at higher levels. The relevant issue with respect to
clearinghouse effciencies is: what is the optimal size of the clearinghouse?
Economies of scale may exist in scientific research and monitoring of land-based sources
of marine pollution, too. Table 13, in the next section, lists the research, coordination, and
advocacy organizations that focus on marine science in the Caribbean today. It is likely that at
least some, if not all, of the relevant economies of scale in scientific research and monitoring
have been realized alread though the activities of these organiations.
Officials at some international institutions, such as UNEP and the Caribbean Division of
the World Bank, have begun developing synoptic views of the primary Caribbean regional
environmental institutions and their mandates. Table 5 lists these institutions and their
corresponding mandates. These institutions act in clearinghouse capacities, but, according to
World Bank officials, the institutionaLframeworkis stil too fragmented, suggesting that even
more centralization is warranted:
The fundamental problem is that these efforts have often led to the formulation of proposals and
implementation of activities that, while responding to a priority issue, do so from a paricular
institutional or even funding source perspective. There is, in general, a need for coordination on
a regional basis in order to increase the effectiveness of the regional efforts. (Elvis and Colbert
1994)
10 As fixed costs are spread out over greater levels of the activity, their per unit contribution to total costs
declines. Fixed costs are by definition "recoverable" so that, for example, expenditures that are made on supplies
or infrastructure can be recouped if the activity termnates. If these expenditures canot be recouped, then the costs
are "sunk." Sunk costs do not contribute to economies of scale.
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Although there would appear to be the potential for economies of scale, questions persist
about how these might be realized through a protocol arrangement and whether a protocol is
better than some alternative. To date, clearinghouse roles have been developed and implemented
by international organizations with international resources, such as UNEP and the World Bank,
with apparently little effect on the commitment, practices, or environmental problems of
individual states. The example of UNEP's CEP, which was established in 1982, serves to make
the point. Brewster (1994) has identified the following four existing constraints to the successful
implementation of CEP: (1) insufficient political commitment; (2) inadequate financial support;
(3) organizational weaknesses; and (4) inadequate awareness, expertise, and experience at the
domestic leveL. These constraints are of the same nature as those that may well limit the
effectiveness of a regionwide LBMP protocol.
Clearly, there is a role for a clearinghouse on LBMP in the WCR. To a large extent,
this role is being performed already by UNEP and the World Bank, as well as by other smaller
regional institutions, such as OECS. The fundamental issue is whether additional economies can
be achieved by an "umbrella" institution established through the protocol. Although this
question cannot be answered until such an institution is established, it is sensible, at least, to
question the potential for additional scale economies. We suggest that the best approach is an
incremental one. 
II A clearinghouse established under the LBMP protocol should take advantage
of existing institutions and expand step-by-step, testing for the existence of scale economies. 
12
F. Uniform Standards
The extent to which marine pollution should be controlled depends upon our
understanding of both causes and effects, and the extent to which it can be controlled depends
uponour ability to infuence causes so as to reduce adverse effects. Figure 10, adapted from
Fisher and Peterson (1973), describes the relationship between emissions (causes) and the
determination of damages (effects). A wide range of pollution control instruments are available,
ranging from command-and-control regulations, or standards (Helfand 1991), to market-based
approaches (OECD 1994; Tietenberg 1985), or to combinations of the two. The best instrument
or combination of instruments may depend upon specific environmental, political, or economic
factors. In the WCR, much of the discussion about pollution control instruments has focused
on the development of "standards" of two types: ambient water quality standards and technology-
based controls.
11 Wood-Thomas (pers. coin. 1995) reports that". . . we are pushing a reorientation of CEPPOL to serve
defined management needs and we wil likely pursue a functional linkage of work undertaken through both CEPPOL
and IPID," a regional Integrated Planing and Institutional Development Project.
12 The protocol institution may decide to contract, instead of expand, existing institutions in order to achieve
the most effcient level of clearinghouse service.
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In the Caribbean, concentrations of LBM pollutants, of any type, vary by location; they
are "non-uniformly mixed" (Tietenberg 1988). Pollutant levels at each location also may vary
over time as a result of environmental events, such as storms; seasonal oceanographic
phenomena, such as freshets; or cumulative effects, such as the build-up of pollutant stocks.
Pollutant concentrations, of any type, may be attributed to single or multiple sources, such as
industrial plant emissions, sewer outflows, or runoff from farms. In general, each pollution
source contributes a different amount to the ambient concentration at each location, because of
relative proximity, precipitation or mixing, or other reasons. Finally, the distributions of natural
resources and human uses of the marine environment also are nonuniform (Elder and Pernetta
1991) .
The nonuniform distributions of both ambient pollution concentrations and resources or
uses implies that damages from marine pollution are likely to vary by location. Damages can
also vary because of differences in the tastes and income levels of the users of resources at
particular locations. The differential relative contribution of sources to ambient concentrations
at any location implies that costs of pollution control vary by location as well. Costs of
pollution control for sources can vary also because of differences in technologies, market
conditions, and other factors.
If the causes and effects of marine pollution were uniformly distributed, then uniform
regional standards or controls might be appropriate policy instruments. But the existence of
nonuniformities in the Caribbean argues strongly for approaches that are capable of dealing
effectively with the problem of pollution control at each location.13 In other words, regionwide
uniform water quality standards and technology-based controls are not necessarily appropriate
policy instruments, given the environmental and economic characteristics of the Caribbean.
As a precursor to the selection of a pollution control instrument, we require inormation
about the damages associated with pollution at each location in the Caribbean (see the "dollar
costs" box in Figure 10). Ideally, this information would include data on the damages associated
with different levels of pollution at each location. Moreover, we need information about the
costs of control for sources contributing to pollution at each location. An economically efficient
emissions quota or charge could then be set for each location. Preference for either a quota or
a charge depends upon the relative levels of knowledge about damages or control costs (Baumol
and Oates 1988).14
For many pollutants, a surrogate measure of damages, based upon a scientific
13 One might argue that "on average" standards would be appropriate pollution control instruments. Such an
argument ignores difficulties of political acceptance of standards (Sand 1991) and the natural tendency to weaken
the standards approach through waivers or exceptions (UNEP 1994c).
14 In general, it can be quite expensive to gather information about either damages or control costs.
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understanding of the potential effect of pollutants on human health, often is employed instead
(see the "effects" box in Figure 10). A water quality standard can be set to ensure that pollution
is kept at some level that has a low probability of health effects (Figure 10). Quotas can be set
at levels to ensure that the water quality standard is not exceeded. 15 Water quality standards
are less expensive to administer than the efficient quotas or charges described above, because
there is no need to measure damages explicitly. 16 But because water quality standards consider
neither damages nor control costs, their uniform application may require excessively costly
pollution control in areas where there are very low levels of marine resource use.
Several analysts have suggested that regional water quality standards should be applied
in the Caribbean. In Policy Principles, WWF and ESI (1994: 2) argue for "regional
environmental standards and environmental quality commitments." Their argument is based
primarily on the potential benefits of a level regulatory environment across Caribbean states. 17
Kasten (1994: 17) has argued for establishing a technology-based control program in the short
run and supplementing this program with water quality standards in the long run.
The use of the term "regional" in these studies probably implies water quality standards
that are "uniform" across the region, but there is no need for this interpretation. For example,
in Appropriate Approaches, UNEP (1994c: 27) argues for domestic water quality standards
based upon regional standards that can be modified though the use of "exceptions" and
"waivers." Exceptions and waivers would be based upon "particular ecological, geographical,
and physical characteristics and the level of existing pollution." In this way standards might be
made appropriately nonuniform across WCR states. IS
In order to design technology-based controls that meet established water quality
standards, the relationship between pollutant discharges and effects should be known. Often this
relationship is not well understood, and pollution controls have been recommended or adopted
in many part of the world without regard to their likely effectiveness in meeting,~water quality
standards or sometimes even prior to the establishment of water quality standards.
Arguments for the adoption of pollution controls without water quality standards arise,
in part, from the supposition that control of LBM pollutants must begin before the lengthy
processes of establishing water quality standards and understanding cause-and-effect relationships
15 Setting the appropriate quota wil require some knowledge of the relationship between emissions and effects,
i.e., of the assimilative capacity of the environment.
16 Water quality standards can also be applied without regard to the costs of control, although it is often the case
that policy debates wil tend to focus on these costs.
17 This argument is based on the idea of "pollution havens." See below.
is Note, however, that if exceptions become widespread, then water quality "standards" may lose their meaning.
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are completed. In effect, such an approach is an application of the "precautionary principle,"
defined, as follows, in the Rio Declaration of the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development (UNCED):
(w)here there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall
not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation. (emphasis added)'9
Economic theory, in combination with a substantial body of empirical analysis, indicates
that technology-based standards may be one of the most costly ways in which to control pollution
(Cropper and Oates 1992; Tietenberg 1985). For example, Lyon and Farrow (1995) have
examined the benefits and costs of clean water programs in the United States. Their findings
suggest that incremental costs of water pollution control, which are based on estimates of
constructing publicly owned treatment works, exceed incremental benefits.
Notwithstanding their relative costliness, there are several reasons why technology-based
standards might be promoted as a policy measure. Table 6 presents a comparison of the
economic incentives and effects of different types of pollution control instruments. First, from
an economic standpoint, the presence of theshold effects in the face of uncertainty about
damages or control costs is one of the strongest reasons in favor of establishing technology-based
standards. Such effects may exist in the WCR with respect to harmful, persistent pollutants,
such as organohalogens.
Many of the WCR states are Contracting Parties to the London Dumping Convention (see
Table 9 in Section IV), which has organied pollutants into prohibited (black list) and regulated
(grey list) substances. Black list substances tend to be those with theshold effects. One option
for the Contracting Parties to the Cartgena Convention is to consider treating LBM pollutants
in the same manner ~s London Dumpin Convention pollutants so that, for example, land-based
discharges of black'list pollutats would be banned and land-based discharges of grey-list
pollutants would be regulated by individual states. However, W ood- Thomas (pers. comm.,
1995) explain that the negotiations concernng the WCR protocol are leading in a different
direction:
L
¥j
L
'"
l
We are specifically avoiding a black-list, grey-list approach in the WCR because of lessons leared
in the Baltic, Nort Sea, and Mediterranean. This structure has failed to focus the respective
paries on those contamnants that are the priority problems within a region. Changes in the Baltic
and North Sea have reflected a recognition of this problem as they have developed "red-lists."
We hope to utilze the negotiation of specific anexes to take this concept to a more pragmatic
19 Adoption of technology-based controls without water quality standards can be considered an application of
an extreme version of the precautionar principle (cf., Broadus 1992), one whose adoption might be questioned on
ecnomic grounds uness clear threshold effects are suspected. Threshold effects are damages that are severe or
irreversible, imposing high levels of social costs if pollution is controlled at too Iowa leveL.
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level-focusing effort on the principal source categories that are responsible for the more obvious
and gross sources of pollution. Various anexes would then be developed over time as the
scientific understanding evolves concerning what pollutants and sources are most important in the
Region. As such we use the protocol structure to help rationalize and focus the attention of the
parties on those problems that are most significant in the region. The problems vary and are not
shared by all, but with adequate flexibility and definition of the anexes, these should provide a
useful vehicle to facilitate limited, but pragmatic actions that expand over time (recognizing the
scarcity of resources and that scientific understanding will improve and offer new priorities for
action).
Second, from a political standpoint, some industries may favor standards because they
constitute barriers to entry, and employees of controlled industries may favor standards because
of wage-enhancing effects. Table 7, adapted from Dewees (1983), outlines some of these
reasons .
Third, from a strategic standpoint, as happened in the case of the negotiations over an
LBMP protocol in the Mediterranean, developed states might argue in favor of technology-based
standards for at least three reasons: (1) technology-based standards may already be in place; (2)
adoption of similar standards removes the incentive, however small, for a developed state's
industries to relocate; and (3) establishment of technology-based standards in other states
presents market opportnities for existing producers of pollution control technologies.
Technology-based standards are just one of several possible kinds of standards. 20
Moreover, as shown in Table 6, standards are not the only available pollution control
instrument. Given nonuniformities in the distribution of LBMP causes and effects, it is not
obvious, ex ante, that technology-based standards wil be the most appropriate pollution control
intrument in every case. Following the intent of the precautionary principle to encourage the
adoption of cost-effective pollution control methods, flexibilty in selecting and implementing
methods of control seems more appropriate. Furter, such flexibilty is likely to increase the
potential for gains from trade in pollution control: and, thereby, to enhance the potential for
protocol effectiveness.
Some analysts have argued for uniform standards to "level the environmental playing
field." This argument, which is one version of the "pollution haven" hypothesis (Cumberland
1981), states that the implementation of uniform standards removes incentives for industries to
relocate to jurisdictions in which standards are low or nonexistent. The pollution haven
hypothesis is currently the focus of a number of research effort in the environmental policy field
(Jaffe et aL. 1995; Cropper and Oates 1992). Early results from this research are not in full
agreement, but basic theory suggests that a policy of "environmental federalism," or the setting
of standards at a level which internalizes pollution impacts, is economically efficient (Oates and
20 Helfand (1991) evaluates the economic effects of at least five different kinds of standards.
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Schwab 1988). This result derives its force from the fundamental nonuniformities in cause and
effect, described above.21 This theoretical result reinforces an argument for the setting of
standards at domestic or subregional levels in the Caribbean, although it should be recognized
that some states or subregions wil need outside assistance in setting standards.
Other considerations suggest that pollution haven arguments are sometimes exaggerated.
For example, unlike marine pollution from ships, land-based capital is not completely mobile
and cannot be moved costlessly to avoid stringent environmental regulations. Some types of
land-based sources, including utilities such as power plants, must be sited in almost every
jurisdiction. 22 For those states that focus on tourism as a major industry, the pollution haven
hypothesis would appear to be easily rejected. Also, factors affecting other inputs to an
industrial firm's production processes, such as labor costs, may greatly outweigh the estimated
costs of environmental regulation in a firm's location decision. For example, Jaffe et al. (1995)
find that the costs of industrial compliance with federal pollution control regulations in the
United States are a small fraction, averaging only two percent, of the total cost of production.
It is likely that great difficulties wil be encountered in attempts to reach agreement on
or to implement regionwide uniform water quality standards or technology-based controls,
thereby heightening the potential for protocol ineffectiveness. The adoption of regional standards
may result in an international consensus on the lowest standards acceptable to all parties (cf.,
Sand 1991), instead of ones that reflect the size of damages or that adequately protect human
health. The nonuniform distribution of causes and effects of LBMP in the WCR strengthens an
argument for decisions to be made on water quality standards and pollution control instruments
at the subregional, bilateral, or domestic levels. Discussion at regional fora on the benefits of
waivers, exemptions, and timetable extensions indicate that the Contracting Parties are aware
of the problems of adopting and applying uniform standards. Thus, a critically importnt role
for an LBMP protocol is to help states identify the most appropriate pollution control
mechanisms for their individual or shared environmental circumstances.
G. Summary
Many of the arguments made for concluding an international LBMP protocol in the WCR
are valid at some scale. Transboundary pollution occurs along the borders of some states but
21 In their study of the benefits and costs of the U.S. clean water program, Lyon and Farrow (1995) recommend
that more attention be given to geographically targeted controls instead of uniform national regulations.
22 If environmental regulations var by jurisdiction, then the kinds of technologies employed by utilities may
var as welL. But utilties wil not be attracted to regions because of nonstringent environmental regulations. In
fact, some types of "point" sources, such as sewage treatment facilties, will be attracted to regions because of
stringent environmental regulations.
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is not a regionwide phenomenon. Nevertheless, it may be one of the strongest reasons for
concluding an international agreement. Clearinghouse efficiencies, a type of scale economy,
may exist for some categories of pollution problems that are common among the WCR states.
Clearinghouse programs exist already in the region, and the issue for protocol negotiators is how
to take advantage of these programs through judicious consolidation or expansion in some
directions to test for additional scale effects. The nonuniform distribution of causes and effects
of marine pollution in the WCR argues for approaches that deal with problems at each location.
We argue for flexibility in the adoption of pollution control instruments, such as tradeable
permits or emission charges where appropriate. Regionwide requirements for technology
controls wil be unnecessarily costly and inappropriate unless threshold effects are likely.
Increasingly, observers are arguing for an LBMP protocol in the WCR that gives priority
to resolving localized but widely occurring pollution problems. Such an approach is clearly
more compatible with the environmental realities of the region than one that seeks only (or
primarily) to address transboundary pollution problems. However, the logic of concluding an
international protocol to address primarily domestic pollution problems depends upon certain
unproven assumptions about clearinghouse efficiencies and other scale economies, and about the
likelihood that an international program wil be more effective than efforts by individual states
in attracting funding and other forms of assistance from multilateral and bilateral donor agencies.
We believe that these assumptions are valid to a point that stops well short of justifying a
uniform, regionwide approach to LBMP problems and solutions. Rather, recognizing that some
common LBMP problems in the WCR are more common than others (see Section IV), we
recommend a protocol that carefully delineates subregional groupings and approaches on the
basis of common marine environmental problems. We further recommend (in Section VI) that
the "umbrella" function of a regional LBMP protocol should concentrate on the need to ensure
uniform access to all clearinghouse products and on the internal allocation of financial and
techncal assistance to individual states and subregions.
:.ir.o.
In the next two sections, we describe commonalities and differences across WCR states
and begin to identify opportnities for mutual benefits in pollution reduction and control, which,
if properly elucidated, can be used to encourage subregional pollution control efforts.
48
IV. Economic and Institutional Characteristics of the WCR
A. Regional Diversity
The limited evidence of trans boundary pollution effects noted in the preceding section is
an importnt respect in which the Wider Caribbean Region (WCR) more closely resembles the
Mediterranean Sea than either the Baltic or the North Sea. Another striking similarity between
the Wider Caribbean and the Mediterranean is the large number of countries bordering the
regional sea and the tremendous diversity of cultures, economies, and national priorities that
each region embraces.
Four official languages-English, Spanish, French, and Dutch-and dozens of dialects
are spoken thoughout the Wider Caribbean Region, which encompasses 37 distinct political
units: 25 sovereign nations (13 island nations and 12 continental), 5 territories of the United
Kingdom, 3 overseas departments of France, 2 self-governing units of the Dutch realm
(including one island shared by the Netherlands and France), 2 territories of the United States, i
and the US-associated commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Table 8). The region's 25 sovereign
nations alone range in size from 40,000 persons inhabiting 269 km2 (St. Kitts & Nevis) to
roughly 250 milion dispersed over more than 9 milion km2 (United States), with economies
ranging from the world's largest and most diversified (United States) to one of its most abjectly
poor and undeveloped (Haiti) (Figure 11; see also Tables A.l and A.2 in Appendix A).
B. The WCR States and the Cartgena Convention
The large number of countries bordering the Gulf of Mexico/Caribbean Sea is reflected
in a long list of Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection and Development of the
Marine Environment of the Wider Caribbean Region, or Cartgena Convention. Participation
by the countries and territories of the WCR in the Cartgena Convention and its two existing
protocols (on cooperation in combating oil spils and on the establishment of specially protected
areas and wildlife) is displayed in Table 9, along with their participation in the Law of the Sea
Convention (UNCLOS III) from which the Cartagena Convention takes its definition of
pollution, and in the London Dumping Convention, which govern the dumping of wastes from
ships into the marine environment. Not listed in Table 9 are the three European states with
island territories in the region-France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom-that are
Parties to the Cartgena Convention. All told, 16 of the 25 sovereign states in the region are ...
Contracting Parties to the Cartgena Convention, and 10 of the 12 foreign dependencies are
lThroughout the text, we omit the uninhabited US territory of Navassa Island from counts and discussions of
the WCR states. We mention it here only to explain its appearance on the maps in Sections I and V, where
individual states are identified in terms of their maritime boundaries; in these maps, Navassa appears as a white area
(as do two areas of high seas in the Gulf of Mexico) to the southeast of Cuba.
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Table 8
Political Units of the Wider Caribbean Region
Terri tories/dependencies
Sovereign States
Island Continental
France Netherlands United United States
(overseas (self- Kingdom
departments) governing (terri tories)
units of
Dutch realm)
Antigua & Belize French Aruba Anguilla Navassa Is.
Barbuda Guiana (uninhabited
terr. )
Bahamas Colombia Guadeloupe Netherlands British Puerto Rico
Antilles Virgin (commonweath)
Islands
Barbados Costa Rica Martinique Cayman U.S. Virgin
Islands Islands
(terrtory)
Cuba Guatemala Montserrat
Dominica Guyana Turks &
Caicos
Islands
Dominican Honduras
Republic
Grenada Mexico
Haiti Nicaragua
Jamaica Panama
S1. Kitts & Suriname
Nevis
S1. Lucia United
States
.... .. ... ..-.
S1. Vincent Venezuela
&
Grenadines
Trinidad &
Tobago
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Figure 1 i" Regional diversity as measured by GDP per capita. Greater diversity is shown
as a larger deparre from the 45° dashed line, which depicts a perfectly uniform
distrbution of GDP per capita. Among the four regions depicted, the Wider
Caribbean and the Mediterranean are the most diverse.
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Table 9
Participation In Law of the Sea, London DumpIng, and Cartagena Conventions
State Law of the London Cartagena
Sea Dumping & Protocls
Anauila' .
Antiqua & Barbuda . . . .'
Aruba" 0 . .. .
Bahamas .
Barbados . ..
Belize .
Bntish Viraln Is: . . .'
Cavman Is.c . . .'
ColombIa 0 0 . ..
Costa Rica . . ..
Cuba . . .. .
Dominica . ..
Dominican Reoublic 0 .
French Guiana' 0 . .. .
Grenada . ..
Guadelouoe' 0 . . .'
Guatemala 0 . .. .
Guvana .
Haiti 0 .
Honduras . . 00
Jamaica . . .. .
Martinique' 0 . . .'
Mexico . . ...
Montserrat .
Neth. Antiles" 0 . . ..
Nicaraaua 0 00
Panama 0 . . .'
Puerto Rico' . ..'
SI. Kits & Nevis .
SI. Lucia . . . .'
SI. Vincent & Grenadines - . . .'
Sunname 0 .
Tnnidad & TobaQo . ..'
Turk & Calcoc . . .'
United States . . .'
US Virain Islands' . . .'
Venezuela 0 .. .
. Convention signed and ratified. 0 Convention signed but not ratifed.
. Oil spil protocl signed and ratifed: 0 Oil spil protoc signed but no ratifed:
. SPAW protocl signed (only Colombi has ratifed)
'Not a Contracting Party to the Cartagena Convention, blt participates in the Canbbean
~nviroment Programme.
By Netherlands.
"By UK.
'By France (Cartagena Convention signed "wth reseive.'j
'By US.
Sources: Branes 1991: IMO 1991: Curtis 1993: Broadus and Vartanov 1994: Mandell 1994:
UNEP 1992a: World Bank 1994: WR11994.
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bound by its provisions as welL. i (Signatories that have not ratified the convention include
Honduras, Nicaragua, and the European Economic Community).
The Cartagena Convention was negotiated under the auspices of UNEP, and more
specifically of UNEP's Regional Seas Programme, whose charter is to promote "a regional
approach to the control of marine pollution and management of marine and coastal resources"
(Introduction to Cartagena Convention, UNEP 1983). The Wider Caribbean Region became the
fourth designated Regional Seas Programme area in 1981 (the Mediterranean was the first, in
1978), when an intergovernental meeting at Montego Bay, Jamaica, adopted an Action Plan
for the region. As is customary for the UNEP Regional Seas Programme, the Action Plan set
forth required program components in the areas of environmental assessment, environmental
management, environmental legislation, institutional arrangements, and financial arrangements.
The Cartgena Convention, adopted in March 1983 at Cartagena de Indias, Colombia,
satisfies the Action Plan's requirement for environmental legislation. It takes the customary
UNEP form of an umbrella convention, elaborated by specific techncal protocols, that serves
as a legal framework for cooperative regional and national actions. As expressed in the
Introduction to the Cartagena Convention, "The legal commitment of Governents clearly
expresses their political wil to manage individually and jointly their common environmental
problems." Article 7 identifies land-based marine pollution (LBMP) as among the environmental
problems to be managed.
Joint management of LBMP is likely to be particularly challenging in the case of the
WCR, given the large number and broad diversity of the countries involved. As noted in the
comparative study of the Baltic, North Sea, and Mediterranean programs, "one may expect
cooperation effort-and particularly the establishment of shared objectives and common
approaches-to be the most complicated in regions with relatively heterogeneous member
countries" (Broadus et al. 1993). The study goes on to suggest, in the case of the Mediterranean
program, that "improvement in managing land-based pollution may be possible by separating and
recombinng the Mediterranean countries into new subregions, based on environmental
considerations. "
In the remainder of this section, we consider the prospects for addressing LBMP on a
subregional basis, using as our point of departre the six WCR subregions designated by the
CEPPOL program. The CEPPOL point-source pollutant inventories and other reports of
observed pollutants and associated environmental degradation are reviewed in the context of
various economic and institutional factors that shed light on these observations and on the
prospects for controlling land-based marine pollution through collective actions and mechanisms.
i The United Kingdom has ratified the Caragena Convention on behalf of the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman
Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands, but not Anguilla or Montserrat.
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C. Overview of Demographic and Economic Indicators
Selected indicators of LBMP inputs are presented for the 37 countries and island
territories of the WCR in Table A.3 (Appendix A). The indicators fall into four general areas
of information: on human settlements, agriculture, mining and manufacturing, and deforestation.
Information on human settlements includes the estimated concentration of each country's
population within the drainage basin and coastal areas of the Wider Caribbean Region (see
Appendix B) and the extent to which the population has access to sewage treatment services.
This information sheds light, for example, on the CEPPOL finding that a very high proportion
of the Subregion V domestic pollutant load is attributable to Venezuela, even though Venezuela's
population, at 19 milion, is only three-fifths the size of Colombia's: Venezuela's coastal
population is approximately 4.5 times greater than Colombia's (Mandelli, pers. comm., 1995;
see also Table B.l in Appendix B). Other information reported in Table A.3 includes the extent
of pesticide and fertilzer use and the distribution of oil refineries, mines, and factories of
various types thoughout the region.
Subsumed under the statistics on agriculture are those for fisheries, which, unlike
agriculture (or mining and manufacturing), derives more benefit from an unpolluted marine
environment than from the freedom to contribute to LBMP. 3 For this reason-and because
economic data on the region's fisheries are scant and are believed seriously to underestimate the
value of fishing to many WCR cultures and economies (Mahon 1993)-selected data by weight
on fish catch, imports, exports, and domestic consumption are presented separately in Table A.4
(Appendix A). Table 10 provides some limited economic data on those WCR countries that rank
among the top 50 in the world for the value of their annual fish imports and/or export, as
reported in U.N. trade statistics (UN, n.d.). Nineteen of the WCR countries and territories
qualify for inclusion, but only nine of these-the Bahamas, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, French
Guiana, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela-are net fish exporters in terms of value
of catch.
Tourism, an economic mainstay for many countries of the region, is an activity that can
be both vulnerable to and a contributor of LBMP. Tourism receipts as a percentage of GDP are
reported in Table A.5 (Appendix A), which also includes a narrative summary highlighting the
most prominent economic activities and targeted growth areas for the WCR countries. The
countries are grouped in the table according to the six CEPPOL-designated subregions, making
it comparatively easy to identify those geographical areas where economic activities and
priorities are the most homogeneous (Subregions II and IV), the most vulnerable to LBMP
(Subregion IV), or the most likely to create LBMP effects for downstream countries (Subregion
V).
3 This statement is paricularly true for the smaller island states, where near-shore arisinal fishing accounts for
most of the employment in fisheries.
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Table 10
Major Net Importers and Net Exporters of Fish and Fish Products in the WCR
1992 Value ($US 1000)
State
Net Imports Net Export
Bahamas 264,033
Barbados 1,499
Colombia 129,123
Costa Rica 26,027
Cuba 345,883
Dominican Republic 16,457
French Guiana 38,075
Guadeloupe 14,085
Guyana 1,375
Haiti 3,701
Honduras 41,335
Jamaica 9,889
Martnique 19,492
Mexico 260,087
Netherlands Antiles 1,623
Panama 52,656
Triidad and Tobago 1,120
United States 4,530,905
Venezuela 72,511
Source: 1992 International Trade StatistIcs Yearbook; United Nations.
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D. Comparative Overview of the CEPPOL-nesignated Subregions
Within four of the six WCR subregions, the amount of divergence in standard of living
and the size and composition of economies is nearly as striking at the subregional level as it is
throughout the WCR as a whole. The exceptions to the general pattern of diversity are
Subregion II, which is typified by agricultural economies with low per capita GDP and fairly
low population densities, and Subregion iv, which is typified by tourism-dominated economies
with somewhat higher than average Gnp and very high population densities.
Fisheries statistics, although very incomplete and often unaccommodating for purposes
of direct comparison, provide sketches of the subregions that have similar implications for the
emphasis likely to be placed on the quality of the marine environment. For example, the
average per capita consumption of fish thoughout the WCR is approximately 20 kg, and it
ranges from a low of 5.9 kg in Subregion II (with all 7 states well below the WCR average) to
a high of 33.7 kg in Subregion iv (with 5 states consuming more than twice the WCR average,
and another 3 well above average). These patterns, like the larger economic picture, point to
strikingly different incentives at work in the two subregions with respect to controllng
degradation of marine and coastal resources. Within the other subregions, by contrast, the levels
of fish consumption, like the other economic indicators, are much less consistent.
A number of marine pollution and resource degradation problems plague all of the
subregions, though in varying degrees. The most widespread problems are direct damage to
reefs and mangroves from commercial and recreational activities (e.g., dredging, clearing,
dumping, fishig, diving, and boating) and pollution of coastal waters by sewage effuent.
Among the problems that reach serious proportions in some subregions while occasioning little
distress in others are coastal erosion; deforestation; and pollution from fertilizers and pesticides,
bauxite mining, and oil refineries.
1. Economically heterogeneous subregions
Subregion III, the most strikingly heterogeneous subregion (in economic terms), includes
the Greater Antilles, the Bahamas, and the Cayman and Turks and Caicos Islands. This
subregion is horne to both the highest and the lowest per capita Gnps throughout the WCR (the
Cayman Islands and Haiti, respectively), as well as to the economies that rank highest
throughout the WCR in terms of the predominance of agriculture (Haiti, at 34 percent of GDP),
versus manufacturing (Cuba and Puerto Rico, both at 39 percent), versus tourism (Cayman
Islands at 70 percent, about even with Antigua & Barbuda and the US Virgin Islands in
Subregion IV; and the Bahamas, where tourism has recently declined from about 75 to about 50
percent of GDP). Moreover, among all the economies in the WCR that are heavily oriented
toward tourism, those in Subregion III are the most firmly bolstered by a robust financial
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services sector.
Jamaica, at the geographic center of Subregion III, has the most balanced mix of
agriculture, manufacturing, tourism, and mining of any country in the WCR (agriculture 5
percent, mining 10 percent, manufacturing 20 percent, tourism 21 percent), and in this sense
could perhaps be characterized as the most typical of Caribbean countries, notwithstanding a per
capita GDP less than one-third the WCR average.
The Subregion III countries exhibit similar range as well in the extent to which fisheries
provide a significant export/import and dietary staple. The value of net fish exports by the
Bahamas is the second-highest throughout the entire WCR (after Cuba; Table 10). As can be
seen in Figure 12, the Cayman Islands has one of the smallest catches (by weight) and exports
the largest share of its catch of any WCR country, relying heavily on imports (Table A.4) to
satisfy a roughly average per capita domestic consumption rate among its tiny population of
26,000. Haiti, by contrast, exports less than 10 percent of its catch, which ranks in the middle
range (by weight) among all the WCR countries; nonetheless, more than two-thirds of the fish
consumed by Haiti's population of 6.5 millon must be imported, even though its per capita
consumption rate is the fifth lowest in the entire WCR (Table A.4).
Subregions I and V also exhibit considerable divergence in terms of economic size and
emphasis, although in neither case is the mix of leading economic sectors for individual countries
as pronounced as in Subregion III.4
Subregion i. The divergence among Subregion I countries is most striking with respect
to per capita GDP (Table A. 1, Appendix A). This is the subregion with the highest average per
capita GDP by far (1.75 times the WCR average), yet US per capita GDP is 6 times hìgher than
Mexico's and 14 times higher than Cuba's. Similarly, population density is well below the
WCR average of 159/km2 in all thee countries, but it nonetheless ranges considerably within
the subregion, from 27/km2 in the United StatesS to 96/km2 in Cuba. All thee economies are
industrialized and diversified, but Cuba's is the most distinctly geared to .natural resource
exploitation: 20 percent of Cuba's GDP is concentrated in agriculture and mining, as opposed
to 11 percent of Mexico's and just 4 percent for the United States-notwithstanding the fact that
the United States holds more than 1600 outer continental shelf leases in the Gulf of Mexico and,
together with Mexico, accounts for thee-quarters of the roughly 100 oil refineries in operation
thoughout the WCR (Table A.3).
4This is hardly surprising, given the smaller numbers of countries involved-just 3 in Subregion I and 5 in
Subregion V as opposed to 8 in Subregion II-and the higher proportions of large economies, which tend to be
more diversified and more balanced than smaller ones.
SPopulation density is roughly the same throughout the five Gulf coastal states as for the United States as a
whole.
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Sources: FAD, 1993a; United Nations, n.d.
Figure 12. WCR fish exports and per capita fish consumption
(Note: States appear in order, bottom to top, from largest to smallest catch by
weight.)
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The picture is similar with respect to fish export: Cuba has the fourth-largest catch by
weight in the WCR (after Mexico, the US Gulf Coast states, and Venezuela), and the value of
its net fish exports is the highest of any reported for the entire region (Table 10). Only
Subregion VI has less economic reliance on tourism, which constitutes less than 2 percent of
GDP for each of the three Subregion I countries and about 2.6 percent of GDP for the five US
Gulf coastal states.
Subregion V. As importnt as petroleiim is in the Gulf of Mexico, it is in Subregion V
that its economic dominance is greatest. Each state in the subregion has at least one refinery,
and oil accounts for roughly 30 percent of GDP for Trinidad & Tobago and about 23 percent
for Venezuela. Tourism is targeted for development in Venezuela and especially in Trinidad &
Tobago, but in neither country, nor in Colombia, does it yet contribute appreciably to GDP.
The least industrialized state in Subregion V is the Netherlands Antilles, which has the
largest commercial drydock in the Western Hemisphere, on Curacao; tourism is the major
employer and accounts for more than one-third of GDP, followed in importnce by
banking/finance and fishing. Although tourism figures even more prominently in Aruba (where
it is nearly 50 percent of GDP), Aruba's oil and manufacturing sectors are considerably more
robust than in the Netherlands Antiles.
Colombia's maintays are agriculture and manufacturing (each accounting for 21 percent
of GDP), but in no other country of Subregion V does agriculture account for more than 5
percent of GDP.
Fish is an importnt dietary staple only in the Dutch dependencies, which must import
thee-quarters or more of their needs to meet domestic demand. The largest fish exporter in the
subregion is Colombia (Table 10), which has the sixth largest catch by weight in the WCR,
export 40 percent of its catch, and import. one-thrd of its needs to meet the lowest per capita
domestic consumption rate outside of Central America. Venezuela, with a catch thee times the
size of Colombia's, exports very little of its catch (about 10 percent) and import less than 1
percent of its needs. Trinidad & Tobago imports just under half of its needs and exports less
than one-fifth of its catch.
Subregion VI. Fisheries may well be more importnt to Guyana and French Guiana in
Subregion VI than to any other countries in the WCR. Both have small and quite narrow
economies and very high per capita rates of fish consumption. Guyana, with a population of
800,000, has the distinction of being the only WCR state that is self-sufficient in fish.6 French
Guiana is one of the major exporters of fish and shrimp in the region, with shrimp accounting
6According to many sources, including FAO (1993a). UN trade data for 1992, however, list $1,375,000 worth
of fresh and frozen shellfish imports by Guyana.
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for half of export earnings (and sugar accounting for most of the rest).
Overall, agriculture is the predominant sector in both economies, in terms of share of
GDP. In French Guiana, however, the major employers are forestry and construction, although
France is both the largest source of income (in the form of subsidies) and the most important
source of high-wage and high-skil employment (at the Euro-French space center at Kourou).
Guyana, nicknamed the "breadbasket" of the Caribbean, is also known as the world's largest
producer of bauxite and has recently become a producer of gold as welL.
Agriculture and bauxite mining are less prominent, though not insubstantial, in the
economy of Suriname, where the largest share of GDP (22 percent) is concentrated in financial
and real estate services and the largest segment of the workforce (37 percent) is employed in
public administration and defense. Suriname's is decidedly the most precarious ewnomy within
the subregion, however, having hovered near the brink of fiscal crisis ever since economic aid
from the Netherlands and the United Nations was suspended in 1982 in the wake of a post-
independence military coup (U. S. State Department 1994).
Probably the most homogenous aspects of the Subregion VI countries are their
remarkably low population density, which averages just 2.6 persons per km2, and the near-total
concentration of their populations along the coastline. Per capita GDP is also below the WCR
average for all thee countries, but it ranges from a very low $435 in Guyana to more than ten
times that amount in Suriname.
2. Economically homogeneous subregions
Subregion II. Average per capita GDP is lowest of all in Subregion II, one of two quite
economically homogeneous subregions within the WCR. As noted earlier, agricultural
economies with low per capita GDP and low population densities are characteristic of Subregion
II. So, too, is a greater economic orientation toward the Pacific than the Caribbean coast for
all the Subregion II countries that have two coastlines (i.e., all but Belize). Manufacturing,
though generally accounting for a lesser share of GDP than agriculture, is even more ubiquitous
throughout the subregion as an importnt economic sector.
The only two countries that depart appreciably from this description are Mexico (where
agriculture is just 9 percent of GDP) and Panama (where agriculture and manufacturing
combined are just 20 percent of GDP). Mexico, as noted earlier, is quite highly diversified, and
its economy completely dwarfs all others in the subregion (although Mexico's per capita GDP
is no more than 50 percent higher than any other in the subregion). Panama alone in Subregion
II has an economy dominated by services (26 percent of GDP in transportation/communications,
with 32 percent of the workforce employed in governent services).
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Only in Belize does tourism represent a substantial proportion of GDP (23 percent) and
a priority area for investment and growth.
After Mexico, Panama leads the subregion in fish catch (by weight). Costa Rica,
Honduras, Guatemala, and Belize all export substantially greater proportions of their catch than
Panama, but within the subregion only Mexico's net fish exports surpass Panama's in value.
The average rate of domestic fish consumption in Subregion II is the lowest in the WCR, and
only in Mexico and Panama does it surpass 10 kg per capita per year.
Subregion iv. In striking contrast to this picture is Subregion IV, the only other
economically homogeneous subregion, which is typified by tourism-dominated economies,
somewhat higher than average per capita GDPs, and very high population densities. Subregion
IV contains seven of the bottom eight WCR countries in terms of proportion of GDP accounted
for by agriculture, mining, and manufacturing combined.
The homogeneity is particularly noteworty for the fact that Subregion IV is the one with
the greatest number of political units (14) and the broadest array of foreign dependencies (two
French overseas departents, the smaller islands of the Netherlands Antiles, three British
territories, and the U.S. Virgin Islands). Clearly the commonalities are the small size of the
islands and their considerable limitations with respect to natural resources. Only Dominica,
Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines can support agriculture to any
significant extent (i.e., approaching 20 percent of GDP).
Tourism is tremendously importnt to most of the Subregion IV economies. This is true
even of heavily (French) subsidized Guadeloupe and Martinque and those few other states that
may be equally well known for other things besides tourism-such as Barbados for its sugar,
rum, and banking services, or the US Virgin Islands for its Hess Oil refinery, the largest in the
Western Hemisphere.
Fisheries employment and fish consumption also contrast distinctly with the Subregion
II pattern. Domestic consumption of fish is very high in nearly all the Subregion IV states, and
comparatively little of the fish catch is exported by any state except St. Vincent and the
Grenadines.
3. Marine pollution and resource degradation problems within and across subregions
Table 11 displays the observed pollution and resource degradation problems associated
with the economic activities and population concentrations within the WCR states and
subregions. Nearly every state in the region has suffered direct damage to coral reefs and
mangroves from a combination of pollutants and economic and recreational activities (as well
as from natural hazards such as hurricanes and coral bleaching). The next most common
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problem throughout the region is pollution of coastal waters by sewage effuent. Oil pollution
is another widespread problem, although one that tends to originate primarily from sources and
activities that are not based on land.
On average, the states in Subregions I and V do better than those in the other subregions
in providing sewerage services (an average of 73 % of citizens in Subregion I have access to
services, and an average of 64% of Subregion V citizens). Being the most heavily industrialized
of the subregions, they share other, less desirable, traits as well. Readily apparent in Table 11
(and in the CEPPOL results), for example, are the pollutants associated with the heavy emphasis
on oil exploration and refining in both these subregions. Problems of a more localized nature
in Subregions I and V include the coastal erosion associated with the high concentration of
population in the coastal zone in Venezuela; soil erosion/sedimentation emanating from Mexico,
the US Gulf Coast, and Venezuela; deforestation in Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela; and
stress to reefs and mangroves from ship traffic and wrecks off Colombia, the United States, and
Venezuela.
The only other area in the WCR where ship traffc and groundings have been cited as
a serious problem is the Greater Antilles, especially off Puerto Rico and Jamaica. Far more
important and common throughout Subregion III, however, is pollution by oil and grease,
minig, and other industrial pollutants, which has left only the Bahamas and the Turks and
Caicos Islands relatively untroubled. Jamaica, the most economically broad and balanced state
in the subregion, suffers the broadest array of pollution and environmental degradation problems
as well, including stress to mangroves from sand removal and bauxite mining, deforestation, and
soil erosion. Haiti is noteworty for its very high rate of mangrove clearing for fuel to sustain
a tradition of charcoal-based cooking, and for its very low rate of access to sewerage services.
Overall, Subregion III ranks in the middle range for provision of such services, which are
available to an average of 62 % of citizens thoughout the subregion. The broadest access is
provided by the Cayman Islands, where 97% of the population have access to sewerage services.
The contrasts between Subregions II and IV, and the relative homogeneity within each,
are also evident in the environmental problems noted in Table 11. Deforestation is a problem
for every Subregion II country, whereas coastal erosion, sewage pollution, and overfishing are
the most pervasive natural resource problems in Subregion IV (in addition to the ubiquitous
stresses to reefs and mangroves). In both subregions, an average of just 37% of the population
has access to sewage services. 
7 Within Subregion II, the coastal waters of Costa Rica,
7Accrding to the Britannica Book of the Year 1995. The Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) paints
an even more discouraging picture: P AHO estimates that -c 10 % of sewerage systems in Latin American countries
have adequate treatment plants, and that only 5-10% of the collected wastewater receives adequate treatment
(PAHO/WHO 1992). For the countries of the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM, including Antigua &
Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Doiinica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico,
Puerto Rico, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, and
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Honduras, and Mexico contain substantial amounts of industrial pollutants, which is a problem
as well for Barbados, Grenada, Guadeloupe, and the US Virgin Islands in Subregion IV.
The very few indications of pollution and natural resource degradation problems noted
for Subregion VI in Table 11 reflects primarily two factors: the relative lack of modern
industrialization in the subregion, and a lack of study of its environmental problems. Only the
sewage problems associated with the heavily coastal concentration of the population are
recorded.
4. Extra-regional trade as a unifying force
Having emphasized the economic diversity of the Wider Caribbean Region and the
distinct characteristics of its individual states and subregions as crucial considerations in the
development of an effective protocol on land-based marine pollution, it is equally importnt to
recognize the degree to which this region has come to be defined and shaped into something of
a single, coherent entity by virte of its trade relations with the rest of the world. The states
with importnt agricultural sectors, for example, are bound by their interest in preferential trade
agreements with the United States and the United Kingdom concernng sugar and bananas, and
the manufacturing-oriented economies are bound by a similar interest in agreements with the
United States concernng garments and other consumer goods.
Currently there is considerable concern that at least some of these sectors are in jeopardy
from the trend toward trade liberalization embodied in recent NAFTA and GATT/WTO
developments and from changes in UK import policies resulting from the integration of the
European market. (In addition, Caribbean shipping services have been predicted to lose market
share in the wake of European integration and resulting effort to strengthen the position of
European shipping services.) The fear of fallng prices and/or loss of market share has
intensified the trend.roward investmentin.tourism "thoughout virtally the entire region-just
as banana production was intensified after a dramatic lowering of US sugar quotas in the 1980s
led to a decline in the importnce of sugar to many WCR economies.
The increase in banana production has had serious environmental consequences (World
Bank 1993), primarily in the forms of soil depletion and erosion and high concentrations of
nutrients and pesticides in agricultural run-off. The intensification of tourism-related
constrction, sewage, transporttion, and other activities and services, particularly within the
well-established, beach-oriented tourist markets, could eventually prove even more
environmentally damaging. As one concerned observer has argued, "Tourism in the Caribbean
could cease within ten years if destruction of the environment continues at the present pace"
Venezuela), a recent PAHO survey concluded that only 2 % to 16% of the population is served by sewage systems
(UNEP 1994a).
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(Goodwin 1992).
One encouraging and potentially competing trend, in which Belize, Dominica, and
Guyana have been leading the way, is an emphasis on ecotourism and nature activities, which
are particularly popular with the Europeans who account for most of the recent growth in tourist
arrivals in the region (Goodwin 1992). Another development, embraced by some governments
and shunned by others, is the spread of casino gambling, which has proven quite successful in
boosting tourism performance in Aruba, for example (Goodwin 1992).
E. Legal and Regulatory Frameworks
In the context of negotiating an international protocol, a particularly important aspect of
regional diversity in the WCR concerns the distinct legal traditions and systems which must be
harmonied and upon which a system of effective protocol implementation depends. The
majority of states follow one of two primary legal/cultural systems prevailing in the region. The
first of these is the Roman civil law tradition of the Spanish-speaking countries, in which
patterns of resource use are based upon the principles of private ownership and have been
codified over time in a body of civil codes, statutes, and ordinances. The other major tradition
in the region is that of Anglo-Saxon common law, which traditionally has emphasized custom,
usage, and the decisions and precedents of courts of law, and only comparatively recently has
been codified by legislative action.
Characteristic of nearly all the WCR countries, however, irespective of legal tradition,
is an incomplete and somewhat disjointed approach to environmental legislation and
management. Two common conclusions noted in studies of the environmental problems of the
Wider Caribbean Region are that (1) the laws, regulations, statutes, and ordinances with a
bearing on environmental matters typically are too fragmented to deal. comprehensively and
effectively with the full range of environmental problems in the region; and (2) the legal andlor
admiistrative mechanisms for enforcing environmental rules are too often absent,ìhappropriate,
andlor readily ignored or circumvented.
A 1991 study by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), for example, notes that
most Bank borrower countries in the WCR8 lack coherent national policies for environmental
protection, relying instead on so-called sectoral legislation and ministries, which typically
address themselves to thee general categories of fundamentally "dissimilar" subjects:
(i) protection of certain natural resources such as water, soil, wildlife, marine and coastal
ecosystems, nonrenewable natural resources, etc.;
8lADB borrower countries in the region include the Bahamas, Barbados, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Suriname, Trinidad &
Tobago, and Venezuela.
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(ii) management of the urban environment, such as human settlements and industrial sites; and
(iii) protection of human health from environmental impact (Brañes 1991).
The IADB study further notes that this purely administrative approach to environmental
legislation is generally accompanied by an approach to enforcement that revolves around the
notion of policing and the establishment of penalties. The fines associated with environmental
infractions, moreover, are generally too low to constitute a serious deterrent, and in many cases
they are easily avoided because of the lack of resources to police effectively.
These points are reinforced in a 1994 World Bank study of the 16 member nations of
CARCOM (the Caribbean Common Market).9 The World Bank study rates the severity of 11
key environmental issues in each of the 16 countries, using a scale of 1 (least severe) to 5 (most
severe). Heading the list, in terms of combined score for all 16 countries, is inadequate
"monitoring/enforcement" (54 points). Rated fourth most severe among the 11 issues are the
adequacy of the "institutional framework" and "coastal zone degradation" (both at 44 points),
after solid waste management (51) and sewage disposal (47).
A third and closely related problem with the institutional framework, according to the
IADB study, is the tendency of WCR states to centralize legislative and administrative authority
unduly at the national leveL. Very few of the region's countries-only Cuba, Mexico, St. Kitts
& Nevis, the United States, and Venezuela-have a federalized form of governent in which
states or provinces are interposed between the national and municipal levels and given extensive
authority for establishing or enforcing laws and regulations with environmental relevance. io
One importnt consequence of this approach has been to limit severely the response capability
of environmental administrations (Brañes 1991).
As a practical matter, however, the pattern in federalized and non-federalized states alike
is for "general issues of the ownership and use of environmental components, damage to the
environment, and legal custodianship of the environment" to be governed not by comprehensive
legislation but by a 'patchwork of. sectoraL legislation and civil codes, under criteria that the
IADB study criticizes as "totally inappropriate" (Brañes 1991). At the heart of the problem with
the legal and regulatory framework that is characteristic of most WCR countries is legislation
that fails to recognie what the World Bank (1994) has termed "the interlocking nature of the
economy and the ecology" for most of the Caribbean countries:
9'e CARICOM members are Antigua & Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the
Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad & Tobago.
lOIn Venezuela, however, although state governments generally have powers expressly assigned to them as well
as residual powers not expressly assigned to the national or municipal governents, authority for environmental
matters is reserved for the national governent. In Mexico, similarly, the national governent has long reserved
such powers, although recent reform allow for a gradual sharing of environmental powers by state and municipal
governents (Brañes 1991).
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This legislation ignores the fact that the behavior it attempts to correct through these sanctions does not
normally involve individual deviations from an imposed legal order, but generalized social behavior which
is deeply rooted in society as a result of the predominant style of development based on production and
consumption patterns that often clash with environmental protection. (Brañes 1991)
Nor does the typical pattern of sectoral legislation and civil codes reflect a modern, scientific
understanding of the environment as a single, interlocking system.
There are some noteworthy exceptions to this pattern, however, which Brañes argues are
contributing to a trend throughout much of the region toward a more comprehensive approach
to environmental legislation and management. The IADB study cites national legislation in
Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, and Mexico as instances of "true" environmental legislation-that
is, legislation "based on a concept that views the environment as a whole, organied as a
system." The specific examples include Colombia's National Code on Renewable Natural
Resources and Environmental Protection (1974); Cuba's Act No. 33 on Environmental
Protection and the Rational Use of Natural Resources (1981); Guatemala's Environmental
Protection and Improvement Act (1986); and Mexico's General Act on Ecological Balance and
Environmental Protection (1988), which combines and supersedes two earlier acts of similar
character (the 1971 Federal Act on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution, and
the 1982 Federal Environmental Protection Act). Although not covered by the IADB studies,
both Belize and the United States could be included in this group as well-Belize for its 1992
Environmental Protection Act, and the United States for its 1969 National Environmental Policy
Act.
Evidence for the argument that other states in the region are beginng to recognie the
integrated nature of the environment and of the causes of its degradation is presented in Table
12, which indicates the incidence of cabinet-level ministries, national committees, or other
national bodies whose charter is to provide comprehensive leadership and coordination on
environmental matters. Although comparatively few of the WCR states (Belize, Colombia,
Grenada, Mexico, Trinidad & Tobago, and Venezuela) have yet accorded the environment the
importnce of a cabinet-level concern, most have at least established a nationaL:committee or
some other entity that addresses itself more or less exclusively to environmental matters.
National committees typically are housed in the office of the president and include in their
membership the ministers of relevant sectoral agencies; they may also include representatives
of other public or scientific organizations, industr, and NGOs.
Although national committees are generally less infuential than groups accorded cabinet-
level status, as permanent bodies they help to ensure that environmental affairs receive
continuous, comprehensive, high-level attention. Of the 25 sovereign WCR states!! listed in
Table 12, only 6 have not established some form of national umbrella organization to provide
comprehensive oversight and leadership on environmental matters, and there is no WCR state
that does not fill such a gap by vesting at least some measure of national environmental policy
"With few exceptions, the Dutch, UK, and US dependencies and the French overseas deparments in the region
conform to the laws and regulatory structures and procedures of their respective protector states, which are not
considered in this discussion.
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and authority in one or more sectoral mInistries. Table 12 also shows that, although
intermediate state-level authority for environmental matters is quite rare thoughout the WCR,
all but 9 national governments share such authority, at least as a practical matter, with
municipalities.
Even in those states where a holistic view of the environment has not taken hold, local
and national sectoral authorities have in many cases acquired broader responsibility and authority
as knowledge of the interactions between environment and economic activity has increased.
Ordinances for controlling beach litter, for example, have been expanded to encompass habitat
protection and beach stabilization; and port/harbor authorities in some small-island nations have
acquired major responsibility for regulation of construction and development activities (UNEP
1994c). As noted in UNEP's 1994 document on Appropriate Approaches to the development
of an LBMP protocol for the Wider Caribbean, "(t)he challenge for governents is to determine
how to establish a national plannng framework that builds on existing power structures and
specialized expertise and complements and reinforces local authorities" (UNEP 1994c; emphasis
in original). The same document also recommends the designation of a "national focal point"
for land-based marine pollution problems and control, which in many instances may well ensure
greater and better-integrated attention to LBMP issues than could reasonably be expected of a
newly established national minstry with a far more comprehensive environmental charter.
F. Measures of Environmental Infrastructure
In addition to the environmental laws and regulations described above, we have surveyed
the literature for measures of environmental infrastructure. Table 13 compares some useful
measures across WCR states. Good summaries of the quality of the local marine environment
and the status of intitutional and technological capabilities to deal with LBMP problems can be
found in the national reports to the UNCED conference (United Nations 1992). Some of the
relevant information is listed in the last column of Table 13.
Other useful measures include the number of major submarine outfalls (Salas 1994), the
percentage of the state's populations with access to closed public sewers or septic tanks, and the
percentage of the population with access to safe drinking water. Submarine outfalls provide
benefits in terms of removing sewage from discharge into immediate coastal environments. Only
in the United States and Puerto Rico are discharges subject to primary or secondary treatment.
Many states have minor submarine outfalls; for example, in some island states, coastal hotels
often discharge in this manner. No statistics have been collected on minor submarine
discharges. Where sewage disposal is available, the populations of most small island and
developing nations are using septic tanks. Closed public sewers are limited to a few urban
environments and to the developed states and associated territories of the WCR. Safe drinking
water is readily available to the majority of the region's populations, except in the case of a few
very underdeveloped states. Many of the island and coastal populations have encountered
problems associated with the draw-down of groundwater supplies, resulting in saline intrsion
into aquifers and the contamination of groundwater. In some cases, coastal desalination plants
can contribute to excessive salinity levels in wetland or near coastal environments.
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A common plea in the national UNCED report is for foreign aid and other international
financial assistance to help fortify the mostly inadequate capabilties for dealing with LBMP
problems in the region.
G. Scientific Capabiltiesii
Most countries and terrtories in the WCR support some level of marine scientific
research, the most commonly tageted research areas being fisheries, coastal management, and,
more recently, the development and maintenance of marine parks and reserves. Much of this
research is carried out at regional unversities or at small marine laboratories that are owned by
a regional or a Nort American university, supported by competitively awarded governent
funding. Typically such scientific research programs are seriously constrained by small budgets
and associated limitations in staff siz and facilties. Formal cooperation among a number of
the region's research intitutions is well established, however, partcularly cooperation toward
the goal of promoting general awareness in the region of mae problems and programs to
address them. One promient example is the Association of Mare Laboratories of the
Carbbean, which was founded in 1957 (as the Association of Island Mare Laboratories of the
Carbbean) and in 1994 included 23 member intitutions located in 17 WCR states (see Table
A.6, Appendix A).
An importnt component of the basic ecological research conducted in the Caribbea is
research by US university-affiliated scientists workig in regional marine laboratories with
support from such US governent agencies as the National Science Foundation, the National
Park Service, and the Nationa Oceanc and Atmospheric Admistrtion. As orthe late 1980s,
the greater Caribbean accounted for one-fift of all US mare scientific projects requiring vessel
clearances from foreign governents (Negroponte 1987). Included in Table A.6 is a list of
member intitutions of the Southern Association of Mare Laboratories, a US organition
representing governent and academic laboratories from the Virgina coast to the tropical
southeatern Nort Atlantic.
In addition to these US reseach activities, a substatial amount of the marine scientific
reseach conducted in the region is cared out by scientists from Canda, the United Kigdom,
the Netherlands, and other Euopea countres with fuding provided by their governents.
There are also a good many regionally sponsored cooperative projects or programs that
focus on mare resources, pollution, and environmenta mangement. In the mid-1980s such
projects numbered about 60 and ranged frm small, bilateral effort to large, long-term
multiateral or regionwide effort (Negroponte 1987) involving UN agencies, environmental non-
governenta organtions (NGOs, discussed separately in the next section), national
governent agencies, and regional scientific organtions. In the last category is CARCOMP
(for Carbbean Coastal Mare Productivity), a research and monitorig network of 24 Carbbea
mare progra sites (laboratories, parks, and reserves) at which scientists monitor basic
iiUnless otherwise noted, the information in this section is drawn from Gladfelter and Ogden (1994), which was
prepared for use in this study.
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oceanographic and meteorological variables as well as species type, abundance, and productivity
in selected coral reef, seagrass, and mangrove systems. CARICOMP (with member institutions
also listed in Table A.6) was established in the mid-1980s with funding assistance from
UNESCO and the U.S. National Science Foundation.
Lest the extent of mare scientific activity in the region be overstated, it is importnt to
underscore that national capabilties are in some cases extremely limited, as are the mechansms
and infrastrcture to support regional collaboration. According to a 1983 UNESCO survey, for
example, fewer than one-half of the marine scientists identified as working in the Caribbean
island nations were at work in one of the much more numerous small island states; and only 63
of the 583 scientists workig in Latin America were workig in the small Central American
nations.
H. The Role of NGOs in the WCR13
The extent to which NGOs (and citizens groups) play an importt role in bringing
popular and offcial attention to environmental affairs varies considerably across the WCR states,
but overall it is markedly on the rise.
In general, NGOs tend to number in the hundreds and to be very well-established, varied,
and inuential in the larger and more industralized countres, such as Colombia, Mexico, the
United States, and Venezuela. All of these countries afford some legal basis for the
establishment of public bodies empowered to represent the public interest, under which NGOs
and/or citizn action groups are assured representation.
Thoughout most of the WCR, the infuence of NGOs is somewhat more limited (though
not inbstatial), in par because of the more limited basis for public action, essentially based
on the rights of citizen complaint. Although the numbers and the range of interests of NGOs
in many WCR countres are considerably more modest, there is nonetheless an unistaable
trend toward their proliferation. In the Bahamas there are fewer than two dozen NGOs, but they
have a very long-stading and venerable status dating back to the establishment in 1959, by an
act of parliament, of the Bahas National Trust. The Nationa History Society of Jamaica is
even older, but most of Jamica's 15 or so other active NGOs are less th 20 years old, as is
generally tre of the growin number of NGOs thoughout Central and South America. Even
the poorest and least developed of the WCR countres had at leat one major environmental
NGO by the early 1990s-the Foundation for a Beautiful Surie, for example, and in Haiti
the Friends of Nature Federation and the Association to Combat Erosion and for Full Land
Rehabiltation.
An importt element in fosterig the effort of NGOs is the emergence of regional
NGOs, notably the Regional Network of Nongovernental Environmental Organtions for
Sustained Development in Central America (REDES-CA), established in 1987, and the
Caribbean Conservation Association (CCA), established in 1967. The first of these includes
13Unless otherwise noted, the informtion in this section is drawn from Brañes (1991).
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NGOs from Belize, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama; the latter
includes in its membership 17 governents, 65 NGOs, and 120 individuals from among the
island and coastal nations of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea, including the Bahamas
and Guyan. Headquartered in Barbados, the CCA serves as a clearinghouse for information
on the environment and provides techncal assistance, environmental education, assistance for
parks and protected areas, and regional and national plang services for sustainable
development and resource management (Island Resources Foundation 1989).
i. Other Regional Organizations
Although the scope of the CCA's membership, interests, and areas of expertise may be
unusually broad, the CCA is nonetheless but one of some 100 donor agencies and techncal
assistace organitions supporting progras for sustainble resource development and
environmental management in the Eatern Carbbean alone (Island Resources Foundation 1989).
Throughout the entire WCR there are hundreds of such agencies and organitions, including
multilateral investment bans, specializd UN agencies, chatable foundations, and NGOs,
whose concern rage from disaster preparedess and relief to nutrtion and education.
Many of the UN agencies and other intergovernenta organtions focus in one way
or another on economic and social development (Table A.7, Appendix A), including public and
environmenta health concern. Two of the most promient agencies active in the region in ths
latter area are the Pan-American Health Organtion (pAHO), par of the World Health
Organtion (WO) network; and the Caribbea Environmenta Health Institute (CEHI), an arm
of CARCOM (see Figure 13).
The Caribbean Environment Programe (CEP), whose legal fraework is provided for
in the Cargena Convention, serves as an umbrella organtion for collaboration among the
many social, economic, scientific, and techncal organtions active in the region. The CEP
is adminstered by UNEP, though its Regional Coordinating Unit (RCD) in Kigston, Jamaica.
Together with the relevant national and regional environmental intitutions (see Table 14), the
RCU provides the intitutional capabilties necssar for the implementation of a land-based
mare pollution protocol. In ths . context, two of the CEP's most importt intitutional
networks are CEPPOL and a program on Information Systems for the Management of Marine
and Coastal Resources (CEPNET), whose role is to ensure that scientific inormation obtained
though CEPPOL is appropriately collated and dissemite though usefu databases.
Unlike many of the other organitions whose membership or concern are limted to
either the Caribbean island states or the contiental countres of Lati America, the CEP
expressly extends its reach to all the WCR coasta and island states. Moreover, it taes a broad,
comprehensive view of environmental affairs and of the special lin between economic and
environmental concern withn the region. Nonetheless, as mentioned in the precing section,
the CEP has had only modest success in this coordinting role. As is tre of so many other
aspects of the Wider Caribbean Region and its environmental agenda, the rationae for a
comprehensive approach may be gainng general acceptace, but many of the mechanisms that
allow coherent action are simply not in place.
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Although the impediments to implementation of the CEP are numerous and varied
thoughout the region, four broad problems have been identified (see Section III and Brewster
1994), including lack of adequate financial support. This point is borne out to some extent in
Figure 14, panel a, which displays the levels of contributions and deficits (on pledged amounts)
for CEP member states during 1982 though 1992 (in current U.S. dollars). Eight of the 34
member states are in arrears by amounts greater than their cumulative contributions, and it
would appear that a disproportionate share of the financial burden has been shouldered by France
in particular, and to a lesser extent by Mexico, the UlÙted States, Sweden, and Colombia. It
is useful, however, to examine different representations of the CEP contributions. 
14 Figure 14,
panel b, displays each state's CEP contribution (deficit) per coastal inabitant. On this basis,
the British Virgin Islands, France, and the Turks & Caicos Islands make the leading
contrbutions, and many of the British dependent territories are among some of the leading
contrbutors. In Figure 14, panel c, each state's contribution (deficit) to CEP is shown as a
percentage of its "capacity," or an estimate of its coastal GDP (as explained in Section V). In
ths representation, the self-governg unts of the Dutch realm appear to be among the leading
contributors, although Nicaagua and France are the lead contributors. France shows up well
under any comparison, and, as we wil hypothesiz in Section V, it may be one of the key states
in faciltating WCR trading relationships.
J. Summary
In ths section we have reviewed certin economic, demographic, intitutional, and
environmental characteristics of the WCR states with the subregional framework established
by the CEPPOL program. Our review indicates that only Subregions II and IV have a high
degree of homogeneity with respect to economic priorities, and that these priorities, on balance,
constitute an incentive for Subregion IV to control LBMP and a disincentive for Subregion II
to do so. The other four subregions are all more economically heterogeneous. Although all
thee Subregion I economies are highly diversified, they represent a tremendous range of living
stadards, intitutional capacities, and pollutat load contributions. Subregion V is apparently
the most polaried subregion, with. the notable predominance of ming and manufacturig in
the economies of Venezuela and Tridad & Tobago posing a substantial potential theat to the
tourism upon which Arba and the Netherlands Antiles are heavily dependent.
In Section V, we draw upon ths review as the basis for identifying alternative
subgroupings of WCR states to faciltate control of LBMP.
14 In Figue 15, panels b and c, statistics for Guatemaa and Sweden have been left out because of the very smal
number of individuals in the coasta region (or none in the cae of Sweden).
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V. Analysis of the Incentives and Prospects for Collective Action
A. Analytic Approaches
In this section, we explore thee avenues to identifying promising opportnities for
mutually beneficial collaborations and "gains from trade" in pollution control. First, economic
commonalities thoughout the region are identified, with the states grouped and ranked according
to their level of participation in relevant economic sectors. This information is useful, for
example, in identifying states engaged in a paricular polluting activity on a relatively small
scale, who could benefit from pollution control approaches and technologies that have already
been adopted by another state engaged in the same activity at a much larger scale. Next we
consider the relative identities of WCR states as polluters and pollutees withn subregional
groupings. Following the approach developed by Broadus et al. (1993), we estimate the extent
to which each state is a source of LBMP, the extent to which it has a stae in controllng the
problem, and its relative economic capacity to underte corrective action. Finally, we develop
a rating system that attempts to tae into account not only the size but also the direction of a
state's economic incentive with respect to controllng LBMP, and not only its economic capacity
but also its intitutional capacity to underte corrective action.
B. Economic Commonalities
As a prologue to an analysis of the incentives and prospects for collective action on
LBMP problems in the Caribbean, we have organd the states of the region into "economic
groups." These groups are rankgs of states in terms of siz or value of production, or other
measures, for specific industries, including hydrocarbon production and refinig, farming,
marine fishing, and tourism. The states are also raned in terms of foreign aid receipts and
indebtedness.
The purpose of ths subsection is to demonstrte simarities and differences among the
states of the region with regard to major industres tht are known either to affect water quality
adversely (hydrocarbon production and refining, industral chemical production, farming, coastal
development) or to be affected by inerior water quaity (coasta development, tourism,
fisheries). We identify those states in the region that are incumbents in each broadly defined
industral sector. Furer, we identify the major, intermediate, and minor producers in each
industr. We arange states into subgroups as an aid in identifing those states with roughly the
84
same scale of industrial activity in the relevant industr. i
Some observers have hypothesized that, in any particular industr, subgroups of states
with the same scale of industrial activity may encounter the same kinds of LBMP problems. If
this hypothesis is valid, then it is possible that one state's solutions to these problems may be
transferable to others at low cost. Alternatively, subgroups might agree to collaborate on
research or technological development to identify or improve LBMP control mechanisms.
A separate hypothesis is that states exhibiting larger scales of activity in any of these
industres may have already encountered LBMP problems during their industries' growth and
maturation. In this case, states at an earlier stage of industrial development or with a smaller
scale of activity might look to states with a more mature industr or a larger scale for solutions
to LBMP problems.
Of course, there are many assumptions behid these hypotheses. For example, in order
for transfers to occur, we must assume that solutions to LBMP problems exist and that those
states that have identified solutions are wiling to convey them to other states.
The economic groups described in ths subsection are, for the most part, self-explanatory;
we describe the groups only briefly here. We expect that the identification of economic groups
wil be useful as the Contracting Parties to a prospective LBMP protocol begin to consider
possibilties for trading relationships in pollution control. We discuss these possibilities at the
end of this subsection.
Table 15, panels a and b, rank the leading oil and natural gas producers in the Caribbean
and the leading oil refiners, respectively. We note that some of the leading hydrocarbon
producing states have attempted to control marine pollution problems, some more successfully
th others. A group of Latin American national oil companies recently has produced a series
of operational practice guidelines for environmental protection (AREL 1994). These guidelines
are likely to be useful for all of the WCR oil producers and refiners.
Table 15, panel c, rank, in terms of gross sales revenues, the leading producers of
industral chemicals in the Caribbean.
Table 16, panels a, b, and c, ran states according to diferent measures of farming
activity. In panel a, the states are ranked in terms of the percentage of land area devote to
agriculture. Panels b and c rank the states in sugarcae and bana production. Depending
i We note that this kind of comparison is very general, ignoring ecnomicaly relevant, but diffcult to obtai,
informion about market structure and firm behavior and penormance in these industries. Although industral
organtion data would be helpful to this kind of analysis, we expect that its absence wil not affect the qualitative
points we make here.
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upon the irigation and erosion-control practices employed, farming can be a major nonpoint
source of marine pollution from sediments, fertilizer nutrients, and pesticides.
Table 17, panel a, rank the states in terms of coastal '-development, as measured by
population density. Note that there may be considerable variation in the concentration of
populations within any particular state. This variation may be hidden in the data. Table 17,
panels band c, rank the states in terms of marine fish landings and tourism receipts.
Table 18, panel a, ranks Caribbean states in terms of debt service ratio, which is a
measure of each state's abilty to repay loan from foreign sources. The debt service ratio gives
a sense of the proportion of anual export receipts that could be used to pay interest and
principal on international debts. A lower ratio implies that it is relatively easier for a state to
repay its foreign debts.
We hypothesize that those states with a history of significant lending or trade
relationships may be more likely to cooperate in seekig reductions of LBMP. Table 18, panel
b, ranks Caribbean states in terms of the cumulative total of official development assistance from
OECD countres, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands,
Canada, and Sweden, during the period 1981 to 1991. This assistance includes grants as well
as concessionalloans that must be repaid. Table 19 describes exporting activity for each of the
Caribbean states. For each state, both the leading importing states and the leading export
commodities are identified. Table 19 helps to characterize existing trade relationships that may
faciltate mutually beneficial relationships in the control of land-based sources of marine
pollution.
The development of mutually beneficial relationships in pollution control is sometimes
described, in economic parlance, as a type of gain from trade. The possibilties of gains from
trde with regard to a pollution problem can be shown clearly using a stylized model, which we
describe in detail in Appendix C. In ths model, the rights of a state to a clean marie
environment are clear, and states have the legal competency to enter into agreements to control
pollution. However, states may find other reasons for entering into an agreement to control
pollution. Even states that have a legal right to a clean marine environment may be wiling to
accpt some level of pollution in order to benefit in other ways, such as improved international
relations or perceived increased benefits to the state of a trading parer's economic
development. For example, Mäler (1990) cites studies by John Krtila and Alan Kneese which
demonstrate that:
. . . at least along the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders, agreements on
2 In Appendix C, we examne the effects of propert right distributions, burden of proof, and lack of clarty
in propert rights.
88
00 \0
T
a
bl
e 
17
Co
as
ta
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
nd
 L
ed
in
g 
Fi
sh
 P
ro
du
ce
rs
 a
nd
 T
ou
ris
t D
es
tin
at
io
ns
a
. 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
De
ns
itie
s 
as
 a
 M
ea
su
re
 o
r C
oa
st
al
 D
ev
el
oo
m
en
l
(pe
rso
ns
 pe
r s
qu
are
 ki
lom
ete
r)
B
ar
ba
do
s
61
2
Pu
er
to
 R
ic
o
36
8
A
ru
ba
32
6
Si
. V
in
ce
nl
 &
 G
re
na
di
ne
s
33
2
M
ar
tin
iq
ue
32
1
U
.
S.
 V
ir
gi
n 
Is
la
nd
s
28
4
St
. L
uc
ia
25
1
B
ah
am
as
25
0
G
re
na
da
24
7
Tr
in
id
ad
 &
 T
ob
ag
o
24
2
H
ai
ii
23
6
Ja
m
ai
ca
22
4
G
ua
de
lo
up
e
19
4
N
et
he
rla
nd
s 
An
till
es
19
1
D
om
in
ic
an
 R
ep
ub
lic
14
8
Si
. K
iii
s &
 N
ev
is
14
7
A
nt
ig
ua
 &
 B
ar
bu
da
14
6
M
on
ts
er
ra
t
12
0
D
om
in
ic
a
11
3
Ca
ym
an
 Is
la
nd
s
10
0
Cu
ba
96
G
ua
le
m
al
a
85
B
r
it
is
h 
Vi
rg
in
 I
sl
an
ds
80
A
ng
ui
la
75
C
o
s
t
a
 
R
ic
a
60
H
on
du
ra
s
46
M
ex
ic
o
44
Pa
na
m
a
32
Co
lo
m
bi
a
31
N
ic
ar
ag
ua
29
U
ni
le
d 
St
at
es
27
V
en
ez
ue
la
22
T
u
r
ks
 &
 C
ai
co
s
21
B
el
iz
e
8
G
uy
an
a
4
Su
rin
am
e
3
F
r
e
n
c
h 
Gu
ia
na
i
b.
 L
ed
in
e 
M
ar
ne
 F
ish
 P
ro
du
ce
rs
 in
 th
e 
Ca
rib
be
(t
ho
us
an
ds
 o
r 
me
tr
ic
 t
on
s 
in
 1
99
1)
U
ni
te
 S
ta
le
s
52
00
M
ex
ic
o
12
51
V
en
ez
ue
la
33
2
Pa
na
m
a
14
7
Cu
ba
14
4
Co
lo
m
bi
a
84
G
uy
an
a
40
H
on
du
ra
21
C
o
s
t
a
 
R
ic
a
16
D
om
in
ic
a 
Re
pu
bl
ic
16
Tr
in
id
ad
 &
 T
ob
ag
o
10
B
aa
m
as
9
G
ua
de
lo
up
e
8
Si
. V
in
ce
ni
8
Ja
m
ai
ca
7
F
r
e
n
c
h 
Gu
ia
na
7
N
ic
ag
ua
5
H
ai
ti
5
G
ua
le
m
al
a
4
M
ar
ni
qu
e
4
Su
rin
am
e
4
B
aa
do
s
3
Pu
er
to
 R
ic
o
2
B
el
iz
e
2
An
tig
ua
 &
 B
au
da
2
G
re
na
da
2
N
e
ih
er
la
nd
s 
An
ti
le
s
A
ru
ba
D
om
in
ic
a
Si
. 
Ki
il
S
Si
. 
Lu
ci
a
U
.S
. V
irg
in
 Is
la
nd
s
c.
 L
ed
in
, T
ou
ris
i D
es
tin
at
io
ns
 in
 th
e 
Ca
rb
be
(m
il
io
ns
 o
r 
U.
S.
 d
ol
la
rs
 i
n 
19
91
)
U
ni
te
 S
ta
le
49
55
1
M
ex
ic
o
43
55
B
aa
m
as
12
22
D
om
In
ic
a 
Re
pu
bl
ic
8n
Ja
m
ai
ca
74
6
U
.S
. V
irg
in
 Is
la
nd
s
70
8
N
e
t
he
rl
an
ds
 A
nt
il
es
48
4
B
aa
do
s
45
3
Co
lo
m
bi
a
41
0
A
ru
ba
40
1
V
en
ez
ue
la
36
5
Co
st
a 
Ri
ca
33
1
An
iig
ua
 &
 B
au
da
31
4
Cu
ba
30
0
G
ua
de
lo
up
e
28
4
M
ar
ni
qu
e
25
5
G
ua
te
m
al
a
21
1
Pa
na
m
a
19
6
St
. L
uc
ia
17
3
Tr
in
id
ad
 &
 T
ob
ag
o
10
1
B
el
iz
e
95
51
. 
Ki
tt
5
74
51
. V
in
ce
nt
53
H
ai
ti
46
G
re
na
38
H
on
du
ra
31
G
uy
an
a
30
D
om
in
ic
a
28
N
ic
ag
ua
17
Su
rin
am
e
II
Ta
bl
e 
i 8
D
eb
t S
er
vi
ce
 R
at
io
s a
nd
 L
ed
in
g 
Re
ci
pi
en
ts 
of
 F
or
ei
gn
 A
id
a
. 
D
eb
! S
er
vic
e 
Ra
tio
s 
in
 th
e 
Ca
rib
be
n
b.
 L
t'.
ar
lin
l! 
Re
cip
ie
nt
s 
of
 F
or
ei
l!n
 A
id
 in
 th
e 
Ca
rib
be
n
(to
ta 
de
bt 
ser
vic
e (
int
ere
st 
plu
s p
rin
cip
a r
ep
ay
me
nts
 on
 in
ter
na
tio
na
l d
eb
ts)
a
s
 
a
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f 
ex
po
rt
 o
f 
go
os
 a
nd
 s
er
vi
ce
 i
n 
19
91
)
(to
ta 
ne
t d
isb
urs
em
en
ts 
of 
off
cia
l d
ev
elo
pm
en
t a
ssi
sta
ce
 fr
om
 al
l
O
EC
D
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t A
ss
ist
ac
e 
Co
m
m
itt
ee
 so
ur
ce
s d
ur
in
g 
19
81
-1
99
1,
e
xp
re
ss
e 
in
 m
illo
ns
 o
f 1
99
4 
U.
S.
 d
ol
la
rs
)
M
ex
ic
o
33
Co
lo
m
bi
a
32
H
on
du
ra
s
32
M
ex
ic
o
50
19
0
G
uy
an
a
32
Pa
na
m
a
22
88
6
N
ic
ag
ua
25
Ca
ym
an
 Is
la
nd
s
18
86
0
Cu
ba
24
G
ua
te
m
al
a
24
Co
lo
m
bi
a
97
59
Pa
na
m
a
22
B
aa
m
as
84
58
Ja
m
ai
ca
20
Tr
in
id
ad
 &
 T
ob
ag
o
19
H
on
du
ra
43
38
C
o
s
t
a
 
R
ic
a
18
Ja
m
ai
ca
41
57
B
aa
do
s
16
N
ic
ag
ua
38
03
\0 0
An
tig
ua
 &
 B
au
da
14
Co
st
a 
Ri
ca
33
65
D
om
in
ic
a
13
G
ua
te
m
al
a
32
49
V
en
ez
ue
la
11
D
om
in
ic
a 
Re
pu
bl
ic
27
92
D
om
in
ic
a 
Re
pu
bl
ic
11
N
et
he
rla
nd
s A
nt
ile
s
27
55
H
ai
ti
22
89
B
aa
m
as
8
N
e
t
he
rl
an
ds
 A
nt
il
es
6
G
uy
an
a
10
75
B
el
iz
e
6
U
.S
. V
irg
in
 Is
la
nd
s
85
4
G
ua
de
lo
up
e
6
Su
rin
am
e
64
4
F
r
e
n
c
h 
Gu
ia
na
5
D
om
in
ic
a
40
0
St
. L
uc
ia
4
A
ru
ba
37
4
St
. V
in
ce
nt
4
Be
li 
ze
36
7
Su
rin
am
e
3
B
aa
do
s
33
6
G
re
na
da
3
G
re
na
da
27
3
H
ai
ti
3
An
tig
ua
 &
 B
au
da
22
9
St
. 
Ki
tt
s
3
St
. L
uc
ia
21
9
M
ar
in
iq
ue
2
A
ru
ba
1
SI
. V
in
ce
nt
 &
 G
re
na
di
ne
s
in
Tu
rk
s &
 C
ac
os
10
7
St
. K
itt
s &
 N
ev
is
10
2
M
on
ts
rr
t
69
A
ng
ui
la
8
Table 19
Major Export and Primar Importg State
I'RY
EXPORTIG IMRTIG I'ODUlS
STAn: STAn: ("1"'1
Aauilb .. -
An6ua " Øu Unite SCic (41): "" of pc pn
U.iic Kio_ (191;
Gey (191
ANb - -II Uiuic Saia (7: ~Pu Ri (17) 4i1bi ru
- Uniic lGnido (17): su cb cI
Uniic Saia (131 copo
Bdiz U.iic Sw (e7); supr oc~ ~
Uniic IGdo (2el:
Mcxõc (13)
Brsh Yiriin - ..Isl
Caya iib. .. -
Cobi Uiuic Saia (391; !o pruc fi pcnsGcy (91; prua; cooeV-i (9)
c- Ri Uniic Swe (sSI: ba: cooeGcy (II
Ci as (60 su au
Donic Uiuic IGdo (e21 ba; co-b _
Doinic R.lc Uniic Saia (S); fenickd; su
tI. (ni
Frc Guya - -Cn Unite SUlC OS): b3; nutm: co t:
Uiuic lGnido (27)
Gulope Fra (781: ,&ritunl prua
Mantquc (1-4)(l Un."' Saia OSI: cooe ""El s.vo (lei
eu Uaiic IGnc (33; suar: co: bauxii
Un;ic S.. (31
lWei Uni Sw !71 Ic l'ufacrt
Houru Uniic S.. (s. I: ba: cooe slmp an _
Gcy (111J.. Uaik: SU.IC (4)): alumina
Uniic lGid (lSI:Ca (10)
Munique Fro (6S): foo prua rd pcnsCu (27)
Mø Uoiic S.. (8 II ..ina dc cioñau pdMo .. ..
tI AIIc - ..
N"icua Uoiic Saia (191: cooe f.. an rl' in _Gcy (Ui
.. Uni Sw 001: ba: slmpGcy (27)
Pu Ri Uaiic Sl (1 ciõa an ch i-
roo: dc tl
St Ki " tl \J Sl (SSI: nw iu pr
Uni i:do (26)
St Lu Uaic IG (St): ba; cI
Uaiic Su (211
St V_It Th \J IG (ell: bI _GR Tri " Tob
(12) St Lu (10)Sa No o.): aluminaNc (26):
Uniic S.. (ni
Tñi " Tob Uniro S.. (e7) mi..-f\ lublS ch an
ci;a prua
Tut " Ca - ..
Unilc Sc Ca (21; "" .. an po; ba on
Jap (10); misobn llra
Mcxõc (9)
u.s. Viriia Isl - -V.. U... Su (S au pc an pcprua
91
water and water quality have involved "trades" in areas other than the rather
restricted area defined by the environmental resource. The importnt point here
is that there have been trades, although they may not be directly visible.
Table 20, adapted from Kimball (1994), lists some examples of the kids of trades that might
tae place with respect to LBMP control in the Caribbean. We note tht even when the potential
for trade exists outside the realm of pollution control, inormation about the gains from trade
in pollution control per se wil be valuable to states negotiating broader agreements.
In the next two subsections, we tae a closer look at characteristics of states that might
enable mutually beneficial relationships in pollution control to develop. We offer suggestions
on opportnities, but we do not identify any imediate solutions. The reduction and control of
LBMP in the Caribbean wil require much hard work from all of the Contracting Parties to a
prospective protocol. As we begin to sketch out some possibilties for mutually beneficial
relationships, we have found it helpful to keep in mid the economic groups that have been
identifed in ths subsection.
C. Sources and Staes
In ths subsection, we examine the identity of WCR states as polluters or pollutees. We
adopt the approach developed by Broadus et al. (1993) to measure "sources," "stakes," and
"capacity." "Source" is a measure of a state's relative contribution of land~based marine
pollution to a region. "Stae" is a measure of a state's economic interest in reducing marine
pollution. "Capacity" is a measure of the economic capabilties that a state has at its disposal
to reduce pollution, by cutting its own emissions or by subsidizing the reduction of emissions
in another state.
Implicit in this analysis (particularly in the "source" measure) is an assumption of
tranboundar LBMP effects. Although we have note in ealier sections that transboundary
LBMP, where it occurs in the WCR, is generally limted to border areas shared by two states,
we believe that ths anlytic approach has value as well in a somewhat broader (i.e., subregiona)
context, primarily because of the potential for larger-scale tranbounda effects to develop or
be deteted in the future. Even if th does not occur, however, and the aim of the protocol
remain one of responding collectively to common but nontranbounda LBMP problems, we
believe tht an understading of each state's relative stading with respect to source, stae, and
capacity should enhance the abilty of negotiatig paries to concentrate on those specific
collaborations and exchanges that are most likely to be successfully implemented.
For our source measure, we would like to have, ideally, data on ambient concentrations
of pollutants at any location in the Caribbea, combined with the abilty to identify costlessly
the exact origin of each pollutat. Such data do not now exist, nor is it likely that they wil ever
92
Ta
bl
e 
20
O
p
p
o
r
t
it
ie
s 
fo
r 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 a
nd
 C
oo
pe
ra
ti
on
\0 w
Ca
te
ao
rv
I T
V
e 
of
 e
xc
ha
nC
le
Ex
am
pl
e
E
c
o
n
o
m
ie
s 
of
 S
ca
le
D
at
ab
as
es
I
O
C
I
B
E
I
 
C
E
P
P
O
L
C
le
ar
in
gh
ou
se
 s
ys
te
ms
C
E
P
P
O
L
I
 
W
o
r
ld
 B
an
ki
 O
EC
S
Sc
ie
nt
if
ic
/t
ec
hn
ic
al
 A
na
ly
se
s
I
O
C
I
B
E
I
 
C
E
P
P
O
L
T
e
c
hn
ic
al
 t
ra
in
in
g
U
n
iv
er
si
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
We
st
 I
nd
ie
si
 C
AA
RI
P
u
bl
ic
 e
du
ca
ti
on
/a
wa
re
ne
ss
C
E
P
p
O
L
I
 
O
E
C
S
So
ut
h 
to
 N
or
th
 E
xc
ha
ng
es
Pl
an
ni
ng
 te
ch
ni
qu
es
A
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
 
t
e
c
hn
iq
ue
s
I
s
la
nd
 R
es
ou
rc
es
 F
ou
nd
at
io
n
C
o
n
fl
ic
t 
re
so
lu
ti
on
 t
ec
hn
iq
ue
s
C
o
a
s
t
a
l 
ma
na
ge
me
nt
L
o
a
l 
co
..
un
it
y 
en
ga
ge
me
nt
C
o
s
t
a
 
R
ic
a
W
as
te
 re
us
e 
an
d 
re
Cy
cli
nC
l
N
o
r
t
h 
to
 S
ou
th
 E
xc
ha
ng
es
C
le
an
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
co
..u
ni
ty
, C
U
a
F
o
r
e
ig
n 
ai
d 
pa
ym
en
ts
U
n
it
ed
 S
ta
te
s,
 C
an
ad
a,
 F
ra
nc
e,
U
n
it
ed
 K
in
gd
om
, 
Th
e 
Ne
th
er
la
nd
s,
 S
we
de
n,
V
en
ez
ue
la
SU
bs
id
iz
ed
 lo
an
s
W
o
r
ld
 B
an
k,
 I
AD
B
D
e
bt
-f
or
-n
at
ur
e 
sw
ap
s
C
o
s
t
a
 
R
ic
a 
(n
ot
 a
 m
ar
in
e 
ex
am
pl
e)
Sh
ar
ed
 w
at
er
co
ur
se
s o
r
B
il
at
er
al
 o
r 
su
br
eg
io
na
l 
co
mp
ac
ts
V
e
n
e
z
u
e
la
/T
ri
ni
da
d 
, 
To
ba
go
 (
oi
l 
po
ll
ut
io
n)
bo
un
da
rie
s
F
in
an
ci
al
 t
ra
ns
fe
rs
U
n
it
ed
 s
ta
te
s/
Me
xi
co
T
r
a
de
ab
le
 e
mi
ss
io
ns
 q
uo
ta
s
M
ex
ic
o/
Be
liz
e
D
if
fe
re
nt
ia
te
d 
st
an
da
rd
s
D
if
fe
re
nt
ia
te
ed
 t
im
et
ab
le
s
Sh
ar
ed
 m
ar
in
e 
re
so
ur
ce
s
A
ll
oc
at
io
n 
of
 h
ar
ve
st
 t
o 
di
st
an
t 
wa
te
r
o
r
 
ha
bi
ta
t
n
at
io
ns
J
o
in
t 
ve
nt
ur
e 
fi
sh
in
g 
ag
re
em
en
ts
B
a
r
ba
do
s 
an
d 
Tr
in
id
ad
 ,
 T
ob
ag
o
In
te
rn
at
io
na
lly
Fo
re
ig
n 
ai
d
D
es
ig
na
te
d 
Pr
ot
ec
te
d
Te
ch
ni
ca
l a
ss
ist
an
ce
A
re
as
 o
r s
pe
ci
es
B
il
at
er
al
 o
r 
su
br
eg
io
na
l 
co
mp
ac
t
R
e
c
ip
ro
ca
l 
Na
ti
on
al
N
a
t
io
na
l 
li
ab
il
it
y 
la
ws
Po
llu
tio
n 
Li
ab
ili
ty
A
c
c
e
s
s
 
t
o
 
n
a
t
io
na
l 
le
ga
l 
sy
st
em
s
R
eC
lim
es
Tr
an
sb
ou
nd
ar
y
R
e
g
io
na
l 
ag
re
em
en
ts
St
at
e-
OW
ne
d 
oi
l 
co
mp
an
y 
gu
id
el
in
es
E
n
v
ir
on
me
nt
al
 I
mp
ac
t
A
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
 
R
e
a
im
es
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
io
na
l 
tr
ad
e
E
n
v
ir
on
me
nt
al
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
ru
le
s
N
A
F
'
A
I
 
C
A
R
l 
CO
M
? 
aC
lre
em
en
ts
B
il
at
er
al
 I
nv
es
tm
en
t
E
n
v
ir
on
me
nt
al
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
ru
le
s
A
Cl
re
em
en
ts
p
r
iv
at
e 
In
du
st
ry
R
ec
re
at
io
n
R
ed
uc
tio
n 
of
 g
ol
 f 
co
ur
se
 c
he
m
ic
al
 tr
ea
tm
en
ts
M
a
r
ke
ti
ng
 (
gr
ou
p 
po
ll
ut
io
n 
co
nt
ro
l
t
e
c
hn
ol
og
 p
ur
ch
as
es
)
W
a
t
e
r
 
c
o
n
s
e
r
v
a
t
io
n 
an
d 
re
us
e
C
a
t
a
ly
ti
c 
fi
na
nc
in
g 
fr
om
 i
nt
er
na
ti
on
al
do
no
rs
I
A
D
B
 
s
e
w
e
r
a
g
e
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
fi
na
nc
in
g 
in
 B
ar
ba
do
s
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l a
ud
its
P
r
iv
at
e 
To
ur
is
m
C
r
u
is
e 
Sh
ip
 w
as
te
 m
an
ag
em
en
t 
a~
d 
di
sp
os
al
G
E
F
 
P
r
o
je
ct
 o
n 
Sh
ip
-G
en
er
at
ed
 W
as
te
C
O
-
fi
na
nc
in
g 
by
 l
oc
al
 g
ov
er
ne
nt
C
a
r
ib
be
an
 T
ou
ri
st
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
C
o
ll
ec
ti
ve
 B
ar
ga
in
in
g
T
o
u
r
is
t 
ta
xe
s
B
a
r
ba
do
s 
Ho
te
l 
As
so
ci
at
io
n 
To
ur
is
m 
En
ha
nc
em
en
t
Fu
nd
D
on
or
 A
ge
nc
ie
s
R
e
p
li
ca
bi
li
ty
 o
f 
su
br
eg
io
na
l 
ex
pe
rt
is
e
D
o
n
o
r
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
c
it
iz
en
 b
en
ef
it
s
C
a
n
a
da
, 
Sw
ed
en
, 
US
AI
D/
CE
F 
Ea
st
er
n 
Ca
ri
bb
ea
n
E
n
v
ir
on
me
nt
 a
nd
 C
oa
st
al
 R
es
ou
rc
es
 M
an
ag
em
en
t
Pr
oj 
ec
t
So
ur
ce
: 
Ki
mb
al
l 
(1
99
4)
exist. At present, we have incomplete data only on point sources of some pollutants from some
of the WCR states and on point and nonpoint sources combined from the U.S. Gulf coast. Even
these data may be biased, because data tend not to be collected from states with rudimenta
pollution control intitutions. Because of these limtations, we employ instead estimates of the
populations within the WCR drainge area as a measure of source. (Appendix B contains a
description of how these estimates were developed.)
For our stake measure, we would like to have, ideally, data on the value of damages
associated with ambient concentrations of pollutants at any location in the Caribbean. As in the
case of the ideal source measure, such data on impacts do not now exist. The actual impacts
of ambient concentrations of pollutants are furter clouded by the issue of "synergistic" effects
raised by Gladfelter and Ogden (1994). We employ intead estimates of the proportion of each
state's population tht is in the Caribbean coastal zone as a measure of stae (Appendix B).3
For our capacity measure, we nee to know somethg about the distribution of propert
rights. If we assume, as in Appendix C, tht states have the right to a clean environment, then
for source states we would like to have, ideally, an estimate of their abilty to offer payments
(or in-kid services) to downstream states as compensation for pollution damages. This estimate
would be an aggregate of each source state's pollutig industries' marginl abatement cost
schedules (Figure C.1 in Appendix C). These data do not yet exist. As a proxy for an ideal
capacity measure, we employ the stae-weighted gross domestic product for each state. (Note
that tls capacity statistic might be interpreted as a measure of the economic value of a state's
"stae" in controlling or allowing pollution, depending on the nature of its predomiant
industries. )
Table 21 presents the data on sources, staes, and capacities for each WCR subregion,
as delineated by CEPPOL. A more generalized, geographic depiction of tls inormation is
presented separately for each measure in Figure 15, panels a though d. In Figure 15, we have
delineate the CEP subregions by following the actu or hypothetical maritime boundaies in
the region (panel a). In each of the other panels of Figue 15, states should be compared only
with each subregion and not across subregions. Each subregion is associated with a specific
color. There are five possible shades for each color; the lighter shades represent lower values
of the relevant statistic, and vice versa. The five possible shades represent five possible
increments (twenty percent each) of the relevant statistic.
We note that an alterntive organtion of the WCR into different subregions would
result in different measures of source, stae, and capacity for each state. It wil be importt
for the states involved in framg the term of the protocol to give caeful consideration to the
3 Note that this statistic is an improvement on that used by Broadus et al. (1993) becuse we use only the
proportion of a nation's population that is coastal, not the entire drainage basin population.
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Table 21
Source, Staes, and Capaities with Subregions'
SlateiSubre~ion Sourc Share Slake Capacity Share"
Sub..ion I
Cuba 4.0 56.8 2.7
Mexico 24.0 6.0 4.7
United States 720 6.0 92.6
Subreion II
Belize 1.3 64.0 6.6
Cost Rica 10.4 20.8 28.6
Gualemala 36.8 - -
Hondura 32.9 22.0 16.1
Mexico 4.1 0.5 34.9
Nicaral! 6.5 2.4 1.0
Panama 8.0 9.5 12.8
Subreion II
Bahama 0.1 100.0 8.3
Cayma i..lnds - 100.0 2.2
Cuba 19.0 16.3 8.9
Dominican Reouhlic 30.0 58.0 13.3
Haiti 27.0 29.2 2.5
Jamaica 10.0 55.4 6.2
Puerto Rico 13.6 80.0 58.5
Turks & Caico - 100.0 0.2
Subreion IV
Anl!ila 0.4 100.0 0.8
Antil! & Barbuda 3.9 100.0 7.4
Barbdos 16.1 47.4 15.0
British Vi..in Islands 0.7 100.0 2.3
Dominica 5.2 100.0 3.1
Gread 5.2 100.0 4.4
Guaelouoe 21.0 44.2 8.5
Martiniaue 20.9 69.0 24.2
Montsrrt 0.7 100.0 1.3
Netherlands Antilles 0.9 8.0 2.0
Si. Kitls & Nevis 2.5 100.0 2.5
5t. Lucia 9.4 100.0 4.4
51. Vincet & Gredines 6.9 100.0 3.0
US Vi..in Islands 6.1 100.0 3.0
Subreion V
Aniba 0.2 100.0 0.2
Colombia 60.4 5.4 8.4
Neterlands Antiles 0.3 92.0 4.8
Trinida & Tob"o 2.5 69.5 12.8
V enezela 36.6 36.9 73.7
Sub..ion VI
Frech Guian 7.6 85.0 27.6
Guyan 61.7 38.1 10.3
Suriname 30.7 41. 62.1
'Se Appedix B for data SOrc and methology us to esimate drainage populations (for calculation
of sorc shre) and col zo poulation (for calculation of ste).
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Figure i 5. Comparison of Sources, Stakes and Capacities within CEP Subregions.
96
(c) Stake
10°
0°
1000W
90°
80°
(d) Capacity
10°
0°
1000W
90°
80°
Figure is (contd).
97
delineation of appropriate subregions on the basis of relevant environmental characteristics. In
particular, care should be taken to delineate subregions such that they encompass only those
states where sources of pollution originate and effects of that same pollution occur. 4 Our
analysis should be interpreted as a first-cut using subregions previously designated by CEP.
In Subregion I, the United States is the major source, and Cuba has the major stake. The
United States and Mexico have already concluded a bilateral agreement relating to transboundary
marine pollution, the 1983 Mexico-United States Agreement on Cooperation for the Protection
and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area. Reductions ofLBM pollutants from
U. S. sources through some tightenig of its existing water pollution rules might be one element
of a larger rapprochement between the United States and Cuba should Cuba begin to move
toward democratization and openness. However, given the primary current flows, Cuba is
unlikely to be affected much by U.S. LBM pollutants. The nortern Bahamas, in Subregion III,
would appear to be more at risk from land-based sources in Subregion I, and therefore should
be considered for inclusion in the same subregion as the United States.
In Subregion II, Guatemala and Honduras are the main sources and Belize has the largest
stake. Encouraging agreement among these states concernng the Gulf of Honduras would
appear to be a priority in this subregion. Accentuating Belize's large stae is the fact that it has
the most extensive coral reef ecosystem in the Western Hemisphere. However, Belize City is
a significant source of pollutants, and Belize is located upstream of the other two states, in terms
of the predominant coastal countercurrent. 
5 As alluded to in Section IV, Honduras may begin
to shift its banana agriculture to other industries, e.g., ecotourism, as U.K. subsidies are phased
out under new European Community rules. This should lower Belize's risks from nutrient and
pesticide runoffs. The United States, as a major foreign aid provider to Guatemala and
Honduras, might playa role in facilitating agreement by encouraging Honduras and Guatemala
to reduce LBM pollutant loads in return for reductions in sewage and industrial pollutants
emanating from Belize City. Belize and Guatemala currently are engaged in negotiations over
a maritime boundary, and these negotiations might usefully include discussion of potential
transboundary pollution flows.
Costa Rica has a significant stae and capacity share in this subregion, but it is located
at a substantial geographic distance from the other three major sources and stakeholders. This
4 We note that subregions could overlap. For example, if pollution from state A affects state B, and pollution
from B affects state C, but pollution from A does not afect C, then two overlapping subregions should be
established. Furthermore, subregions could be "nested." For example, if pollution from A affects B and C, but
pollution from B affects only C, then Band C form a subregion that is nested inside the subregion formed by A,
B, and C.
5 Note that there may be some cycling of pollutants in the Honduras Gulf, suggesting that these three countries
may have a common pool type pollution problem.
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point furter reiiûorces the critical need for a careful delineation of subregions: is it reasonable
to expect Costa Rica to expend much of its capacity on this problem when it is neither a
significant source of LBMP nor noticeably affected by the LBMP contributions of the major
source states in the subregion?
In Subregion III, the Domincan Republic and Haiti are the major sources and Puerto
Rico has the largest stae and the largest capacity. But the priar current movements suggest
tht Puerto Rico is upstream of both these states. Transboundary pollution, if it occurs, might
follow a path from the Domican Republic and Haiti to Cuba and from the south coast of Cuba
toward Jamaica. The United States, which is closely associated with Puerto Rico and a major
foreign aid provider to both the Dominican Republic and Haiti, might playa role in encouraging
the latter two states to control LBM pollutants, to reinorce the effects of the existing application
of US pollution controls in Puerto Rico.
Subregion III includes thee states with economies tht are heavily dependent upon
tounsm: the Bahamas, the Tuks & Caicos Islands, and the Cayman Islands. The southern
Bahas and Turks & Caicos are relatively protected as upstream states. Reduction of pollution
in the southeastern section of Cuba, another significant source in the subregion, could reduce
most of the risk faced by these two states. France, which is a major western source of foreign
aid to Cuba, might play a role in encouraging Cuba to reduce pollution in ths region. The
Caymans are protected in a relatively remote area of the Carbbean Sea, but may be at risk,
depending upon curent flows, to pollution pulses from upstream states in the .caribbean Sea.
This risk is likely to be small.
In Subregion IV, Guadeloupe and Marque are the major sources. Because all of the
states in ths subregion are islands or island groups, they all have large stakes. Many of the
island states in ths subregion have undiversified economies, with tourism the overwhelmingly
predominnt sector. Martinque has the largest capacity to deal with any potential pollution
problems, and the U.S. Virgin Islands and Barbados have substatial capacities as well.
Although there are some riks of tranbounda pollution problems among the states of the
subregion, it is likely tht actual tranbounda effects are small, if they exist at alL. Many of
the Antiles are islands that have some kid of association with a Euopean state (France, the
Netherlands, or the Unite Kigdom) tht ca draw upon its experiences in the Nort Sea LBMP
program (and, in the case of Frace, in the Mediterranean Program as well). It wil be
importt to know whether these Europea states have already concluded other bilateral or
multiateral agreements for control of mare pollution that apply or tht ca be easily adapted
to relations between associated states in the Carbbean. Should tranboundary problems develop,
or become apparent, states in ths region might use OECS resources to assist in the identification
of relevant gains from trde (see, e.g., Table 20). Moreover, current OECS member states
might benefit from an expansion to include all of the Subregion IV states.
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In Subregion V, Colombia and Venezuela are the primary sources. The island states,
again, have major stakes; Aruba and the Netherlands Antiles are comparatively undiversified
states, dependent primarily upon their tourism economies. Venezuela and Trindad & Tobago
already have entered into a bilateral agreement on marine pollution (Goodridge 1994). Although
a coastal countercurrent is thought to move from Colombia toward Venezuela, this is not likely
to add significantly to the pollutants generate along Venezuela's industrialized coast. In this
context, it is interesting to note that Colombia has been working to strengthen its environmental
laws, and its efforts have recently drawn praise from Venezuela. 
6 Local pollution control
effort in Venezuela, which has significant source, stae, and capacity statistics, wil become
increasingly importnt to the domestic population as Venezuela continues to develop
economically.
In Subregion VI, the notions of source and stae are affected strongly by the predomit
nortwestern current flow. All thee states are almost certiny affected by Amazon effuents,
which are defined to be outside the Wider Carbbean Region. (Notably, Guyan and Sure
are on the Amazon Cooperation Council with BraiL.) Given the direction of current flows,
Suriname is the leading source and Guyana has the largest stae. Surine also has the largest
capacity, suggesting that gain from trade, if transboundary effects are present, might derive
from an agreement between Surie and Guyan. The Netherlands, as a major trading parer
with Suriame, might playa critical role in facilitating such a trade.
Table 22 presents an overview of "key" source, staeholder, and faciltator states in each
of the subregions. Key faciltators are those states that provide significant amounts of
development assistance to key source states and so might be in a position to encourage a trading
relationship to develop. Where the key source state is not receiving development assistance, a
major trading partner is identified as the key faciltator. (We reiterate the potential sensitivity
of the results to the existing delineation of subregions.)
Matchig key faciltator states with key source states may provide clues to importt
international relationships in the resolution of LBMP problems in the Carbbean. For example,
the United States, with assistace from Mexico, might offer the following deal to Beliz: in
return for the reduction of LBMP emissions in Beliz, the United States wil put pressure on
Hondur (and possibly Guatemala) to reduce its emissions.
Other interntional trdin relationships might cross subregions. For example, the Unite
States, as Venezuela's largest trdig parer, might encourge Venezuela to reduce its
emissions. The Netherlands would benefit directly from such a move. In retu, the
6 At the 25th anversar of INDERENA, Colombia's environment agency, Araldo Jose Gabaldon, Venezuelan
Environment Minister. praised the conversion ofINDERENA into a Minstr with broader legislative and reguatory
powers.
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Netherlands might encourage Surinae to reduce its emissions, benefitting Guyana and,
potentially, Venezuela. To the extent tht the Lesser Antiles are at risk from Venezuelan
emissions, France would benefit from Venezuelan cutbacks. In return, France might encourage
Marinque and Guadeloupe to control their LBMP emissions, benefitting the U.S. Virgin Islands
and thereby completing the lin. Although ths international negotiation ha many lin, it
involves only four states. In fact, a bargain strck among the United States, Venezuela, and
France to reduce LBMP emissions in their respective territories and in the territories of
associated states and states to which they give foreign aid might reduce much of the risks
associated with transboundary LBM pollution in the WCR.
D. An Alterntive Assessment of Capacities and Incentives to Control LBMP
As noted in the previous subsection, the. analytic approach developed by Broadus et aL.
(1993) to estimate sources, staes, and capacities of states proposing to underte collective
action on LBMP has as an underlying assumption the generaliz presence of trboundar
LBMP effects. This assumption limts the utiity of the analysis for a region like the Carbbean,
where most LBMP effects have so far been demonstrated to be localiz, and where general
recognition of ths fact has not precluded interest among the Contractig Paries to the Cargena
Convention in negotiating a protocol that addresses common but not necessarily tranboundary
LBMP problems. The approach has certin other, more general limtations as well. These
include the failure of the "stake" measure to distinguish between an economic stae in
controlling pollution vs. a stae in continuing to pollute, and the failure of..the "capacity"
measure to capture environmental inrastructure as an importt component of a state's abilty
to underte effective action to control LBMP.
In this section we build on our review of economic, intitutional, and environmental
chaacteristics of the WCR states in an attempt to assess the individual and collective prospects
for undertg sustained and effective action to control land-based marine pollution. This
assessment is based on the assumption that the factors upon which these prospects mainy depend
are a combintion of (i) the states' economic and intitutional capacity to tae corrective action
and (ii)the extent to which their economic strengths and priorities represent an incentive to
maintain a healthy coastal environment or, alternatively, to value the suounding marine
environment priary as a convenient sin for pollutats. Another importt difference here
is tht, unike the application of the Broadus et aL. approach in the preceding section, we do not
begin the assessment by assigng states to subregions, but rather by considerig all the WCR
states together, with a single, unorm context.
Table 23 displays some sumar results of ths assessment effort, expressed in terms of
qualitative ratings for each WCR state in the areas of economic capacity, institutional capacity,
and economic incentive. On each of these thee measures, a state was assigned a rating on a
scle of 1 (weak capacity or incentive) to 4 (strong), based on an admittedly subjective
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Table 23
Qulitative Ratigs of Capacity and Incentive to Underte LBMP Control
Slate Ecnomic Insiiiuiional Ecnomic Combined
Capaiiy" Capaciiy' IncetiveC . Scre'
Anguila 0 a . 8
Antigu &. Barbda 0 0 . 9
Aniba . a . 9
Bahama . 0 . 10
Barbados 0 0 . 9
Belize a a 0 5
British Virgin Is. . 0 . 10
Cayma Is. . 0 . 10
Colombia a 0 a 4
Co Rica 0 0 0 5
Cuba a 0 0 7
Dominica a 0 0 6
Dominica Republic a a 0 5
Frech Guian 0 a a 4
Gren 0 0 0 7
Guadeloupe 0 a 0 6
Guatemala a a a 3
Guyana a a 0 4
Haiti a a 0 4
Hondura a a a 3
Jamaica a a . 6
Martinique 0 a 0 7
Mexico 0 0 0 7
Montsmit 0 0 . 9
Neterlands Antilles 0 a . 8
Nicagua a a a 3
Pan 0 a ø 4
Puerto Rico 0 . 0 10
St. Kitls &. Nevis 0 ø . 8
St. Luia 0 ø . 7
St. Vint &. 0 0 . 6
Greadines
Suriname ø 0 0 4
Trinidad &. Tobago 0 ø 0 6
Turl &. Caco (S. 0 0 . 9
United Slates . . 0' 9
US Virizin Is. . . . 12
Venezuela ø 0 0 5
o wek (i) 0(2) 0(3) . strong (4)
.Bas on pe capita GDP.
"Bas on obsrved rercpollution prolem. provision of sewerage and safe drinking water. an
compreensiven of environmeta magemt and enforct.
"Bas on relative importce of marine reurc an reevant ecnomic activities/priorties.
'Gulf Coa slates only.
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assessment of one or more relevant factors for which inormation was available. Specifically:
. economic capacity was rated solely on the basis of per capita GDP;
. institutional capacity was rated on the basis of a state's observed resource/pollution
problems, the extent to which it provides sewage services and safe drining water, and
the comprehensiveness of its environmental mangement and enforcement;
. economic incentive was rated on the basis of the significance of a state's marine
resources and the relative importce and direction of pertinent economic activities and
priorities.
The assigned ratings for these thee factors, and the resulting total "score" for each WCR state,
are also displayed in Table 23. Figure 16, panels a though d, display the geographic
distributions of the WCR states with respect to economic capacity, intitutional capacity,
economic incentive, and total "score."
Admittedly, the thee rating factors constitute a limted and somewhat arbitrary basis for
assessing somethg as complicated as a state's capacity-and especially its motivation or lack
of motivation-to devote high-level attention, effort, and other resources to marine
environmental concern. As a practical mattr, however, these factors reflect the limts of the
relevant inormation that is available on a more or less uniform and comprehensive basis for all
the WCR states. At least equally importt, they constitute what we believe to be the most
reliable indicators of the WCR states' long-term capabilties, intentions, and priorities (in
contrst to, for example, the charer or early statement of objectives of a fledgling environmental
ministry) .
Table 24 arrays the WCR states according to their total "scores" for the thee qualitative
ratig meaures, which range from 3 to 12. As indicated by the title of the table, we consider
these results to provide a qualitative idea of each state's overall prospect or likelihood of
engaging in sustained and effective action to control LBMP, based on its economic and
intitutional capacity and its economic incentive to do so. Another way of describing the
inormtion in Table 24 is to consider the states in the far-right colum (i.e., US Virgin
Islands, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and United States) as those most likely to brig
to the effort the strongest mi of know-how, fmaciaI commitment, and political determtion,
whereas those listed at the far left (i.e., Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaagua, Colombia, French
Guian, Guyana, Haiti, Pana, and Surie) are the states least likely to participate in any
meanigfl way without substantial fmanciaI and technca assistace and other, speciaI
inducements.
Clearly, the majority of WCR states fall somewhere between these two extremes (i.e.,
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Figure i 6. Relative Capacities and Incentives to Control LBMP Throughout the WCR
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(c) Economic Incentive to Control LBMP
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Figure 16 (contd).
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in groups with total "scores" ranging from 5 to 9), and the specifics of their circumstaces
warrant closer scrutiny. Fifteen of the WCR states-all of them island nations or
dependencies-have very strong economic incentives to control LBMP (see Table 22 and Figure
16, panel c). This group includes: Anguila, Antigua & Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, the
British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Jamaica, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antiles, St.
Kitt & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, the Turks & Caicos Islands, and the
US Virgin Islands.
Of these 15, all but the US Virgin Islands have a substatial to very serious need for
techncal assistance to overcome weak intitutional capacity, and 4 of them (Jamaica, St. Kitts
& Nevis, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines) have a substantial to very serious need
for fincial assistance as well (Figue 16, panel a). In contrst to ths latter subgroup is another
subgroup of 3 (Arba, the Bahas, and the British Virgin Islands) that is in a comparatively
strong position to pay for the techncal assistace or intitutional strengthenig they would need
to control LBMP to a level that is consonat with their economic incentive to do so.
Other than stress to coastal ecosystems, which is a ubiquitous problem thoughout the
WCR, pollution from sewage is the most widespread of the serious LBMP problems confronting
ths group of 15 states with especially strong economic incentives (affecting 9 of the 15).
Sewage is followed by coastal erosion (affecting 7 of the 15 states). Other LBMP and related
resource degradation problems that affect at least one-thd of ths group are pollution of coastal
waters by oil, ming, and other industrial effuents; deforestation; and overfshi. In addition,
5 of the states in ths group have been cited in various studies for failure to underte an
assessment of their marine resources and problems, and an additional 2 (Jamaica and the
Netherlands Antiles) have been criticizd for their general failure to regulate development and
other activity in the coastal zone (refer again to Table 11 in Section IV).
The most obvious sources of both finacial strengt and techncal assistance with the
WCR are the Unite States and the US Virgin Islands (although the latter has its own diffculties
with sewage management). Puerto Rico is another comparatively strong prospect for techncal
assistace-perhaps paricularly to those neighborig countres that have yet to inventory their
coasta assets and problems or to develop and enforce effective regulations concerng coastal
zone activity. Although not in the top tier in terms of overall intitutiona capacity, Cuba rates
well above average for the region, and it should be considered as a potential source of techncal
assistace, especially on the use of "clean" technologies to reduce pollution by industral
effluents.
Cuba is one of 9 WCR states whose economic incentives to control LBMP may be
described as importnt but not compelling, in that industries such as tourism and fishig are
together substantially less importnt thn manufacturing and/or agricultue. Cuba is noteworty
among ths group for having developed its quite strong intitutiona capacities despite a very low
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standard of living,7 whereas something like the reverse is tre of Marinique, whose relatively
high standard of living has not tranlated into much progress in the area of environmental
inrastrctue. For the rest of ths group, there tends to be a much closer correspondence
between standard of living and institutional capacity to control LBMP and other environmental
problems, with the need for both financial and techncal assistance being most serious for Belize,
Domica, Haiti, and the Domican Republic.
Other than Belize and perhaps Costa Rica (as discussed furter below), the Central
American countres should not be expected to paricipate in a sustained and meanigful way
without special inducements. 
8 All of these states have little in the way of economic capacity,
intitutional capacity, or economic incentive to paricipate. In Central America, two main
reasons for the low incentive are the predominance of the agriculture and manufacturig sectors,
and the far greater orientation of population centers and economic activities toward the Pacific
coast and watershed.
For several of the WCR states, factors other th economic self-interest should not be
overlooked as major motivations to paricipate in a regiona protocol on LBMP. For the United
States, for example, the apparent motive is a sense of responsibilty, as the dominnt economic
power in the region, to share its strong intitutional and techncal expertise with its neighbors
(and to imrove the well-being of its own citins and resources in the Mexican border area as
well). Venezuela is likely to be motivated by similar sentiments, including a desire (or perhaps
a political necessity) to improve the environmental quality of life for the very nïgh proportion
of its population that is concentrated along the Carbbean coast. Perhaps most importt for
Venezuela, however-and for Puerto Rico and Trindad & Tobago as well-is an awareness that
these states account for most of the industral point-source pollution entering the Caribbean
proper (i.e., not including the Gulf of Mexico). Finally, Colombia and Costa Rica have both
taen various steps which indicate that environmental concern are a much higher priority than
their actual intitutional capacities would suggest, and it is likely that both these states see the
completion of a regional protocol on LBMP as improving the chances that greater attntion and
resours wil be made available to improve their domestic capabilties in ths area.
E. Concluding: Remarks
The anlytic approaches and examples described in ths section, together with the
7As noted by Broadus (pers. comr., 1994), one explanation that readily comes to mind is the low opportty
cost with a commd ecnomy, paricularly one that until recntly enjoyed tremendous foreign subsidies.
8The same is probably true for the three South Amenca states to the eat of Venezuela, although Guyan and
Sune do paricipate in the Amazn Cooperation Treaty, which may well be more relevant to their environmenta
concern than LBMP in the Carbbea.
109
information compiled in the previous section and in the Appendix A data tables, are intended
to serve as a basis for explicitly recogniing common and complementary self-interests,
strengts, and weakesses in the design of protocol mechanisms to facilitate mutually beneficial
collaborations and exchanges.
No attempt has been made to integrate these anlytic approaches into a single "formula"
for determinig the "best" organtion of states into subregions. Nonetheless, the present study
has given attention to concern that were expressed by some reviewers of the earlier,
comparative study (i.e., Broadus et aL. 1993) as to the desirabilty of relying on a single
indicator-population-to represent a state's stae in controlling LBMP. Specifically, Broadus
et aL. (1993:48) used the percentage of a state's population in the relevant drainage area as a
proxy for "political and economic interest in reducing marie pollution" -a measure for which
few other reliable data are uniformy available.
In ths study, the approach of Broadus et al. has been refined by using an estiate of
coastal population rather than drainge area population to represent a state's "stae" in
controlling LBMP. 9 In addition, an attempt was made to test the validity of the above-
mentioned criticism. The coasta population estimate was weighted by our composite indicator
of "economic incentive to control LBMP" (see Section V.D), which represents the significace
of a state's marie resources and the relative importce and direction of pertinent economic
activities and priorities.
Reviewers of the earlier study may be surrised to lear tht ths weighting exercise
resulted in only minor deviations from the results report in Section V.D. For example, Costa
Rica and Honduras exchanged places but remained fairly close in the middle range of staes
within Subregion II; and in Subregion il, there was a simar reversal of position for the
Dominca Republic and Jamaica, with both remainig in the middle range.
Cuous readers can easily perform ths exercise and consider the results for themselves.
The resuts are not report here because we remain skeptical about the utiity and validity of
weighting factors that provide only a naow sense of a large and complicated economic pictue
(e.g., agriculture as % of GDP) or caot be reliably quatified for such use (e.g., tageting of
industries for concerted development effort). 10
9'e preferabilty of coasta population is obvious if one considers that residents of the US states of Montaa
and Pennylvania, for example, although par of the WCR drage basin population, are unikely to see themselves
as having an ecnomic stake in the quaity of the Gulf of Mexico or WCR mare environment.
10Simlarly, we have rejected a suggestion that land-use data be used to weight population for a better indicator
of "stae." Lad-use data are quite diffcult to obta, especially for the smal island states. Far more imortt
is the fact that, even where available, they are by their nature destied to capture only the relative imprtce of
polluting and flpollution-neutral fl industries, while failing to capture the importce of industries that are vulnerable
to LBMP. such as tourism and fisheries. As such, land-use data, were they more uniformy available, might more
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A case in point is the evolving economic reality of Cuba, which was singled out by one
reviewer as a state for which population alone suggests a far greater stake in controlling LBMP
than its overall economic make-up would suggest (Wood-Thomas, pers. comm., 1995). While
it is tre that Cuba has an unusually high proportion of GDP accounted for by manufacturing
(39%), there are other importnt (but diffcult to quantify) factors that account for Cuba's
having been assigned a rating of "3" for economic incentive to control LBMP. The most
importnt of these factors are the following:
Tourism has been targeted as the number one growt area by the governent, and
foreign investment in tourism development has been very strong.
Cuba is the largest net exporter of fish in the WCR; the reported value of its net export
exces that of the second-largest net exporter (Bahamas) by more than 30 percent.
Manufacturing is heavily concentrted in paper products and has been tageted by the
governent for strategic diversification. An emerging industr tht could well benefit
from ths move, and in which Cuba is a leader in the WCR, is the development and
application of so-called clean technologies.
Such factors, we believe, constitute a sound basis for characterizing Cuba as having a much
stronger economic incentive to control LBMP than its historical emphasis on manufacturing (and,
to a lesser extent, agriculture) would indicate. At the same time, however, such
information-being diffcult to quantify and not uniformy available or relevant across the
region-does not lend itself to use as a weighting factor.
The development of one or more weighting factors for use in anlyzing states' relative
stae in controlling LBMP remain an intriguing area for furter effort, but one in which succss
wil depend heavily on substantial improvement in the collection and availabilty of relevant
demographic and socioeconomic data. For the present, we offer the inormation and anlyses
report here as a framework for assessing which states are the most likely to engage in
sustained and succssful action to control LBMP, and the general categories of assistace or
spial inducements tht the other states are likely to nee in order to participate successfully.
appropriately be used as a weighting factor for "source" if one were neeed (which, to our knowledge, has not been
suuggested).
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Vi. Lesons Lerned i
A review of experience with regional programs to control land-based marine pollution
in the Baltic, Nort Sea, and Mediterranean has revealed a number of factors that can contribute
to program effectiveness (Broadus et al. 1993). We compare these factors with expectations
about a protocol for the Caribbean region, based upon regional characteristics and the current
state of policy debate over the establishment of an LBMP protocol. 2
We present here and apply a checklist to help sumariz effectiveness factors across the
four regions (Table 25). In general, factors for success can be classified into thee categories.
The first is a set of regional background characteristics associated with effective cooperation.
The second is a set of program design elements, which are explicitly subject to the control of
progr planners. The third is a set of indicators of program effectiveness. (Success breeds
furter succss, and evidence that a progr is in fact doing what it set out to do serves to
reinorce or provide momentu for furter program effectiveness.)
In the case of the Caribbean, our checklist is necesarily incomplete because there is no
practice under an LBMP protocol to be observed and evaluated. Neverteless, we feel tht ths
checklist provides a useful comparson across the four regional interntional programs.
A. Regional Background Characteristics
1. Delineation of Subregions
The appropriate region must be defined in terms of the actual environmental relationship
between states. If pollutants do not circulate widely, then the inclusion of unaffected states in
a regional program wil only complicate cooperative effort.
In the Baltic and Nort Sea regions, mare pollution is trly a transboundar problem.
The Baltic is shallow and stagnat and thus tends to trap dischaged pollutats, affecting all
states borderig it. The counter-clockwise curents of the Nort Sea provide a bettr flushig
mecham for that regiona sea, but a general tranboundar problem remain in tht the
dischages of some states are exported to other states.
i Much of this section has been adapted from Broadus et aI. (1993) in order to faciltate the application of
"lessons leaed" from regional international program to control land-based mare pollution in the Mediterrean,
Baltic, and Nort Sea regions to the Wider Carbbean. .
2 Ths comparson was intiated though discussions at a workshop conducted as par of this study, which was
held 4-6 Decmber 1994, at the University of the West Indies in Bndgetown, Barbados.
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Table 25
Checklist: Factors for Regional Program Success
Regional Background Characteriics ror Baltic North Med Caribbean
Errective Cooperation Se
Is me region defined in terms of the pollution Ves Yes Doubiful No. focus should be on delineation
problem? Do the pollutanlS arreci all or the stales or subregions
cmtering inlo the agremenl~
Is there coherence among member slates? Are they Largely. Ves No No. bui possibly yes al an
al similar levels economic and scientific but some appropriiely delineate
development. and do they have similar resources at dispanry subregional level 
stake?
Are ile member sialC politically committ 10 the Yes Yes No Doubtl. a1i1ough ise is
progiim? Is the condition of the regional se a regniz
pnonty isse. and are high level politica offcials
involved in overseeing me program?
Was thre geneiii knowledge of die baseline Ves. fair No, por Some. IOCARBE and CEPPOL have
enyironmnial conditions in the se al th time of the paal made a goo sian; focus should be
progra's ineption? Where ile baic sorc and on pnonty problem ares
shres of pollutani inpUlS kllwn?
Elen of Efecve Prgra De
Is die goal of die regional agremenl clearly Stte, Yes Yes Yes Should reive pnonty
an are th progiim objecves designe to meel this
goal?
Dos ile agremenl oblige coniiicting panies to Ves Ves Ves Focs on encuraemenis:
adopi mesures 10 meei progiim objecves? IInsctions coS! ~uctons
Do mesures spify ~uciion targeis and deadlines Ves Yes Few Enurae flexibility al subregional
(or their achievement? leyel
Are progiim mesures designed efflcienUy? Do they No. bul No No Design proiocl instiOJlÏons 10
target pollutin sourcs for which ile gretest improving encllge effcieni subregional
reuciions can be achieved al the lowesi marginal gains from Illde
cost?
Does ile agremeni provide a mechanism 10 Ves. bul Ves Yes Environmental monitoring and
deienoine whedier or ii coniiicting panies comply not in the enforcmeni are roles for protool
with adopied mesures? Is there an obligaiion In pal insiilUbons
repoR on progiim implementaiion?
Does the progiim incorpiiie mechanisms for tiide Limiied No Some Encouiige bilatelli or small group
10 increse prognim efficiency? agrements
Adequate finaing feaOJres? Yes Yes Problems Build on CEPPOL foundtin
Is die progiim's declisioiuing pross effectiye? Fair Yes Fair Fos shuld be on proure thi
Are mere adOpied so as 10 keep dieir content aim to reuce ttnsactions cost
meningful wiiloul alienating reluciani panicipanis' and define nghlS 10 a clean manne
environment
Is th progiim adapiable? Can ii be adjusted 10 Yes Yes Somewhai Design inio prolOl
refleci chaned circmsiaces and imroved
lcwledge?
Dyc Mea or EfecVCI
Is thre complia widi th progra' Do Yes. bui , Some or De inlO prolOl using
conictng part imlemeni progia limite minima enyironmnia monilOnng suppon
remmendations'
Is ile goal being achieved? Has the regional Ves Yes Perhps -
enyironmeni improved relative to the hypotheiical
siOJalion thi would have ocrr withoui the
regional progiim?
Haye naiiona abatemeni effons ben greter dian Ves Ves Doubtfl Aim shuld be 10 harnss explicidy
thy would have ben widioui regional copeiiiion? natinal abatemei effons dirogh
die faciltaiion of subregional
ammgcments
Adapted from Broadus et al. (1993).
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The weak currents and small tides of the Mediterranean Sea leave pollutants mostly in
the areas where they are discharged. Although some of the current flows in the Caribbean are
strong, most effects of LBM pollutant emissions are felt locally or subregionally. Pollution
problems that are local or subregional imply that 
subregional effort wil be more effective.
Effective reduction of pollutat discharges at the subregional level can reduce the risks of
regionwide effects.
Broadus et aL. (1993) found that cooperative efforts to control land-based sources of
marine pollution are most appropriately based in regions defined in terms of the pollution
problem itself. In regions where measures to control 
land-based sources are only one component
of a larger umbrella agreement, it may be useful to focus on environmentally defined subregions
when addressing land-based sources, rather th unecessarily including unaffected states.
In the WCR, CEPPOL has identifed 6 subregions of contiguous states for purposes of
analyzing the distribution of pollutat loads (UEP 1994a). This delineation is a useful intial
attempt, but we note that the ocurence of localiz LBMP problems does not follow ths
pattern in most cases. For example, some of the most common and pressing problems and their
distrbution across WCR states (based on inormation sumarizd in Table 11) are as follows:
Sewage management: Arba, Bahas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin Islands,
Cayman Islands, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Domincan Republic, Grenada,
Guadeloupe, Guyan, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Marinque, Mexico, Netherlands
Antilles, Panaa, Puerto Rico, St. Kitt & Nevis, Surine, Trindad & Tobago, United
States, US Virgin Islands, Venezuela
Indusrial pollutats: Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Colombia, Cuba, Domincan
Republic, Grenada, Guadeloupe Jamaica, Marinque, Mexico, Netherlands Antiles, St.
Kitt & Nevis, Puerto Rico, Tnndad & Tobago, United States, US Virgin Islands,
Venezuela
Need for better resource assesment/coas use reguation: Anguila, Bahamas,
Beliz, Colombia, French Guian, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Jamica,
Honduras, Marinque, Mexico, Montserrt, Nicaragua, Pana, Sure, Tuks &
Caicos Islands
Deforestion: Beliz, Colombia, Costa Rica, Domica, Grenada, Guatemaa, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Marinque, Mexico, Nicaagua, Panaa, St. Lucia, St. Vincent &
Grenadines, Venezuela
Coas erosion: Antigua & Barbuda, Barbados, Dominca, Grenada, Guatemala,
Jamaica, St. Kitt & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Venezuela
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Solid waste management: Colombia, Dominica, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Netherlands
Antiles
Delineation of subregions is one of the most importnt tasks that must be underten
under the auspices of a protocol. Clearly some of the above problems are more common than
others, suggesting that a system of overlapping subregions, defined by the presence of tageted
LBMP problems (as arayed in Table 26) might be appropriate. As scientific inormation is
developed, revision of existing subregions may be required.
2. Coherence Among Member States
The success of cooperative effort depends upon "coherence:" shared cultural values,
public preferences that coincide, simlar stages of economic development, and compatible
political organtions. Regions with states at simlar stages of economic development, such as
the Baltic and Nort Sea states, are able to contribute on a relatively equal basis to a marine
pollution control progr, in term of the scientific, techncal, and fincial resources they have
at their disposal. Conversely, regions comprising states at varying stages of economic
development, such as the Mediterranean and Caribbean, may need specializ technology
transfer and financial assistace mechansms if their programs are to function on a fully regional
scale.
In the caes studied, the regions with the best coherence have the most effective regional
cooperation and are leat complicated by a number of tranfer issues. Furtermore, cooperative
effort are most effective when member states are simarly affected by a degraded mae
environment and have simar resources at stae. If they are not similarly affected by pollutat
discharges or do not perceive the condition of the mare environment as a priority issue, it is
more difficult to design a program in which participation is beneficial to all members.
The effectiveness of the Baltic and Nort Sea regional programs, relative to the
Mediterranean and, potentially, to the Carbbea, can be explained by the nature of each region's
member states and the degree of coherence among them. The Nort Sea region consists of a
small number of relatively homogeneous states, sharg simar staes in the condition of their
regiona sea. Most of the Baltic states similarly share a stae in and commtment to their
regiona sea's environment, though some disparty is evident between the traditional democracies
and the formerly communt states. Cooperative effort in these regions have ben able to
function on a more uniform basis, with a higher level of political commtment and few tranfer
issues.
The disparty in levels of economic development in the Mediterranea, in paricular, ha
made uniform action virally impossible and has complicated relations by vire of the nee for
transfer mechansms. We expect tht the existence of similar types of disparities among
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Table 26
Commonalty of Specific LBMP Problems as Basis for Subregional Groupings
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Caribbean states implies a high potential for lack of coherence there. A careful delineation of
subregions would enhance the potential for coherence among states within each subregion.
Building upon the example introduced in the preceing subsection, we note that Table
26 presents the qualitative ratings (from Section V) of individual states' economic capacity,
intitutional capacity, and economic incentive to control LBMP. Of the 37 political units in the
region, there are only 7, or fewer than one-fift, for which at least 4 of the 6 selected LBMP
problems are significant: Colombia, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Jamaica, Martinique, Mexico, and
Venezuela (the shaded rows in Table 26). Five of these seven have strong to very strong
economic incentives to participate in an LBMP protocol, but none has an intitutional capacity
rating higher than 2, and the average economic capacity rating for the group is just 1.85. The
addition of the United States (including Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands) and Cuba to this
group, however, could make for a kind of "super" subregion that is truly representative of the
full range of problems, incentives, and capacities thoughout the region. Withn a framework
of overlapping subregions, a "super" subregion constitute on such a basis could be explicitly
charered to playa coordinative role among all the other subregions; to ensure equal accss to
the protocol's clearighouse products; and to promote fairess in the internal allocation of
fmacial and techncal assistace to all participating states and subregions.
3. High-Level Political Commtment and Oversight
The success of a regional program inevitably depends on the political commitment of its
member states. Unless members accept the condition of their regional sea as a domestic priority
issue, it wil be difficult to get them to take costly effective action. One indicator of likely
political commitment is whether the program grew out of internl or external motivations. A
program that develops out of mutual concern for a shared resource is likely to enjoy a greater
level of commitment th a program initiated by external players, whose concern and
motivations differ from those of the regional states. The frequency of ministerial-level meetigs
may also indicate continued interest and commtment to a regional program. High-level political
involvement in setting progr objectives and reporting on program implementation also adds
some accountabilty to the program framework.
Both the Baltic and Nort Sea programs were internly motivated, growing out of a
shaed perception among regiona states tht the degradation of the marine environment was an
issue of great importnce. Minsterial conferences have contributed to the success of these
progr by producing specific commtments with meanigfu timetables and by encouraging
Contracting Parties to tae actions with greater scope.
Both the Mediterranean and Caribbean programs, on the other hand, have resulted
primarily from external UNEP intiatives. As in the other regions, minsterial-level meetings
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have contributed to the effectiveness of the Mediterranea program by expediting the adoption
of common measures.
A sense of urgency and concern for the condition of a regional sea, essential to the
success of a pollution control program, canot be introduced into regional states by external
organitions. Many WCR states already consider the risks of transboundary LBMP to be a
pressing problem, especially because of theats to tourism economies. Even nontransboundary
pollution problems may harm other tourist economies, especially those lined by cruise ship
business, in that visitors may form a general impression of the Caribbean as polluted on the basis
of localized problems. Institutions organd though a Caribbean regional protocol may have
an importnt role to play in encouraging subregional agreements to reduce pollution by lowering
transactions costs, channeling foreign assistance effort, and serving as a clearinghouse.
4. Knowledge of Baseline Conditions
All four regions suffer from a lack of adequate baseline data. Without such inormation
it is difficult to establish effective program priorities, to gauge program effect, or to adjust effort
in response to changing conditions.
Than to the long tradition of environmental monitoring in the Baltic Sea, the natue of
the region's pollution problem was relatively well understood at the time of the Helsin
Convention's inception. This knowledge of baseline environmental conditions has increased the
effectiveness of cooperative effort in the region.
The baseline conditions of the Nort Sea were not very well understood when cooperative
effort were first undertken. As of 1988, estiates have been developed for the inputs of
nutrients, heavy metals, and halogenated substances, with resultig improvements in
effectiveness.
Baseline pollution sources in the Mediterranean were loosely identified in 1972 by the
FAO's General Fishery Council. Therefore, some inormation on the pollutats dischaged into
the Mediterranea and their sources was available in 1975 when the Med Plan was develope.
However, the degree of pollutat tranport was overestiated.
CEPPOL has begun to assemble data from each state on its point source contrbutions
to the Carbbea Sea and connected waters. Furer reseach effort are neeed to develop a
better understading of current flows and the associated distrbution of pollutants. A regiona
monitoring system would improve the quality of scientific data and deepen our understading
of pollutat dispersal and the potential for damages. Ths task is one of the most importnt to
be undertken by the WCR states. In combintion with IOCARE, the CEP program has taen
valuable first steps in characteriing baseline conditions.
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Furter improvements could be made by encouraging the scientific community involved
in local monitoring of Caribbean waters to make coarse approximations and estimates of
environmental conditions, suitable for management guidance, rather than waiting for more
thorough and exact research results. The World Bank has already taen steps in this direction
(Elvis and Colbert 1994). These estimates should be employed in identifying priority bilateral
relationships, delineating subregions, and assisting states in the identification of potential gain
from trade.
B. Elements of Effective Program Design
1. Clear Goals and Objectives
Effectiveness wil hige on the aptness of program objectives in light of the overall goal.
When a regional program is established to improve the quality of the marine environment,
objectives should be realistically designed to reduce emission of pollutants into the marine
environment. A program is ineffective if the successful attinent of objectives does not resut
in the achievement of the goal. For example, objectives that call for "confdence-building"
exercises do not, in themselves, result in improved marine environmental quality.
All of the cooperative agreements operating in the Nort Sea region clearly state their
goals. In the case of the Interministerial Nort Sea Conferences (INSC) and the Paris
Convention, objectives have been designed to meet the goal. The Paris Convention calls for the
elimination of blacklisted substaces, the strct limitation or elimation of grey listed substances,
and the prevention of pollution from radioactive substances in order to attin the goal of
reducing pollution of the Convention area from emissions of land-based sources. The
Declarations of the INSC call for the development of timetables for the various actions aiming
to achieve the goal of protecting the Nort Sea environment.
The goal of the Helsink Convention is clearly stated in the Convention text. Anexes
to the Convention identify substaces that Baltic member states should. endeavor to prohibit or
mi in order to attin the Convention's goal.
The Barcelona Convention is not very specific in outling its goals and the mea to
achieving them. However, the Athens Protocol states its goal as tag "all appropriate
meaures to prevent, abate, combat, and control pollution from land-based sources." Program
objectives are outlined in Aricles 5,6, and 7 and call on Contracting Pares to elimate (Aricle
5) or strctly limit (Aricle 6) pollution by substaces liste in Anexes 1 and 2, respectively.
Aricle 7, however, limits ths obligation by conditionig the adoption of programs and measues
under Arcles 5 and 6 on the "capacity to adapt and reconvert existing intallations, the
economic capacity of the Parties and their need for development. "
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A clear goal for the reduction and control of LBMP has not yet been articulated by the
paries to the Cartgena Convention. In articulating such a goal, states should take advantage
of existing intitutions, including bilateral agreements to control pollution, and interntional
organitions, such as the CEP and the World Ban. We have argued in this report that an
explicitly subregional focus should be incorporated into an LBMP protocol for the WCR. Gain
from trade are more readily apparent at the subregional, especially bilateral, leveL. By
encouraging states to control the actual incidence of pollution at the subregional level, the risks
of potentially widespread regional pollution can be lowered dramatically. By taking "small"
initial steps requiring relatively few but more easily accssible resources, an effective approach
to the reduction and control of LBMP in the Caribbean can be built. A careful examintion of
existing intitutions and programs shows that some small steps in ths direction have already been
taen, providing a firm basis for the subregional approach we recommend.
Clarification of the term "appropriate measures" for LBMP reduction or control, as in
the Barcelona Convention, wil be another importt focus of discussions leading toward a
protocol for the Wider Caribbea Region. It is more likely that effective pollution control
measures wil be adopted if states are permitted to choose the most cost-effective approach for
any given level of water quality. At the subregional level, WCR states should be given
flexibilty in the adoption of appropriate pollution control measures. Flexibilty wil permit
control measures to be one term of negotiation in a trading arangement.
2. Obligation to Adopt Measures: Targets and Deadlines
Effectiveness depends on the degree to which a program's objectives, however aptly
designed, have been met by its Contractig Parties. Specific targets and timetables for emission
reductions are necessary first steps towards ensring that program objectives result in real action.
The practice of including dates and proceures for reporting on implementation in issued
recommendations is also useful in ths regard.
PARCOM issues recommendations to its Contracting Paries and calls upon them to
implement the recommended progr and measures in order to attin adopted objectives. The
effectiveness of these measures improved with the 1987 and 1990 Nort Sea Conferences, when
an emissions reduction program with speified tagets and time limts was adopted (Wettestad
1992). Prior to the 1987 Conference, the reduction program adopted were vague and reflected
the position of the most reluctat paricipants.
HELCOM issues recommendations to its Contrcting Paries on the adoption of measures
necssar to fulfill the program objectives. These meaes usually contain specific tagets and
deadlines for their accomplishment.
Recommended common measures have been adopted in conjunction with the Athens
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Protocol, addressing 12 of the 28 substances covered in Anexes I and II. However, the content
of the adopted measures is general, with few fixed time limits related to concrete reduction
goals. Only four of these measures include target dates, or periods, for their achievement.
Thus the recommendations effectively do not demand that practical action be taen by the
Contracting Parties. In such a diverse region, however, there may be so many local variables
that common action becomes virally impossible. In these situations it may be more effective
to adopt variable standards or differential timetables than to adopt uniform measures that result
in litte or no practical action.
A useful method of accommodating a region's developing states, or states otherwise
subject to drastically different conditions or incentives, is to employ differential timetables for
complying with objectives, accompanied by mandatory reporting requirements on progress made
toward implementation. In ths way, Contracting Parties are encouraged to tae some sort of
action toward meeting program objectives, at least in the form of enabling steps, and some
recrd of their progress can be observed.
The differential tietable method can be applied to subregions in the Carbbean. With
guidace from protocol intitutions, subregional groupings of WCR states should be encouraged
to set stadads, identify appropriate pollution control mechanisms, and determine appropriate
timetables for control. Regional institutions, such as the CEP or the W orId Bank, might be
called upon for general advice in selecting these parameters of a program.
3. Efficientlv Designed Progra Measures
Program measures are most effective when they target effuents and locations for which
the greatest daage reduction can be achieved for the least cost. Reductions across the board,
such as those required by uniform standards, tend to be more costly and less efficient than a
strategy that bases reductions on the marginal damage done and the marginal cost of abatement
for each substance.
The measures adopted for the protection of the Nort Sea Convention area were not
designed effciently. Improvements in the mare environment wil be made at a higher
economic cost than necessar (Wettestad 1992). Ths is evident in the apparent preference for
uniorm emission reduction stadads over environmenta quality standards, and in the fact tht
the major problems in the region are confmed to several coastal hot spots whie the meaures
adopted address the entire Nort Sea area.
Past HELCOM recommendations have not been designed efficiently. As with the 50
percent reduction target, past measures have been taen across the board. However, the Baltic
program seems to be moving away from across-the-board reduction strategies. The pre-
feasibilty studies of the Baltic Joint Comprehensive Programe focus on the most serious point
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sources of pollution in an attempt to provide a basis for cost-effective action. Thus, if
HELCOM follows the lead of the Baltic Task Force, measures adopted for the protection of the
Baltic Sea should become more effective and efficient.
The measures adopted for the protection of the Mediterranean region are ineffectively
designed and often do not result in practical action.
In the WCR case, arguments are now being made for regionwide uniform water quality
standads and technology-based emission controls. These approaches are infexible and
potentially quite costly. Further, they are warranted only in special cases, where theshold
effects are strongly suspected or actully evident. As in the case of the Mediterranean, it seems
unlikely that an "effective" protocol wil result from agreement on regionwide standards of these
types. WCR states should be encouraged to focus on relevant margin abatement benefits and
costs. Where water quality stadards are determed to be a more practical approach than the
determintion of economic damages, states should be encouraged to adopt intrents of control
that allow the stadards to be met in the most cost-effective maner. Although there may be an
importt role for technology-based controls on certin discharges or for certin industres, in
the interest of effectiveness, they should not be imposed arbitrarly as the only feasible pollution
control measure.
4. Compliance Mechanisms
Reportg on measures taen toward implementation is a critical element of any
subregiona pollution control agreement. This is particularly tre in a common-pool
environment, because many states may be reluctant to tae action without the knowledge that
other states are doing the same or at least not subverting their effort. In a unidirectional
pollution case, such as for many Caribbean pollutats, downstream state(s) have a strong
incentive to monitor changes in environmental quality to ensure compliance by the upstream
state(s).
In the absence of physical evidence to determine compliance, paries should be called
upon to report on their level of compliance, in term of legal, regulatory, or other measues
taen toward implementing progr objectives. However, it is essential that reporting be made
convenient and easy, to ense tht failures to report are not mistaenly interpreted as failures
to comply.
Although there are no physical mechansms to monitor the compliance of Contractig
Paries in the Nort Sea region, the recommendations issued by the INSC and the Pars
Commssion inc1udea date and procedure for reporting on measures taen. Member states
report on the implementation of recommendations at the meetigs of the Contracting Paries.
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HELCOM is becoming increasingly effective at ensuring the compliance of its
Contracting Parties. Until recently, reporting on compliance was voluntary. The 1992 Helsinki
Convention has expanded the requirement to report on domestic implementation, as well as the
obligation to provide inormation on discharge permits, emissions, and environmental quality.
This information is now to be provided upon the request of a Contracting Part or the
Commission, thus improving the Commission's effectiveness in determining compliance.
The Mediterranean regional program is relatively ineffective in monitoring compliance.
Although the Barcelona Convention contains an article on "compliance control," it has never
been implemented. Thus, there is no effective, binding mechanism to assure the reporting or
verification of actions taken.
In the WCR, a regional protocol might contain reporting mechanisms as one way in
which to reduce the costs to individual parties of gaining information, negotiation, and
enforcement ("tranactions costs"). A regional verification authority, deploying environmenta
monitoring technologies, could be empowered to determne compliance in the event of a dispute
over whether or not a state has made good faith effort to comply.
5. Mechanisms for Trade
Trading mechanisms can faciltate the accomplishment of mutual goals in regions where
members' abilties and preferences vary. Where there are substantial differences in levels of
economic development, the tranfer of financial resources, technology, and inormation to
developing states may allow the region to achieve improvements in the mare environment that
would otherwise be impossible. Such transfers may also serve as inducements for states to adopt
goals and actions more in line with those of their parers. Trading can also improve the
efficiency of a regional program, if member states are allowed to exchange pollution reduction
responsibilties. None of the programs studied, however, has utilized mechansms such as
tradeable emissions quotas to increase program efficiency.
The Baltic regional program has been successful in utilizing the differing expertise of its
member states. The "lead state" priciple has called upon states with a comparative advantage
in deaing with particular substaces, sectors, or processes to be responsible for directing relate
progr intiatives. Ths inovation has provided Baltic states with access to expertise relevant
to the state-of-the-art technologies for paricular industral sectors. The 1992 Helsin
Convention reinorces the importce of inormation exchage by expanding the duties of the
Commission to include promoting relevant research and reciving, processing, and disseminting
relevant scientific and techncal inormation.
The Mediterranean program, with its diverse paricipants, presents many opportnities
for trade. The Mediterranean program has done the most of the four to transfer financial
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assistance and encourage capacity building among its members. Most information and
technology tranfers in the Mediterranean region have focused on environmental monitoring
programs, treatment plant design, and traing for economic policy personnel in the region's
developing states. The potential benefits of trade in the Mediterranean program have not been
fully realized, and other agencies have intervened to encourage and execute transfers.
Trading among member states improves a program's abilty to achieve the mutul goals
of its members. Trading mechanisms become increasingly importnt in regions with diverse
member states. A successful program explicitly recognis the differences in the endowment
of its members, and faciltates trading that allows each state to do what it does relatively best.
In ths report, we have developed a styliz model of bilateral trade in pollution control
to clarfy the opportnities for gains in the Caribbean (Appendix C). These opportnities are
diminshed to the extent that propert rights in a clean marine environment are obfuscated;
scientific, techncal, and economic inormation useful for characterizing marginal abatement
schedules remains undeveloped or is kept proprieta; barrers to negotiation among polluter
and pollutee remain in place; and trading relationships are weakened by indequate enforcement.
All of these hindrances to gain from trade are appropriate focuses for LBMP protocol
institutions .
6. Adequate Financing Features
The efforts involved in reaching, maintaing, and evolving regional agreement are costly
in themselves, and the measures required to implement program recommendations are much
more so. The inclusion of adequate financing mechanisms is therefore indispensable for
program success.
Financing of program organition and secretariat costs on the basis of equal
contrbutions or on shares pro-rated by economic capabilty (or with supplemental contributions
from host members) is simple and expedient as long as these costs are relatively modest. This
formula, however, does not take account of the relative staes, responsibilties, and capabilties
of the members with respect to the specific problem at hand. For example, both the percentage
of France's population in the Mediterranean coastal region and its share of economic capacity
in that region are less than one-thd of its required share of payments to support the program's
operating costs. Ths can lead to problems if, as in the Mediterranean, secretaiat and
adminstrative costs grow large. These problems may be exacerbate where fmancial tranfers
between states are involved and when the mechansms for these transfers lack transparency.
¡.
r
Implementation of measures agree to by the program, such as installation of sewage
treatment facilties and introduction of modern industral production or control technologies,
is a different problem. These measures wil cost orders of magmtude more thn cuupciative
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program expenses. Reliance on domestic financial resolve for compliance seems unavoidable,
although measures for international fincial assistace wil be needed where intra-regional
economic discrepancies are large. We have begun to see already an interest by the World Ban,
GEF, IADB, and UNDP in assisting in the financing of marine pollution control facilities in the
Caribbean.
The Baltic's Joint Comprehensive Programe (JCP) appears to offer a good example of
both flexible targeting of regional priorities and realistic consolidation of financial resources to
address those priorities. How successful it wil be in practice remain to be seen, and ths wil
depend significantly on success in mobilizing and managing fmancial resources. The use of
existing multilateral financial institutions in the region as executig agencies promises smooth
and competent fmancial mangement though well-understood mechanisms. Greater tranfers
(from west to east) wil be required in the Baltic, but the regional program can also help guide
the allocation of assistance from outside the region though externl intitutions such as the
World Ban, GEF, and EIB.
The Mediterranean program also has shown some success in shaping the fuding
priorities of external donor organitions, though to some degree ths has been in reaction to
intiatives outside the program arising in part because of dissatisfaction with the program's
effectiveness and lack of fmancial transparency. The Mediterranean Trust Fund mechansm has
not been notably effective in achieving regional program goals, though it should be
acknowledged that it was not intended to finance domestic implementation and capital investment
projects.
Based upon our analysis of the Baltic, Nort Sea, and Mediterranean cases, it has become
apparent that a key to effective finncing is to sustain the program's credibilty by keeping its
goals and recommended measures in line with the tre priorities of its members and by not
allowing its recommended measures to outstrip realistic fincial means.
In the Caribbean, program funding might build upon the foundation already established
though the CEP . We recommend that small steps be taen, starting with a focus on the
region's existing priority tranboundary marine pollution problems. If waranted, the program
and its resources can be expanded as experience in catalyzing subregional agreements is gained.
Ths kid of "ramping up" approach is more likely to elucidate relevant protocol "scale
economies" and to build confdence among Contracting Paries than a more grandiose effort
from the outset.
7 . Effective Decisionmaking Process
The means by which measures are adopted is likely to inuence the effectiveness of the
program. Seeking consensus ensures broad-based support for adopted measures but tends to
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drive the content down to a level that is palatable to the most reluctant parties (Sand 1991).
Although the compromises necessary to reach a consensus may demonstrate a high capacity for
political problem solving, they often result in ineffective pollution control measures. Strict
inistence on a unanious choice can be an obstacle to progress.
Conversely, measures adopted without consensus tend to be more substative, but may
also discourage a high level of consistent participation. Without consensus, and with no
supranational authority to enforce adopted measures, such an approach is likely to introduce
problems of non-compliance.
The approach adopted by the Paris Convention represents a feasible compromise.
Consensus is sought, thus building support for adopted measures. However, if the Contracting
Parties canot reach a consensus, measures are adopted by a thee-quarters majority vote. Thus,
Contracting Parties are not confined to the preferences of the least enthusiastic participants, and
an "opt-out" opportnity is available.
In the Caribbean, the trade-off between the level of participation in the program and the
level of action called for in adopted measures should be explicitly recognied and addressed in
light of a clearly articulated overall goal. Instead of focusing on consensus or majority
agreement over uniform stadards, the Contracting Parties might usefully decide on procedures
for clarifying the legal rights to a clean environment and reducing states' costs of inormation
gathering, negotiation, and enforcement. These procedures can then be applied in any particular
subregional case.
8. Adaptabilty Over Time
The abilty to adjust the program to changed circumstances and improved knowledge is
vital to its effectiveness over time. The method of keeping the framework convention quite
spare and leaving program elaboration to subsequent protocols and recommendations is useful
in ths regard. So, too, is the periodic oversight and intervention of high-level political authority
from among the paries.
All four programs exhibit relatively spare framework conventions, leaving program
elaboration to protocols and recommendations. The Baltic program introduces furter
adaptabilty by devising specific priority projects and tasks without the need to adopt formal
recommendations. Both the inormal and formal interplay between the INSC and the
Commission in the N ort- East Atlantic region help the Nort Sea program adapt to changing
circumstances and knowledge.
To a large extent, adaptabilty is related to decisionmaking rules. Reliance on consensus
hinders innovation and adaptabilty. Decision mechanisms that permit or specify variable
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timetables or the ability to opt-out or opt-in on particular measures, as in the Nort Sea region,
also enhance adaptabilty. So do mechansms that encourage the formation of subregional
compacts and projects, again as in the Paris Convention.
The constant public and political pressure assured though high-level political oversight
and involvement, as with the INSC and Baltic Ministerial meetings, encourages program
adaptabilty. So does pressure from NGOs and public interest groups that is faciltated by
program transparency and accessibilty.
Both the Baltic and Nort Sea programs have demonstrated adaptabilty with adoption of
revised 1992 conventions, but even greater adaptabilty would not require so fundamental a
change at the framework leveL. There is some evidence that the adaptabilty of the
Mediterranean program, and, by implication, tht of the Caribbean program, may be hidered
by their being embedded in the United Nations system. In the Med Program, for example, the
abilty to generate baseline data was hindered to some extent by the inclusion of all parties in
the study effort, rather than relying on research intitutions that were already functionig
effectively in the region (Broadus et al. 1993; Skjaerseth 1992). There is already some
indication that the CEPPOL program is following a similar approach and suffering simar
consequences (see Section II, especially footnote 6). Another intitutional problem encountered
by the Med Plan was a disagreement over funding between UNEP and UNDP, which caused a
thee-year delay in the implementation of a Priority Action Program (Broadus et al. 1993); in
ths respect, the negotiating parties would be well advised to learn what they can about the
experience to date of the GEF project on ship-generated waste in the WCR, which is a joint
effort of UNEP, UNDP, and the World Bank.
None of the thee earlier programs exhibits adaptive featues that specify uncertinties
or changed conditions whose resolution would lead to specific adaptation in the program. These,
too, would be useful features.
C. Dynamic Measures of Effectiveness
1. Level of Compliance
Program effectiveness is in part reflected in the proportion of issued recommendations
that are actually implemented by the Contracting Parties. If the program merely issues
recommendations that none of the parties adopts in practice, then the program may be deemed
ineffective.
Although Nort Sea states report on the measures taken toward program implementation
at the meetings of Contracting Parties, no coherent record of their comments is compiled by the
INSC or P ARCOM, making it is impossible to monitor the effectiveness of the program in this
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respect.
Mechanisms to monitor the compliance of Baltic Sea states have been put into place, but
it is stil difficult to draw any concrete conclusions on the present degree of compliance. The
available information indicates that only 12 of the 47 LBS recommendations issued between 1980
and 1991 have been implemented by Contracting Paries, implying that the regional program stil
cannot be considered completely effective in this respect.
It is very difficult to determine the degree of compliance with the Mediterranean
cooperative program. Despite the obligation to report on measures taen and results achieved,
Contracting Parties show a great reluctance to provide such information (Skjaerseth 1992).
Requests for inormation on land-based sources and domestic legislation have received little or
no response. Furtermore, there is evidence that most Contracting Paries have failed to adopt
domestic laws and legislation reflecting the provisions of the Athens Protocol and its Anexes
(UNEP 1991b). The available inormation suggests that the level of compliance is quite low.
Weare greatly concerned that if an LBMP protocol for the Caribbean follows along the
lines of the development of the Mediterranean program, that compliance wil be predictably low.
This lesson provides one of the strongest arguents for a subregional approach in which
downstream WCR states have imediate incentives to seek pollution reduction from upstream
WCR states and a forum to which they can turn, at low cost, to see that such reductions can be
implemented.
2. Achievement of the Program Goal
A regional program can be considered effective if the regional environment has improved
relative to the hypothetical situation that would have occurred without the regional program.
Knowing the intial environmental conditions that the pollution control program is designed to
alleviate is essential in this respect.
Following the agreement by states of the Nort Sea region to reduce pollutant emissions
by 50 to 70 percent by 1995, it appears that the goal of reducing pollution from land-based
sources is progressing toward being achieved. Although the physical evidence to support ths
conclusion is scant, there is a general sense among expert that there has been some
improvement in the Nort Sea environment. In fact, the Quality Status Report produced in
conjunction with the 1987 Nort Sea Conference noted that "the few sufficiently long time series
available indicate that with a few exceptions, containation has been reduced or at least has not
increased over the last decade" (as reported in Wettestad 1992).
There is some evidence that HELCOM has been effective in achieving its goal and
improving the condition of the Baltic Sea. According to HELCOM experts, the Baltic
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environment would have been much worse off in the absence of the Commission's activities
(Rodionov 1992). This view is corroborated by the official statement of the Finnsh Delegation,
which concluded that "the state of the Baltic Sea today is definitely better than it would have
been without the many efforts and concrete . . . measures of the Baltic Sea states" (Delegation
of Finland 1990).
There are no reliable time series data that would indicate changes in marine
environmental quality resulting from Med Plan activities. The best available inormation is
provided by UNEP's 1989 "State of the Mediterranean Marine Environment" report (UNEP
1989b), which gives a fragmented and uncertin account of the condition of the Mediterranean
environment. There is some evidence of localized improvements, but how these were inuenced
by the Med Plan is unclear. Interviews with regional scientists indicate that they feel that the
level of pollution has remained roughly constant over the last decade, while coastal population
and industr have grown steadily (Skjaerseth 1992). Thus it appears that the effects of increases
in population and industr may have been offset by the actions taen from 1976 to 1990. There
may thus be some basis for believing that the Mediterranean marine environment would have
been worse off without regional cooperation.
Progress has been made on characterizing baseline environmental conditions in the
Caribbean. Further research wil be necessary, and ths research should focus on marine areas
that are seen to be priorities in terms of the incidence of actual transboundary pollution effects
or acute localized problems.
3. Increased Domestic Abatement Effort
If a regional program is operating effectively, one would expect member states to engage
in greater pollution abatement efforts than they would without regional cooperation.
The pollution abatement efforts of the Nort Sea and Baltic states are probably at a
higher level than would have occurred in the absence of regional cooperation, especially with
respect to the adoption of the 50 percent emissions reduction target for the Nort Sea region.
It is reasonable to assume that no single state would adopt so strgent a measure without
reciprocal action from other discharging states.
Domestic abatement effort in the Mediterranean region are not obviously greater than
they would have been without the Barcelona Convention and its Protocols. It can be argued that
the effort of several states (specifically Greece, Albania, and Egypt) were affected by the
regional program, because they embarked on vigorous new public adminstrative campaigns to
integrate environmental considerations into traditional coastal zone development and economic
planng. However, many polluting states had established domestic environmental authorities
and legislation prior to the Med Plan's inception in 1976. Many actions taen during Med Plan
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years were taen at the domestic level and likely would have been taen anyway. Although the
Mediterranean would have been worse off without regulation, the Med Plan probably only
accounts for a minor part of the achievement witnessed (Skjaerseth 1992).
WCR states already recognie the existence of LBMP problems, and many have begun
already to develop the infrastructure, including the legal institutions and technological controls,
to begin to deal with these problems. An effective LBMP protocol would build upon these
nascent efforts, tang small but certin steps to move in the direction of pollution prevention,
reduction, and control.
D. Sumary
At ths juncture, it is not yet possible to evaluate the effectiveness of a protocol on LBMP
control for the Caribbean. We can, however, say somethg about the general features and
elements of a protocol that might be incorporated to improve its potential for effectiveness
(Table 25). The WCR resembles the Mediterranean as a regional sea, suggesting that many
lessons can be drawn from the Mediterranean experience. Experience with the control of LBMP
in other regional seas can provide useful lessons as well, paricularly in the areas of program
financing (Baltic), political commitment, (Baltic, Nort Sea), statements of goals (Baltic, Nort
Sea), targets and deadlines (Baltic, Nort Sea), and compliance (Nort Sea).
We argue, in this section, for a careful consideration and delineation of subregions, based
on shared LBMP problems of a localized nature, and, where relevant, transboundary pollution
effects. In the latter case, protocol mechanisms should build upon existing bilateral
arangements, if these are seen to be effective in themselves. A WCR protocol can also utilize
and build upon the resources and capabilties of existing intitutions for scientific research,
monitoring, and clearinghouse fuctions. These intitutions should be expanded, or contracted,
incrementally to determe their most appropriate and efficient scales of operation.
The rights of a state to a clean marine environment should be clariied with the
protocol, enabling staeholder states to seek beneficial reductions in actual or expected LBMP
from source states. The Contracting Partes should employ the protocol and its intitutions as
a forum with which the agreements to reduce LBMP, based upon transboundary effects or
common needs, are faciltated, thereby reducing transactions costs (see especially Appendix C).
The protocol should encourage states to adopt cost-effective intrments for pollution control,
including tradeable pollution permits, emission charges, or technology-based controls, where
theshold effects are apparent.
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APPENDIX A
Data Tables
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Table A. i
Ecoic and popaton Data for WCR Sta
Gros Domestic Prouct IGDPl' Population.
State T ota11991 Per caplta 1991 Avg. ann. Totl 199' Ann. Denty
(SUS millon) ($US) ~rowt rate Gro (pe~
~) 19891 (%) 1m km
95'
Anuill 47.4 680 6.5 680 0.6 75
Anaua-Barba" 424 660 1. 64 00 0.3 146
Arba" 85 1360 10.' 63 00 0.2 32
Bahamas" 260 10 20 3.0 24700 11 '8
Barbdos" 180 700 14.01 26 00 0.6 612
Belze 420 2165 9.0' 190 00 2.03 8.3
Bñtish Vil'in Is." 133 1060 2.0 1200 1. 80
Cavmn Is." 670 23 00 4.4 26 00 4.f 100
Coombia 41700 126 3.7 32 30 00 1.66 31
Cos Rica 563 1810 3.1 3 04 00 2.41 60
Cuba" 17 00 1 58 120.01" 1061000 0.89 96
Dominica 174 2100 2.1 85 00 1. 113
Dominican ReD. 7148 976 1. 7 170 00 1.98 148
Fr. Guiana" 421' 439' - 98 00 3.4 1.
Greda" 25 300 10.41' 84 00 10.41 247
Guadeloooe" 1100' 3 30 - 34200 0.8 194
Guamala 935 98 1. 9 20 00 2.88 85
Guvna 349 435 7.0' 80 00 0.94 4.1
Haiti 2641 39 io.n 6 490 00 2.03 236
Honuras 300 567 2.7 514000 3.00 46
jamaica 3497 1431 1.6 2 420 00 1.02 224
Martnlau" 200' 6 00' - 34 00 0.9 321
Mexico 286 628 3321 1.2 84 490 00 2.06 44
Monrr 73 580 13.5' 1200 0.3 120
Netlrltnd 1,40 7,60 1.5 183,00 01 191
Anlles
Nicaraaua 1736 456 11.91 3 68 00 3.74 29
Panama 554 2248 0.5 2.420 00 1.90 32
Puert Rico" 2280 620 2.t 3 30 00 0.1' 36
SL Kitt & Nevis" 142 350 6.8 40 00 0.3 147
SL Lua" 25 165 2.5 153 00 2.6 251
SL Vincnt f 17 1,50 3.ft 113,00 1.4 332Grene
Suñname 1941 4513 12.5) 420 00 1.86 2.6
Tñnlda & Tobo 4939 394 14.41 1 240 00 1.08 242
TUlU & Calco" 68.5 500 - 900 2.3' 21
Unit State 5610802 22 219 2.6 249 98 00 1.03 27
U.5. Viraln Is." 120 1100 - 99 00 10.31 28
Venezula 53441 2705 1.5 1932000 2.12 22
WCR
5~3r
Total:
~~.:44 45 00
'Src: WR1199 exæpl for contr wh note "b" appie.
"src: CIA 199 for polali. CIA 1992 for GDP.
'GNP.
'1987.
,. ab micte deit CN 22 inbi island of a io of abo 700 isnd; hoever, polali is heviy cotrled on New Pi, wh
de ap 700 peliml.
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Table A.2
land Areas, Coastlnes, and EEZ
Land 1-rea WCR Coastline' EEl
(km )' Km As % of YearState nm
total (~~ cllare
not 100
Anauila 91 61 NO
Antiaua & Barbuda 440 153 200 1982
Aruba 193 68.5 NO
Bahamas 10070 3542 NO
Barbados 430 97 200 -1979
Belize 22 960 386 200 1992
British Viroin Is. 150 80 NO
Cavman Is. 260 160 NO
Colombia 1 038 700 1760 55 200 1978
Costa Rica 50 660 212- 16 200 1975
Cuba 110860 3735 200 1977
Dominica 750 148 200 1981
Dominican Ren. 48 380 1268 200 1977
Fr. Guiana 89 150 378 200 1976
Grenada 340 121 200 1978
Guadelouoe 1760 306 200 1978
Guatemala 108430 8s" 22 200 1976
Guvana 196650 459 200 1977
Haiti 27 560 1771 200 1977
Honduras 111 690 591- 72 200 1980
Jamaica 10630 1022 200 1991
Martinioue 1060 290 200 1976
Mexico 1 923 040 2 070- 21 200 1976
Montserrat 100 40 NO
Netherlands Antiles 960 364 NO
Nicaraoua 129 240 478- 53 NO
Panama 75 990 624- 25 NO
Puerto Rico 6959 501 200 1983
St. Kits & Nevis 269 135 200 1964
St. Lucia 610 158 200 1964
St. Vincent & Grenadines 340 64 200 1983
Suriname 161 470 366 200 1978
Trinidad & Tobaoo 5130 362 200 1963
Turks & Caicos 430 389 NO
United States 9 166600 2 625- 13 200 1963
U.S. Viroin Is. 349 186 200 1963
Venezuela 862.050 2800 200 1978
NO not declared
'Source: CIA, 1994.
-Source: Wordmark Encyclopedia of the Nations: Americas. 1964.
'Source: Fenwick 1992.
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Stale Fish Non.Foo Uses Ash Expo Ash Imp Foo suppy fro fish
Catc
(metrto)
Metr As% Metr As% As%O( Metr As% Per Totl
Ton 0( Ton 0( Tol Ton O(Tota capi (metr
Catc Catc Foo Foo (kglyr) to)Su Sup!r froFi Fish
Anui NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Antiua & Barb 233 0 0 201 8.6 5.0 1.90 47.2 62.6 4,04
An 48 0 0 30 6.2 1.4 1,713 79.1 35.5 2,167Ba 764 18 " 1 4,08 53.4 65.8 2,33 37.5 24.8 6,2
Bar 4870 1,33 17.5 105 1.4 1.4 4,151 54.7 29.5 7,582
Bee 1595 0 0 766 48.0 54.5 575 40.9 7.6 1.40
British VlIln Is. 133 0 0 NA NA NA NA NA 86.0 1,33
Caym Is. 613 0 0 574 93.6 72 757 95.0 324 796Co 95,897 2 " 1 37,591 39.2 42.3 30,56 34.4 2.8 88,871
Cola Ri 20,64 0 0 17.191 83,3 113.3 11,72 77.3 5.1 15,172
Cu 203,85 37.38 18.3 2279 11.2 11.4 56,571 28.3 19.1 20.24000 667 0 0 0 0 0 8S 56.3 21.1 1,52
Oon Republic 18,26 0 0 1.182 6,5 2.0 41,50 70.8 8.4 58,58
Fre Guiana 6.28 0 0 4.20 67.0 90.0 2,352 50.2 49.3 4,676
Gre 1.832 5 "1 59 3.2 1.9 1,38 44.0 34.8 3.155
Guape 8.373 0 0 42 0.5 "1 8,279 49.8 43.4 16,610
Guatela 4.60 0 0 3,112 67.7 57.0 4,183 76.7 0.6 5.456
Guyna 36.242 0 0 3,471 9.6 10.6 0 0 41.3 32,771
Hait 7.867 0 0 166 2.1 "1 19,148 71.3 4.2 26,84
Honras 17.519 1 "1 13,53 773 26.0 2,03 40.0 1.0 5,123
Jam 10.33 0 0 432 4.2 1.0 34,65 77.8 18.7 44.56
Maniue 3,251 2 "1 20 6.3 1.4 11,96 79.7 42.1 15,00
Mexic 1.414.332 402,813 28,5 141,09 10.0 15.5 19.274 2.1 11.0 911,911
Montsl 115 0 0 NA NA NA NA NA 10.5 115
Nelh Antill 1,20 0 0 29 2.4 "1 3,60 75.5 27.3 4.77
Nicua 4,108 0 0 1,824 44.4 80.0 0 0 0.6 2,28
Pana 157.63 116,631 74 13,93 8.9 38.7 9,157 25.3 15.3 36,167
Pu Ri NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Sl Ki & Nev 1.700 0 0 221 13.0 11.6 424 22.3 45.1 1,90
Slluc 825 0 0 21 2.5 " 1 1,587 66.4 18.2 2,39
Sl Vinl & 6.302 0 0 5,700 90.4 496.0 54 47.5 10.8 1,149
Grenes
Sur 3.795 0 0 1,158 30.5 42.2 105 3.8 6.6 2,741
Tri & Tob 7.967 2 "1 1,351 17.0 10.5 6,2 48.6 10.6 12,90
Turs & Calc NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Unite Slales
. 4.269,416 1,072,802 25 88,070 20.7 27.7 1,30,60 41.0 6.8 3,196,614
Gul Cost" 737,582 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
US VlIln Is. 763 0 0 NA NA NA NA NA 7.1 763
Venue 315,69 21,96 7 27,23 8.6 10.2 337 "1 14.1 26,82
Table A.4
Selected Fisheries Data, 1990
So (exlo us data): FAO YeBrl Rsry 51sli 1992 (FAO 1993a),
's: Rsris of th Unied 5/B/85, 1992 (NOAAMFS May 199).
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Scientirc Associations and Member Insitutions in the WCR
Table A.6
Asation or Marine Laboralories or ih~ Caribhen
(AMLq
Belars Res Insilute or McGill University.Ba
Beud Biologica Staiion
Bitt En Field Swion. B V i
Cabisc Maren Biolisc Insiiuul. ÇUr2. NACa1i Ma Re Laboraiory. il
Ceie for Ei an Enviromeia Res.
Pu Rico
Ceir de Invesgacon de Biologia Marina.
Reblica Domicaa
Cetr de Invesgaon Y de Estudios A vanzados del
lPN-Unida Merda. Mexico
Cetr Univert.re Aniilles-(uyane. Guadeloupe
CCF Baan Field Staiion. Florida
Demel of Mare Science. UPR. Puerto Rico
Disver Bay Marne Laboratory. Jamaica
Esion de Invesigaciones Marina de Magaria.Vei
Laralorio Invesgacion Pesuera. Puero Rico
Fwion Citifica Lo Roques. Venezula
Intule or ~ar Affairs. Trinidad and Tobago
Iiitulo de Invesigacion Marina de PunlO de Beiin.
Colombia
lnluo Ooniico. Venezuela
Mar Sceo Celer. UVI. USVI
MOl Mar Laboratory. Florida
Port Royal Marne Laboraiory. Jama ica
Rosiel Scl of Marine and Atmospheric
Scien. U. Miami. Florida
Smiilian Troica Resrch InSlilute. Panma
Caribben Coatal Marine PrudiYily
(CARICOMP)
Funion La Salle De Cieoia Natues. Ven
Univeridad Simo Boliva. Ven
Foution CARMABI. Curacao
Bore Marine Parl
Univeida de Pan. Pan
INVEM Sata Mar Colo
Univerly of Co Rica
Insituto de Rocrs Natraes (IA). Nicagu
Smiilia Insitution. Cue Bo Cay. Beize
Hol Oi Marne Rese. Beiz
CINVESAV. Merda, Mexico
Univ. Nac. Auto. de Mexico. Puo Morlos. Mexic
EPOMEX. Campehe, Mexico
Insiiuto de Oclogia. Cuba
Univcriiy or ihe Wes Indies. Jamca
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Republic
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Souihe Asation or Marine Laboratores (SAML)
Regular Membe
Beict Esrine Resrc Labor-iiory. M D
Beud Biological Station for R=rc. Inc.
Oie Biological Labonitory. M D
Colee of ciIeson. SC
Daupl Islan Se Lab. AL
Due Univerity Marne Labonitory. NC
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Fl lniiiuteofTeclogy. FL
Fl Sla Univeriiy. FL
Gulf Co Rcs Laboratory. MS
Haoa Univety. VAHar Bra Ocraic Insiiution, FL
Hon POiDI Envirometa Laboraiory. MD
la Univeriiy, TX
Lo Univerties Marne Cortium. LA
Mot Mar Labolory. FL
Old Dooa Univeriy. V A
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Srri/ Envirota Re Ceter. MD
Soih Calin Wildlife an Marne Resrc
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Teu A&M Univeiy-Crp Christi. TX
Teu A&M Univenityai Galveson. TX
Texas Pari an Wildlife Dcrtmel. TX
Univerty of Florida (Manne ubonitory). FL
UDiverity of Florida (Witny uboniiory). FL
Univeristy of Georgia Marine Insitute. GA
Univeity or Miarr (RSMAS). FL
llniversity of Nort Calina-Cpc Hill. NC
Üï.iverty of North CArolina-Wilrrngton. NC
Univerity of Puo Rico. PR
University of South Carolina. SC
Univerity of South Florida. FL
Univeity of Souther Mississippi. MS
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Naiion Marine Fisheries Service (NM FS). Soth
Fisheres Center. Miarr. FL
NMFS-Beufort uboratory. NC
NMFS-ceson Laboratory. SC
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Nor Calina Scale Universiy. NC
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Resrch uborator. FL ,
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Appendix B: Estimation of Drainage Basin and Coastal Populations
A. Drainage Basin Populations
Estimation of drainage basin populations began with development of a drainage map for
the Wider Caribbean Region by cartographer Tamara Oshychny, based on existing drainage
basin maps for the Caribbean Sea and Atlantic Ocean (Oxford Atlas of the World 1992) and the
Orinoco and Amazon Rivers (The Times Atlas of the World 1985). The results were translated
to the UNEP map depicting the six CEPPOL-designated subregions of the Wider Caribbean
Region (UNEP 1994a) and are included here as Figure B.1.
For countries that lie only partially withn the drainage basin, the drainage map was
superimposed on country maps showing state/administrative divisions, and appropriate
proportions of division-level populations were totaled for each country. For each countr, the
sum was then calculated as a proportion of the total population reported for the same year by the
same source, and the proportion was applied to the 1990 population totals used throughout ths
report.
A comparable process was used in the cases of Mexico, Cuba, and the Netherlands
Antiles to determine the distribution \If drainage basin population across the two CEPPOL
subregions in which each is designated as lying. In the case of Cuba, however, which drains
virtally entirely toward the south, an adjustment was made to capture the heavy concentration
of population in the nortwest Havana area and the related discharge into Gulf of Mexico
waters.
The resulting drainage area estimates are reported in Table B.1.
Data sources: State/adnistatve division mas an populaon daa
Twelve countries and one overseas departent of France lie only partially withn the
Wider Caribbean drainage basin. These are listed on the next page with the sources that were
consulted for state/administrative division maps and population counts. Also listed are Cuba and
the Netherlands Antiles, for which drainage basin population counts were assigned to two
separate CEPPOL-designated subregions (as was also done for Mexico).
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Table B.l
Estimated Drainage Basin and Coastal Populations of the WCR States'
Subrcgion/$iatc Estimatc: Dr.lin,;i£c n..sin EsiilTlcd Coasl.i Populaiion
Populaiion 1990 199
(x 1(0) . (x 100)
Subreeion I 141,836 26,210
Cuba 6,02 5,941
Mexico 34,050 5,069
United Slates 101,760 15,20
Subreion (( 14,259 2,62 '
Beize 190 122
Costa Rica 1.488 632
Gualemala 5.244 -
Hondura 4.693 1,131
Mexico 591 422
Nicarain 920 88
Panama 1,133 230
Subreion (( 24,246 12.04
Bahama 247 247
Cayman Islands 26 26
Cuba 4.584 1,729
Dominican Republic 7.170 4.159
Haiii 6,490 1,895
Jamaica 2,420 1,341
Puerto Rico 3,300 2.640
Turk & Caicos Islands 9 9
Subre¡ion IV 1,629 1,188
An~uilla 7 7
Antil!ua & Barbuda 64 64
Bardos 263 125
British Vir~in Islands 12 12
Donúnica 85 85
Greada 84 &4
Guadeloupe 342 151
Martinique 340 235
Netherlands Aniilles 15 15
St. Kiiis & Nevis 40 40
St. Vincet & Grenadines 113 113
US Vir~jn Islands 99 99
Suhreiion V 49,171 9,825
Aruba 63 63
Colombia 29.700 1.603
Netherlands Antiles 168 168
Trinidad & Tobal!o 1,240 862
Veneniela 18.00 7,129
Subreion VI 1,28 562
F re Guian 98 83
Guyana 792 305
Suriname 394 174
WCR TOTAL 232,425 52,456
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Country Administrative map Population data
United States Broadus and Vartnov 1994" Statistical Abstract of the United
States 1993
Britannica Book of the Year
1994
Mexico James and Minel 1986b
Guatemala
Honduras
Nicaragua
Costa Rica
Panaa
Colombia
James and Minkel 1986
James and Minel 1986
James and Minel 1986
Worldmark Encylcopedia 1984c
U. S. State Dept. 1992d
James and Minkel 1986
James and Minel 1986
James and Minel 1986
James and Minkel 1986
James and Minel 1986
James and Minkel 1986
Britannica 1994
Britannica 1994
Britannica 1994
Britannica 1994
Britannica 1994
Britannica 1994
Britannica 1994
Britannica 1994
Britannica 1994
James and Minkel 1986
Britannica 1994
Venezuela
Guyana
Suriname
French Guiana
Cuba
Netherlands
Antiles Worldmark Encylcopedia 1984 Worldmark Encylcopedia 1984
"The Oceans and Environmental Security: Shared U.S. and Russian Perspectives, James M.
Broadus and Raphael V. Vartanov, eds. (Washigton, DC: Island Press, 1994). This source
includes a map showing U.S. state boundaries and the drainage basin of the Gulf of Mexico.
bLatin America, Preston E. James and C. W. Minel, with Eileen W. James. (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 5th edition, 1986). This source also includes population distribution maps for
individual countries, which were used as an inormal check on the methodology described above.
cWorldmark Encyclopedia of the Nations: Americas (New York: Worldmark Press and John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1984).
dBackground Notes: Panama (Washigton, DC, U.S. Departent of State, March 1992).
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B. Coastal Populations
Where necessary, coastal populations were estimated using several methodologies,
depending on the form and availability of data.
Populaons entrely within the coasal zone
The populations of the following island countries were deemed to be entirely coastal:
Anguila, Antigua & Barbuda, Arba, Bahamas, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,
Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Netherlands Antiles, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent
& the Grenadines, U.S. Virgin Islands.
Counes for which relean coasal populon daa were directly availale
For the United States, 1990 Gulf of Mexico coastal population was directly available (as
number of persons and as a percentage of U. S. total population) from the Statistical Abstract of
the United States 1993.
For 17 countries-Barbados, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic,
Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela-data were available from the World Resources
1992-93 Data Base Diskette. The data used for the coastal population estimation included 1980
coastal and total population and projected 2000 coastal and total population. For each country,
the proportion of coastal to total population was calculated for 1980 and 2000, the results were
averaged, and the average proportion (% coastal population) was applied to the 1990 total
population data used throughout this report.
Countries for which Caribbean coasal populaon was calculaed from availale daa on
total coastal populaon
For countries that also have coastlines outside the Wider Caribbean Region (i.e.,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama), data on the populations of
major cities (from Britannica Book of the Year 1994) were used to approximate the proportion of
a country's total coastal population (as reported in World Resources 1992-93 Data Base
Diskette) that is concentrated on the Caribbean coast. (Here, too, the relevant percentage was
then applied to 1990 population data for use in the study analyses.) For countries with no major
urban concentrations on the Caribbean coast (e.g., Guatemala, Nicaragua), state/administrative
division-level population data (also from Britannica 1994) were used instead of urban population
data.
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Countries/terrtories not includd in the World Resources Data Base, an countes
spaning two CEPPOL-dsignaed subregions
The coastal populations of Puerto Rico and Guyana were estimated from urban population
data (Britannica 1994) using a methodology comparable to the one described above for countries
with coastal populations along more than one coast. This method
was also used to estimate, in the case of Mexico, Cuba, and the Netherlands Antilles, the
proportions of the total coastal population residing in each of two CEPPOL subregions spanned
by these countries.
Finally, no urban or administrative-level population data could be found for French
Guiana. For purposes of this study, 85 % of the population was deemed to be in the coastal
zone, based on statements in various sources (e.g., James and Minkel 1986, U.S. State Dept.
Background Notes 1989, Worldmark Encyclopedia 1984) indicating that somewhat more than
four-fifts of the population of French Guiana resides in the coastal lowlands.
The resulting coastal population estimates are reported in Table B.l.
153
154
APPENDIX C
Opportunities for Gains from Trade: A Stylized Model
155
Appendix C: Opportunities for Gains from Trade: A Stylized Model
i. Introduction
The possibilties of gains from trade with regard to a pollution problem can be shown
clearly using a stylized model (Mäler 1990; Dasgupta 1982). We wil focus on the problem of
transboundary pollution effects between two states. i In this model, states have the legal
competency to enter into agreements to control pollution, and we assume that subnational agents,
such as industries or consumers, are not involved directly in the negotiations.2 Note, however,
that a negotiated outcome might involve the paricipation of subnational agents. For example,
two states might decide that the best way in which to resolve a transboundary pollution problem
is to create a market in pollution rights open to subnational agents from both states.
In order to ilustrate opportnities for gains from trade, we abstract from the real world
in another importnt way . We assume that the two states are strikng a bargain over pollution
control. After all, pollution control is the main focus of the proposed protocol. However, states
may find other reasons for entering into an agreement to control pollution. Even states that have
a legal right to a clean marine environment may be wiling to accept some level of pollution in
order to benefit in other ways, such as improved international relations or perceived increased
benefits to the state of a trading partner's economic development. For example, Mäler (1990)
cites studies by John Krtila and Alan Kneese which demonstrate that:
. . . at least along the U.S.-Canada and U.S.-Mexico borders, agreements on water and water
quality have involved 'trades' in areas other than the rather restricted area defined by the
environmental resource. The important point here is that there have been trades, although they
may not be directly visible.
We assume as well that, because of the strong directional nature of WCR current flows
(Gladfelter and Ogden 1994), there exists an "upstream" polluter and a "downstream" pollutee.
We believe that these assumptions characterize many of the potential transboundary pollution
problems in the WCR. Some localized "commons-type" pollution problems (where each state
is both a polluter and a pollutee) may exist in the Caribbean, particularly in shared rivers,
estuaries, or embayments. Gain from trade are possible in the commons context as well,
i This is known as the "producer-producer" externality problem of Coase (1960). Note, however, that where
smal countries are involved, income effects not unike those in a "producer-consumer" externality problem may
arise. See Baumol and Oates (1988) for details.
2 In reality, subnational agents could influence the negotiating position of the relevant states either by exerting
influence on their national governent or by opportnities provided though developing priciples of transnational
law. Putnam (1988) develops a political model of "two-level games in which a national governent negotiates at
both the international and domestic levels. Sand (1991) advocates "opening local remedies to foreign paries" as
one means for de-escalating transboundar environmental disputes.
156
although, for heuristic reasons, we wil not use the commons example here.3
Although we employ an economic model, and we identify an economically "efficient"
level of pollution in the context of the model, we wil not be overly concerned with calculating
"optimal" levels of pollution here. We are interested in characterizing the conditions under
which economic incentives exist for states to reallocate their resources in a manner that improves
the welfare of both states and, by definition, that of the relevant society as well. In ths sense,
"gains from trade" harness the economic self-interest of individual states to achieve a collective
end (cf., Ridley and Low 1993). We identify the potential roles of WCR states in Section V.
In Figure C. 1, we represent the hypothetical benefits and costs of a problem of pollution
control involving two hypothetical states, X and Y, at any point in time.4 Our analysis is static,
although it is possible to interpret the representation in Figure C.1 as the present values of a
flow of benefits or costs. State X is emitting a pollutant that has an impact on the waters of
state Y.5 State Y would benefit from a reduction in X's emissions according to the total benefits
curve displayed in panel a. In a typical case, total benefits of pollution control rise quickly at
first and then begin to diminsh as more and more emissions are controlled. Reduction of
emissions is costly for state X, and its total costs of reductions increase slowly at first and rise
more rapidly with increasing reductions. 
6
Panel b displays the slopes (marginal abatement schedules) of the total benefit and cost
curves in panel a. According to coasean logic, if we assume either that the legal rights to be
free of pollution have been assigned to Y or that rights to pollute have been assigned to X, then
the two states can realize gain from trade by bargainng to level p*. To see ths- point, consider
a case where X has the legal right to emit pollutants into the Caribbean Sea from land-based
3 Several analysts have examned the problem of international pollution control in the case of a commons. See
Braden and Bromley (1980) and Hoel (1991) for static analyses. Dockner and Long (1993) show in a theoretical
dynamc model that nations may approach an economically effcient level of environmental quality even when they
have not committed themselves to control pollution through an international agreement. What is required is that
the countries communicate before choosing levels of economic output and associated levels of pollution (i.e., they
engage in "cheap talk"). Chander and Tulkens (1992) develop a sharing rule that allows states to divvy up the
"ecological surplus" (gains from trade) and to allocate total abatement costs. Dockner and Long (1993) are skeptical
about the likelihood of approaching effcient outcomes where information is incomplete or nations are dissimilar in
economic characteristics.
4 Note that the information requied to construct these relationships can, in some cases, be diffcult to acquire
(see Section IV).
5 Dasgupta (1982) refers to this example as a "unidirectional externality." Unidirectional externalities are
distinguished from "reciprocal externalities," which could occur when nations pollute each other. We believe that
the case of transboundar land-based marine pollution in the WCR is best characterized as one in which there exists
some risk of unidirectional pollution impacts.
6 Note that this curve also represents the polluter's "demand" for pollution as an input into its production
processes (Baumol and Oates 1988; Seibert 1987). As such, it can be interpreted as a measure of the polluters
wilingness to pay compensation to a pollutee under a regime in which the pollutee has the right to a clean
environment. We discuss this in more detail below.
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sources. We start at point p'. Y would benefit by the amount Q+R from a reduction in
pollution from p' to p*. X would reduce pollution over ths range at a cost R. Y could afford
to pay X an amount equal to R7 plus some part of Q, and both states would have gained from
the bargain. Although there stil exists a measurable level of "pollution" at point p*, there is
no economic reason to reduce pollution to a lower leveL.
This stylized scenario requires two furter assumptions. First, transactions costs,
including costs associated with each state's gathering inormation about the benefits and costs
of pollution control, striking a bargain, and enforcing it, must be zero. The effect of positive
tranactions costs would be to shift the marginal abatement schedules for each state in the
relevant direction and by an amount proportional to the transactions costs each must bear
(Seibert 1987; Bromley 1986). We discuss ths in more detail below. Second, the effects of
compensation payments on the wealth of the states involved must be negligible. 
8 If these so-
called "income effects" are significant, the position of the marginal abatement schedules wil be
affected, perhaps in ambiguous ways, as trading taes place.9
II. Distribution of Propert Rights
Ignore for the moment the effect of transactions costs and income effects, and consider
the possibilty of gains from trade from pollution control in the Caribbean. The first thg one
must know is the nature and distribution of legal rights regarding pollution control. 10 If there
is no clear assigmnent of rights, then we can probably expect continuous disagreement over who
is responsible for pollution control.
Rules of customary international law, such as the "no-harm principle," assert that
polluting states have an obligation not to cause serious or significant harm to other states (HLR
1991). Such rules imply that states have a right to be free of marine pollution from others.
However, Boyle (1992) believes that such rules are "too general to afford useful guidance to
States in the control of land-based sources of pollution" (see also Churchil and Lowe 1985).
7 Note that, at the intemationallevel, ths payment could take many form: direct cash payments, subsidize
foreign loan, tied foreign aid payments, tranfer of pollution control technology, preferential access to fishing
grounds, among others. See Kimball (1994) for a list of additional suggestions.
8 We might expect that "income effects" are likely to occur. The reason is that if the pollution problem is so
smal that its resolution wil have a negligible effect on the wealth of the paries, then it seems unlikely that the
paries wil be motivated to resolve it.
9 For example, the extent to which a country may be wiling to pay for environmental protection may depend
upon its level of development. Moreover, the distribution of propert rights may affect the position of maginal
abatement schedules. The latter issue relates to whether or not the relevant par is income constrained. See
Mishan (1982) for an exposition of this issue.
10 The Coase Theorem does not apply unless propert rights are assigned to one of the paries.
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Another principle, that of "polluter pays," appears, superficially, to say that polluters
have the responsibilty to reduce emissions (or possibly to compensate others for adverse
impacts). In Appropriate Approaches, UNEP (1994c) has recommended that the polluter pays
principle be "phased-in" for the control of WCR land-based marine pollution, at least at the
domestic leveL. (However, ths principle was not incorporated explicitly into either UNCLOS
III or the Cartgena Convention. 
11) In general, the polluter pays principle refers to the
distribution of rights at the domestic level (Hunter, Sommer, and Vaughan 1994). It is not clear
that the principle could be applied between states, although Boyle (1992) suggests that
transnational institutions, such as civil liabilty treaties or international supervisory mechanisms,
might permit application of the principle.
Article 194(2) of UNCLOS III obliges states to ". . . tae all measures necessar to
ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so conducted as not to cause damage
to other states or their environment. . . . "12 Ostensibly, ths duty is clear in its requirement that
pollutee states have the right to a clean marine environment. However, Stevenson and Oxman
(1994) explain that provisions found in UNCLOS III with respect to the enforcement of
interntional standards on LBMP are weaker than many participants had hoped for. The reason
for ths weakness is a familar one:
One difficulty was that delegates to a conference on the law of the sea had doubts about their
competence to deal with activities on land that might cause mare pollution. Delegates to the
1992 Rio Conference, who suffered from no such disabilty, witnessed the diffculty of getting
states to agree to binding rules affecting significant activities on land.
We note further that the Law of the Sea Convention has not yet entered into "force for some
Caribbean states that are major sources of LBMP, including the United States and Venezuela.
The "Montreal Guidelines" 13 refer to obligations that states have with respect to
transboundary pollution flows (Meng 1987). Guideline 3 reads:
States have the duty to ensure that discharges from land-based sources within their territories do
not cause pollution to the marine environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
Note that these "obligations" do not have the status or legal force of an interntional agreement
or treaty. Even so, ths guideline, in combination with the customary "no-harm" principle and
the language in UNCLOS III, suggests that states have the right to a clean environment.
11 This principle has been incorporated into the 1986 Single European Act, implying that territories governed
by the Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom must abide by it.
12 Article 207 contains specific language referring to the obligation of states to prevent, reduce, or control
pollution from land based sources. This obligation extends to the marine environment within national jurisdictions
(Charey, 1994).
13 Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine Environment against Pollution from Lad-Based
Sources, UNEPIWG. 120/3 (1985).
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Here we wil assume that the international distribution of property rights is such that
"downstream" states have the right to a clean environment. 
14 Under this scenario, the extent
to which gains from trade exist may depend upon the existing level of pollution. Return to
Figure C.1, panel b. If the current level of pollution is pO, then state X would be forced by
law-costlessly under our assumptions, but probably not in reality-to reduce pollution at least
to p*. At any level below p*, X would be wiling to compensate Y to move back up to p*, if
this is permitted by law. Note that p* is efficient from the standpoint of society (both states in
our example). Society gain when X reduces pollution from p" to p*, but the distribution of
benefits from such a move accrue completely to Y (Y is not required to compensate X). Thus
there is no explicit "trade" or, therefore, "gain from trade" in the legally required move from
p" to p*. However, if the current level of pollution is pI, then gains from trade are possible
when X compensates Y to move to p*.
As suggested by the quotation from Stevenson and Oxman above, we may be dealing with
a difficult issue concernng the redistribution of assumed pollution rights. States have
traditionally benefited from using the ocean as a sin for the disposal of wastes from land-based
sources. Until relatively recently, this practice has been tolerated for the pragmatic reason that
it may have been much too costly to attempt to enforce nebulous customary rights to a clean
marine environment. In special cases, such as the Trail Smelter litigation,15 principles of
customary international law, such as "no harm," have been invoked to curb serious
transboundary pollution (Churchill and Lowe 1985). More recently, international conventions
such as UNCLOS III, and soft law, such as the Montreal Guidelines, have strengthened the legal
rights of downstream states. In the classic coasean model, when downstream states have clear
propert rights, the scenario involves a move from zero pollution to an efficient leveL. The
situation is different for what amounts to a switch in the distribution of propert rights from
polluter to pollutee: in ths kid of a situation, the polluter is required to shoulder the burden
of emission cuts to levels below its full emissions.
Another factor hidering the realization of gains from trade in this kind of model is a
complete understanding of state Y's marginl abatement benefits. In the absence of any actual
transboundar impacts, there are no benefits from pollution abatement, and, therefore, no
opportnities for gain from trade. On the other hand, risks of pollution effects may be based
upon complicated dose-response relationships or cumulative effects about which little is known.
If there is uncertinty about effects, then the marginl benefits of abatement may be more
accurately represented as a range intead of a line (Figure C.1, panel c). Negotiations over
pollution compensation might stil tae place using expected marginal benefits, but it is likely
that agreement wil be more difficult to reach than in the absence of uncertinty. This suggests
that there exist benefits to scientific research that help to elucidate the nature of the schedule of
14 We assume as well that we have a full understanding of the movement of pollution flows, the costs of
emission reductions, and the benefits of reduce damges on the downstream nations from such reductions.
15 United States v. Canada, II R.I.A.A. 1911 (16 April 1936).
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abatement benefits. 
16
Also of importnce are the international legal defintions of "pollution" and "pollution
control" . 17 Without a clear defintion of pollution and an understanding of the legal basis for
its control, it is likely to be difficult for trading opportnities to arise. Extant definitions of
pollution and its control appear broad enough to incorporate interpretations ranging from
UNCLOS Ill's restrictive defintion (possibly requiring increasingly stringent pollution control
as the "best practical means" at a state's disposal change over time) to the Cartegena
Convention's looser definition (callng merely for "appropriate measures"). Boyle (1992)
explain that "(o)ne of the objects of regional treaties is to identify what substances wil be
treated as causing 'pollution,' and in what circumstances." One benefit of a protocol would be
to give precise definitions to terms such as "pollution," as is commonly done through Anexes
listing "black" and "grey" substances, and to clarify opportnities for trade in pollution rights
as one "appropriate means" for pollution control.
III. Transactions Costs
After clarifying propert rights, the potential for lowering transactions costs is likely to
be one of the most importnt justifications for a protocol on land-based marie pollution in the
WCR. In general, it is possible to identify thee broad types of transactions costs. The first
type is that associated with inormation about the marginal costs and benefits of pollution
abatement. If such information is either highly uncertin or unequally distributed between the
states (or believed to be so by one or both states), then the potential for gains from trade is less
than otherwise. 
18 For example, in a survey of theories of bargaining delays, Kennan and
Wilson (1990) explain that "uncertinty about whether the gain from trade is positive requires
some inefficiency, either as delay or as a breakdown of negotiations." The clearinghouse role
of a protocol in providing scientific and techncal inormation and in channeling assistance to
develop such information can help to reduce the transactions costs associated with inormation
about marginal costs and benefits.
A second type of transactions costs concerns negotiations (or "contracting") between
states over pollution abatement. Model agreements, faciltation and arbitration services,
16 Note that Broadus et al. (1993) mae the important point that there exists an optimal level of "ignorance."
In other words, there may be decreasing returns to the supply, though scientific research, of information about
marginal abatement benefits.
17 Meng (1987) traces the evolution of the definition from the Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects of
Marne Pollution (GESAMP) in the late 1960s to the Stockholm Report and from there to UNCLOS II and regional
agreements such as the Caregena Convention. See also Kiball (1995).
18 Baumol and Oates (1988: 10) note that "(i)f both sides to such a negotiation try to outsmar one another by
devious strategies, an optimal outcome is by no mean certai." Maler (1990) explains a result from game theory
which states that if both states know the parameters of probabilty distributions that describe the position of their
respective schedules, then neither state has an incentive to outsma the other. This result was developed in an
international pollution context by Smets (1973).
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brokerage services, dispute resolution mechanisms, and other means of reducing negotiation
costs can enhance opportnities for gain from trade. These functions are among those that a
protocol might usefully incorporate or develop in order to increase effectiveness.
A third broad type of transactions costs are those associated with enforcement of a
negotiated "trade." These can include costs associated with environmental monitoring,
submitting to adjudication a complaint of a purported inraction, and imposing a penalty on the
state that deviates from an agreement. In their study of international compliance, Chayes and
Chayes (1993) argue for improvement of dispute resolution procedures, techncal and financial
assistance to developing states to enhance their capacities to enter into and comply with
agreements, and increased tranparency of domestic policy actions.
The existence of transactions costs, which may be closely associated with the incidence
of "burden of proof, " is an importt consideration. Historically, the burden of proof may have
rested with the downstream state. Examine Figure C.L, panel d. Consider the case in which
X has already controlled pollution to some level, perhaps for its own internal reasons. We start
at point pU. If the burden of proof rests with y, Y's marginal abatement benefits schedule could
shift downward, reflecting a decreased abilty to offer compensation to Y (Seibert 1987; Bromley
1986). The shift may be so large as to cause the "optimal" level of pollution, as perceived by
Y, to be greater than pU. This kind of scenario might occur in cases where enforcement is
problematic'9 and upstream states have been allowed historically to emit pollutants into the
marine environment.
An application of the "precautionary principle" implies that polluters. must shoulder
responsibilty for demonstrating that discharges wil not harm the marine environment (Hunter,
Sommer and Vaughan 1994). If the burden of transactions costs fall on X, its marginal cost of
abatement wil shift downward (Bromley 1986). We show this in Figure C.l, panel e. In panel
e, we show also the effect of the "polluter pays principle" as an upward shift in the marginal
abatement benefits schedule for Y (Mishan 1982). Such a shift might occur when Y's
wilingness to accept compensation, unconstrained by its wealth or "capacity" (see section V.D.),
exceeds its willngness to pay compensation if propert rights had been reversed. 
20 The net
effect of these two principles is to shift the optimum from p*, in the absence of uncertinty,
transactions costs, and propert assignment effects, to pl. As described above, this may imply
a movement, which does not involve any trades, from the unenforced outcome of p' to pl. To
the extent that burden of proof involves transactions costs, the opportnities for gains from trade
wil be enhanced through the reduction of these costs.
19 For example, Churchil and Lowe (1985: 248) explain that ti. . . there are no international agreements to
faciltate the bringing of claims for compensation by a national of one State who has suffered damage from pollution
emanating from another State. ti
20 In theory, wilingness to accept compensation should be the same as wilingness to pay compensation.
However, where unique marine resources, such as coral reef ecsystems, are at stake and where substantial
uncertainty surrounds the potential damages caused by LBMP discharges, wilingness to accept might well differ
from wilingness to pay. See Freeman (1992) for a general discussion of the issues.
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The extent to which transactions costs affect the marginal benefit curve wil depend upon
the nature of transactions costs as either fixed or varying with the level of pollution or pollution
abatement (Tietenberg, pers. comm., 1995). If tranactions costs are mostly fixed, e.g., costs
associated with a one-time negotiation, then the position of the relevant marginal schedules wil
be unaffected. If negotiation costs are large enough, however, then they may stil preclude the
desirabilty of pollution control. Furter work is required to examine the nature of transactions
costs in the context of trans boundary pollution in the WCR.
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